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1. Introduction  
The question that led to this dissertation emerged in autumn 2009, a year after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the outbreak of the latest financial crisis: Did nobody anticipate the 
crisis? And if there were people who did, why did they not advise caution based on their 
forecasts?  
Indeed, several people issued public warnings about the imminence of a financial crisis. 
Economists such as Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser (2004) or Paul Krugman (2007) stated 
before the emergence of the crisis that the amount of U.S. borrowing was dangerous, that the 
U.S. current account was unsustainable and that the dollar would collapse once this became 
evident to all.1 Robert Shiller wrote in the preface of the second edition of his famous book 
Irrational Exuberance that he worried about the high discrepancy between the skyrocketing 
U.S. stock prices and the modestly moving earnings of the stocks, i.e. of the underlying 
companies (Shiller 2005, p. 4-14).  
However, when analyzing the information flow before a crisis, it is important to 
identify how many of the academics’ warnings reached the industry and whether there were 
also practitioners that drew attention to the critical situation. There are examples of such 
practitioners, most prominently Meredith Whitney, a formerly unknown analyst with 
Oppenheimer, a mid-sized U.S. brokerage house. Whitney produced a strongly negative 
report on Citibank that was issued on October 31, 2007, and led to an uproar in the market 
and a consecutive downgrade of Citibank by the majority of other analysts covering the stock. 
Whitney was able to raise her voice and to be noticed, which finally disciplined the herd of 
optimistic forecasters for Citigroup. After she guided the investors’ attention to the toxic 
assets2 on the bank’s balance sheet, the credibility of analysts arguing the contrary shrank 
drastically (Hong and Kacperczyk 2010, p. 1685). So, why did more analysts not raise caution 
flags in the period before the crisis? Did only a few of them see the upcoming disaster? 
The answer might lie in a less well-known but even more interesting case. In early 
2007, Ivy Zelman, an analyst with the U.S. investment banking division of Credit Suisse, 
                                                
1 An extensive review of the literature is provided in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, Part V.)  
2  The term toxic assets defines financial assets that have become illiquid, a condition which typically 
accompanies a strong decline in their value (see, e.g., Longstaff 2010). 
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started to downgrade the stocks of the construction and building supplier sectors she covered. 
In the following months, she was heavily criticized by both the managers of the downgraded 
companies and by sales persons from her own brokerage unit of the bank. Some sales 
representatives urged her to upgrade the stocks again and one even sent her an e-mail 
“warning that analysts who stayed bearish3 too long often lost their job” (Robinson 2009, p. 
33). At that moment, Zelman faced severe costs for not going with the herd. Had she followed 
the prevailing opinion of her colleagues and the CEOs of the companies she covered, it is 
likely that nobody would have asked her to justify her decision. “It was no fun being the 
bear”, Ivy Zelman said two years later in an article in Bloomberg Markets Magazine 
(Robinson 2009, p. 34). In May 2007, she resigned from the bank to start her own 
independent brokerage house. When the “meltdown of the U.S. subprime market” began in 
summer 2007 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, p. 199), Zelman’s call on the U.S. construction and 
building supplier sector turned out to be absolutely right. Economically speaking, Zelman 
faced major costs, from subtle psychological pressure to the threat of losing her job when she 
issued a forecast that was correct but went against the prevailing opinion in her organization 
and the market. These costs can be collectively termed the costs of non-herding. 
What are the characteristics of such costs of non-herding and where do they come 
from? A first answer to these questions can be illustrated with an interview given in May 
2011 by Brady Dougan, the CEO of Credit Suisse. Dougan stated in the interview that he had 
serious problems explaining to investors and even to some of his own colleagues why the 
bank’s investment in the U.S. mortgage market had not been larger in spring 2007 
(Binswanger and Gimes 2011, p. 18):  
“The crisis confirmed the, per se, simple insight that people tend to behave like a 
herd. That was before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. Human nature is 
pro-cyclical and in particular in our business. Everybody wants to go there where 
everybody else sees success. In the year 2007, the head of our U.S. mortgage 
business was reproached from investors why he did not make as much money as 
Lehman Brothers4. That is the toughest task for a management: Not to lose one’s 
                                                
3 Being bearish or a bear is financial markets’ slang for expressing a pessimistic or cautionary view about the 
future of the markets, a stock, or a certain investment; it means the opposite of being bullish or a bull, i.e. 
expressing an optimistic view of the future.   
4 Before filing for bankruptcy on September 14, 2008, Lehman Brothers was the fifth largest investment bank in 
the world and one of the largest investors in the U.S. subprime mortgage sector, generating an extraordinary net 
revenue increase of 10% on the level of USD 19.3 billion, while Credit Suisse had to digest a decline of almost 
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head in such a situation, keep on being critical and to convince the colleagues that 
it is the right way to hold off.”  
On the question if one has to go against the tide, Dougan responded:  
“First, the markets did not reward our change in the investment banking strategy. 
However, as in 2008 the crisis broke out, everybody asked to do business with us. 
[…] Now it has been said that we are the best and the most secure bank, because 
we did not need any help from the government.”5 
Dougan’s answer reveals several interesting features of the situation before the last financial 
crisis (and before a crisis in general) that can help to explain the absence of people raising 
their voices and advising caution. First, it is always more difficult not to go with the herd than 
to do what everyone else is doing. Second, the more successful a herd becomes during a 
certain period, the more will people who stay outside of the herd come under pressure to join 
the herd. Third, ex-ante, nobody knows if staying aside the herd will benefit the loners, but 
the latter have instant costs in justifying the action to others and to themselves. These features 
are central to the costs of non-herding and to the question of how these costs can induce the 
pressure on the individual to go with the herd. Surprisingly, as Dougan remarked, even 
powerful CEOs of large multinational companies face the costs of non-herding when 
deviating from the crowd. 
It is important to make clear that deviating from the crowd is not always an ingenious action. 
In contrast, the “wisdom-of-crowds” can be an important tool for estimating a future outcome 
(Galton 1907; Lorge et al. 1958; Surowiecki 2005). Yet, to achieve a wisdom-of-crowds 
effect when aggregating the private information of individuals, the information has to be 
independent of the impact of others. In contrast, social influence distorts the efficiency of 
information aggregation. By providing private information to others, an individual exerts 
informational externalities and can bias their assessment of a future situation; but an 
individual might also exert a positive influence, as in the cases of the two analysts, Ivy 
Zelman and Meredith Whitney. On average, it has been shown by experiments that social 
influence tends to undermine the wisdom-of-crowds effect by reducing the diversity of 
                                                                                                                                                   
7% down to USD 18.9 billion in its investment banking business (see, e.g., Lehman Brothers Annual Report 
2007; Credit Suisse Annual Report 2007; Fernando et al. 2012). 
5 The interview was released in German in a Swiss news magazine (Das Magazin). The interview excerpts have 
been translated by the author and cross-checked by an external copy-editor. 
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opinions in a group, resulting in biased information aggregation (Lorenz et al. 2011). 
Therefore, institutional factors are essential to keeping information providers in organizations 
and markets as independent as possible.  
Finally, in reactive markets, in which opinions and forecasts can lead to self-fulfilling or self-
defeating prophecies, distortions due to the costs of non-herding are exacerbated. In such 
markets, reactivity causes the problem that forecasts prompt people to change their behavior, 
and this change in behavior then influences the actual market outcome. As the forecasters try 
to predict the market outcome, they face the problem of forecasting a target that is moving 
endogenously due to their own forecasts. The self-fulfilling and self-defeating mechanism that 
a prophecy can trigger in any anthropogenic6 system biases the incentives of the forecasters in 
two different ways (Morgenstern 1928; Merton 1936; 1948). Firstly, if it is assumed that a 
majority of congruent forecasts can cause the market participants to react in the predicted 
way, the herd of forecasters can induce a self-fulfilling prophecy. Under such circumstances, 
the forecasters that aim at staying outside the herd face even higher costs than without 
reactivity, as the herd’s forecast will become the actual outcome due to the market 
participants' reaction to it. Secondly, in the case of a self-defeating prophecy, for example the 
prediction of severe unemployment, the forecasters' incentives to issue a cautionary forecast 
are vitiated due to reactivity. The reactions of the market participants can ruin the forecast's ex 
post accuracy even though ex ante the forecast was correct. For instance, employees take 
measures to evade the predicted unemployment; they might accept wage cuts or similar 
actions. Thus, the self-defeating prophecy curbs the forecasters’ incentives to release such 
cautionary forecasts. The forecasters will anticipate low forecast accuracy when their 
predictions are assessed ex post by the market participants and, hence, will refrain from 
issuing cautionary forecasts even if it was ex ante correct. 
The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, the thesis analyzes institutional factors of 
organizations that can help prevent herding behavior by reducing the costs of non-herding for 
individuals. The literature on herding behavior remains largely silent about institutional 
factors, such as an organization’s ownership, hierarchical structure, or wage policy, which 
might lower employees’ costs of non-herding. A comparative analysis is employed to identify 
useful institutional factors. Second, the problems for forecasters in reactive markets and the 
resulting distortions for the market participants are discussed from the perspective of various 
areas of the social sciences. A new institution for reactive markets is proposed that helps to 
                                                
6 Anthropogenic systems include all markets in which the actions of human beings influence the actual outcome.  
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reduce the pressure to herd and to provide a more balanced informational environment in such 
markets. Furthermore, a comparative analysis is conducted of markets with different levels of 
reactivity, and the influence of reactivity on forecast accuracy as well as on herding behavior 
is investigated empirically. The analysis exploits the difference in the level of reactivity in 
three markets: the market for weather forecasts, for financial forecasts, and for art price 
estimates. While in the case of the non-reactive weather the forecasts cannot influence the 
actual outcome, the forecasts in the cases of the reactive financial and art markets influence 
the final result.  
The effects of herding behavior in organizations (e.g., Janis 1972; Strasser and Titus 1985; 
Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Garicano and Posner 2005) and on markets (Kindleberger 1978; 
Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001; Salganik et al. 2006; Akerlof and Shiller 2009) has been said 
to be detrimental to the efficiency of market outcomes and of decision processes in 
organizations. Therefore, insights into how to lower the pressure to herd by reducing the costs 
of non-herding for employees might interest managers that aim to improve the informational 
resources in their companies. In addition, regulators might be interested in reducing the costs 
of non-herding for employees of information providers in financial markets by insisting on 
the presence of important institutional factors of such organizations. Finally, investors and 
customers can reduce the problem of herding behavior in financial markets by carefully 
selecting banks or brokers with favorable institutional factors. In general, informing financial 
market participants about institutional determinants of banks and brokerage houses that lead 
to more unbiased and balanced information provision might help to prevent future crises (see, 
e.g., The Economist 2009). Furthermore, the study on reactivity is intended to draw attention 
to the exuberant assumption that more data and faster information processing will improve 
forecasts to full accuracy in anthropogenic markets. Additionally, the insights provided into 
the interplay between reactivity in markets and forecasters' reputation may raise the awareness 
of market participants about how reactivity can deteriorate the ex post assessment of 
forecasters’ accuracy. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of 
the history of research on herding behavior across various fields from psychology to 
sociology to media research. The emphasis is placed on the social sciences and in particular 
on economics. Chapter 3 discusses how institutional and individual determinants of the costs 
of non-herding can help to reduce herding behavior in organizations. The theoretical 
propositions are reviewed with a qualitative analysis of twelve in-depth interviews with 
  6 
directors, highly ranked executives, and security analysts from various kinds of financial 
services companies. The interviewees make clear that an adjustment of certain institutional 
determinants should be able to reduce the costs of non-herding in organizations. They support 
the propositions of flatter hierarchies, less centralized structures, increased private ownership, 
a reduction of performance-related salary components and a more independent risk 
management. Chapter 4 quantitatively tests one of the aforementioned institutional factors, 
ownership structure, with a large data set of earnings estimates of security analysts. The data 
consists of more than one million observations between 1999 and 2008. The evidence 
indicates an economically and statistically significant effect of a brokerage’s ownership 
structure on the propensity of its analysts to engage in herding behavior. Chapter 5 provides a 
theoretical introduction to reactivity and its effects on forecasting in a broad range of 
anthropogenic markets and non-human systems. In addition, the proposal of a new forecasting 
institution that acts as the devil's advocate in highly reactive markets is developed and its 
usefulness explained. Chapter 6 tests the propositions of Chapter 5 in a comparative 
institutional analysis comprising three forecast markets with different levels of reactivity. The 
analysis employs forecast data from the non-reactive weather system, in which the forecasts 
do not influence the actual outcome, and data from the reactive art and financial markets, in 
which the forecasts influence the outcome they try to predict. The study delivers empirical 
evidence that the vast increase in data availability and information-processing technology 
does not improve the forecast accuracy for anthropogenic market outcomes. In contrast, in 
non-human systems such as weather, enhanced data availability and faster processing 
techniques have increased the forecast accuracy significantly. In addition, the evidence 
presented in Chapter 6 shows that the level of reactivity influences the herding behavior of 
forecasters in anthropogenic markets and that forecasters with a high reputation can use their 
reputation to induce biased herding forecasts. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes and critically 
examines the results and the limitations of the studies provided, reconsidering the 
implications for economics, market participants and regulators and suggesting directions for 
future research.   
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2. Literature on Herding Behavior and Related Concepts7  
The scientific literature on herding behavior is immense. Every area of the social sciences 
bears treatises on the topic, sometimes using closely related terms such as conformity, mass 
psychology, or group or collective behavior. Even in sociobiology or in fields such as 
computer science, the topic is intensively scrutinized. Yet, each of the individual areas are 
mostly silent about the research done in other fields. This literature review aims at combining 
and integrating the various areas that treat the topic of herding behavior in the field of the 
social sciences, focusing on the area of economics. To reasonably perform this task, only the 
most important milestones can be considered. However, the literature review provides an 
extensive interdisciplinary overview on the topic of herding behavior, organized in 
chronological order for a better understanding of the gradual development in the various areas 
of the social sciences.  
Two of the earliest contributors in the research on herding behavior and the psychology of the 
crowd were the French sociologist Le Bon (1895) and the political economist Veblen (1899).8 
In his book La Psychologie des Foules, Le Bon describes the sociopolitical dangers and risks 
evoked by human herding behavior. He defines the “crowd” from a psychological point of 
view, stating that “the crowd is always dominated by considerations of which it is 
unconscious” (Le Bon 1895, p. 6). In contrast, the economist Veblen, in his book The Theory 
of the Leisure Class, analyzes the herding behavior of different social classes with regard to 
their consumption. The various “social herds” try to distinguish themselves by consuming 
similar products which they know that a lower social class cannot afford to buy or to use. 
Veblen uses the example of a woman’s dress that is so conspicuously voluminous and 
impractical that it should be avoided and seen as pure waste. Yet, a social class which has 
                                                
7 This chapter draws on two papers written jointly with Bruno S. Frey (Cueni and Frey 2012; forthcoming). 
8 Of course, there exist earlier descriptions of herding behavior in markets, one of the most prominent one being 
Mackay’s “Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds” (1841). Mackay describes the frenzy 
in the market for tulips in the Netherlands between 1634 and 1636, the peak of the tulip bubble. However, these 
treatises do not analyze but rather merely describe the incidence of herding behavior. Garber (2000) provides a 
critical analysis of Mackay’s work and an insightful essay of early price bubbles that misleadingly have been 
attributed to frenzies due to wrong or wrongly interpreted records of older works and chronicles. 
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enough economic resources to invest in such dresses and, hence, to render their wearers 
unable to perform any manual labor is using the dresses to distinguish itself from another 
class that cannot afford to do so. From this economic perspective, individuals are conscious of 
their actions in forming a herd, as they derive utility from doing so, and are not unconscious 
as in Le Bon’s treatise. 
After the Second World War, scholars turned again to research on human herding behavior. In 
the fifties, Leibenstein (1950) takes up Veblen’s (1899) idea on mass consumption and 
develops the theory of the bandwagon effect, due to which people tend to go along with what 
others do or think although they as individuals would act or think differently. In other words, 
they jump on the “bandwagon”9 (Leibenstein 1950, p. 184). 
At around the same time, Asch (1951) provided the first experimental evidence on the herding 
behavior of individuals with his seminal group experiments and thus invented a new chapter 
in sociopsychological research in this field. In Asch’s experiments, there was usually a group 
of eight male students consisting of an “instructed majority” of seven individuals and a single 
“critical subject” (Asch 1956, p. 3-4). The instructed majority sometimes provided obviously 
wrong answers so as to create a situation in which the critical subject, who was not informed 
about the acting of the instructed majority, was forced to disagree when he intended to give an 
objectively correct answer. The critical subject was mostly placed as second last respondent 
of the whole group. The experiments showed that individuals (critical subjects) conform even 
to the obviously incorrect opinions of a majority. Asch inferred that social pressure due to the 
face-to-face communication in the experimental sessions triggered the participants' herding 
behavior. However, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) re-conducted Asch’s experiments but 
eliminated the face-to-face contact between participants. They demonstrated that it was the 
informational effect of prior responses rather than Asch’s social-pressure effect which was the 
dominating force behind the herding of the participants.  
Later research integrated this idea and showed that the critical subjects’ conformity with the 
majority could be rationalized by the subjects’ assumption that all the other participants had 
no incentive to lie. Thus, following this assumption, the probability of seven wrong answers 
in a row – although the correct answer seems so obvious – was perceived to be very low. 
Paradoxically, this calculation led to a different explanation of Asch’s findings. The 
                                                
9 A bandwagon was at that time a marketing instrument. It was a wagon on which a band was placed to play 
songs and which was pulled through the streets to attract peoples’ attention to the banners on and around the 
wagon. In particular, this form of advertisement was used during political campaigns; “to jump on the 
bandwagon” means to join a certain political party or to support a candidate. 
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participants did not herd due to the social pressure to conform but due to their rational 
inference that they must have missed an important fact in the experimental situation or that 
they have been subject to an optical illusion, since the experiments were visual tasks. Hence, 
one can argue that the participants exhibited the high level of herding behavior in Asch’s 
experiment because the answer of the instructed majority was so obviously wrong and not 
although it was so wrong. The subjects’ conformity is mostly not due to pressure from the 
instructed majority but due to the rational analysis by the critical subject that the answer of the 
other seven must be true, as any other explanation seems to have a very low probability 
(Shiller 1995, p. 182-183). Indeed, if Asch had not told the seven members of the instructed 
majority to give the wrong answer, it is credible to assume that they would never have 
provided such wrong answers, or at least not so many of them. Indeed, in a control treatment 
without an instructed majority, more than 99% of all answers were correct. From this point of 
view, Asch’s experiment could be seen as an example of the credulousness of individuals in 
not anticipating the biased information provision of the other participants due to distorted 
incentives rather than a case of conformity induced by social pressure. 
Both Festinger (1954) in his social comparison theory and later Bandura (1965; 1976) with 
the social learning theory developed positive views of herding behavior, since imitating can 
also lead to learning; today, economists use social learning theory in their work on herd 
behavior (see, e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). The difficulty is that social learning can lead 
to positive outcomes when the correct actions of others are imitated, or to negative outcomes 
when the wrong actions are reproduced. This difference is important for research on herding 
behavior, as the observation that people follow others in their actions can imply an inefficient 
imitation or an efficient adaptation. While the term herd behavior usually bears on the first, 
negative case, social learning usually refers to the latter, positive one.  
In sociology, Granovetter (1973) developed a threshold model explaining the non-linear 
characteristics of herd behavior such that there exists a threshold of net costs to the individual 
above which the individual is no longer willing to bear the costs of not going with the herd. 
Hence, costs exceeding such a threshold trigger the adoption of new trends. Below the 
threshold, no such adoption takes place, not even gradually. Burt (1982) advanced research on 
herding behavior by studying peer groups. According to his theory of social networks (based 
on Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance 1957), individuals tend to compare themselves 
with others, who are similar to them but differ in the factor in which they are interested. If 
such similar others (i.e. peers) engage in identical actions, similar individuals tend to follow a 
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herd of their peers. According to Burt’s theory, individuals do not seek to follow a random 
person; instead, they follow a definable “group of similar others” (Marsden and Friedkin 
1993, p. 129). Based on this literature, three social-psychological concepts emerge that are 
important for the study of the herding behavior of employees in organizations. 
Janis (1972) formulated his groupthink theory of conformist behavior during group 
deliberation processes, and it is a concept that is still in use (Baron 2005; Bénabou 2013). It 
suggests that participants in group decision processes miss important alternatives because 
they do not deliberate or discuss the “usual” solutions critically enough because they are 
pressured to conform so as to avoid conflict among the group members. Janis (1972, p. 209-
216) describes some institutional factors which can be used to lower the pressure to conform 
on individuals in decision groups, for example establishing several independent groups 
working on the same problem, or assigning the role of critical evaluator to every team 
member.  
Based on the problems of groupthink, the field of diversity research started to evolve during 
the eighties and provided a different perspective on herding behavior: more diverse teams, 
with respect to gender, education and social background, were assumed to make better 
decisions in crisis situations than more homogeneous teams (Bantel and Jackson 1989). Early 
empirical surveys supported this view, suggesting that members of more diverse teams 
process similar information in more diverging ways and, hence, were less prone to herd 
behavior. Subsequent studies, however, challenged this view and took a more critical 
approach to diversity and its impact on conformity and herd behavior. In particular, they 
provide evidence that mere diversity is not key to better group outcomes and that the context 
and conditions under which diversity is favorable remain unclear (Ely 2004). 
As early as the seventies, Noelle-Neumann’s (1974; 1984) theory of the spiral of silence 
described a further phenomenon in opinion research: In a dynamic process, various players 
start to adopt the opinion they assume to be the future majority opinion, even though 
personally they may have contrary views. According to Noelle-Neumann’s explanation, the 
players do so because they try to avoid conflict and do not want to feel isolated and perceived 
as mavericks. This theory has been applied to financial markets (Aspara et al. 2008), as well 
as to organizational theory (Bowen and Blackmon 2003). 
From an economic perspective, herding behavior can be studied by analyzing payoffs and 
network externalities. Interestingly, a first example of an analysis of a payoff interaction 
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between rational and truly selfish individuals stems from sociobiology. Hamilton’s (1971) 
study of selfish herds reveals that the clumping of animals is an indirect outcome of the 
selfish behavior of each animal in trying to put another member of the herd between itself and 
a predator. As in the case of decision making in teams, individuals avoid being outside the 
herd. As long as an individual goes along with the opinion of the majority, he or she can hide 
in the herd. In particular, if the decision turns out to be wrong ex post, the individual shares 
the blame with all others. This herd behavior serves as an individual risk-reducing strategy 
that involves negative externalities to the other individuals in the organization. 
In the late eighties, the topics of herding behavior and resulting negative externalities were 
revisited. An analysis of lock-in effects showed that a whole industry could adopt certain 
standards although they were not the best ones in either technical or economic terms (Katz 
and Shapiro 1985; David 1985; Frank and Cook 1988; Arthur 1989). Due to the negative 
externalities exerted by the firms that follow the (suboptimal) standard, the other firms are 
also pushed to adopt the same standard; if they refuse to, they face various problems in the 
sales markets. For example, their sound storage medium will not fit a widely used music 
player due to different standards. 
In the nineties, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) as well as Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et 
al. (1992) advanced the topic of herding behavior in economics.10 Banerjee and Bikhchandani 
et al. explain the herding behavior by information cascades, in which rational agents follow 
the strategy of the first mover in a sequential game and ignore their own private information. 
As a result, information-based herding can occur although the players have contradictory 
private information. In contrast, Scharfstein and Stein’s model follows the logic of principal-
agent problems and, hence, describes a reputation-based herding of employees.  
Firstly, models based on information cascades nicely show the negative externalities of 
herding behavior. After randomly occurring, congruent actions by two or more successive 
players, the cascade begins to evolve and the players’ private information is no longer taken 
into account in their decision process (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Such 
information-based herding-models have been amended by introducing information costs, 
imperfect information about the decision process of the other players, heterogeneous 
possibilities in decision making, and adaptive markets (see, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. 1998; 
Avery and Zemsky 1998). However, this strand of the economic literature is important as 
                                                
10 See also Chamley’s (2004) extensive overview on herding behavior and social learning that focuses on 
theoretical models of the phenomenon. 
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informational cascades demonstrate how information can be lost. This happens because the 
first mover in a cascade makes a decision randomly, whereas the following movers ignore 
their private signals and imitate the decision of the first mover, assuming that he or she had 
better information than they did. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) show how availability cascades 
can have a similar effect to that of information cascades. For example, availability cascades 
related to the publicity of an investment opportunity reveal that the larger the amount of 
favorable publicity (without any new information), the more funds can be raised for an 
investment project, although there is no objective reason to favor this specific project over 
another.11 Kuran and Sunstein also show how availability cascades occur in the political 
process of opinion formation and similar herding processes.  
Secondly, reputation-based models connect the mechanism of hiding in the herd and the 
agency problems between supervisors and subordinates or clients and managers. The strategic 
actions of employees, who want to push their careers or gain a higher reputation, can evoke 
harmful herding behavior in organizations (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Prendergast 1993; 
Zwiebel 1995).12 Scharfstein and Stein provide a seminal model that considers two managers 
whose abilities are not known by any observers (e.g., clients or supervisors). Instead, 
observers infer the managers’ abilities by comparing the investment decisions of the 
managers. After each period, the observers update their information according to the 
investment payoffs from the managers’ strategies. The managers are paid based on the 
observers’ assessments of their abilities. The outcome of the model is always that one 
manager follows the other’s lead. The strategy thus results in a loss of information, because 
the manager that follows ignores his or her private information. As the observers do not 
know, ex ante and ex post, what they should expect as the best investment strategy, they 
compare the two managers. As long as the managers take the same action, neither of them is 
blamed for a bad payoff. The managers act rationally and use the herd as a risk-sharing 
mechanism.  
                                                
11 As attention and not only availability is included in the concept, it is also called attention cascades in the 
literature (see, e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh 2010, p. 159; Kim and Meschke 2013, p. 1) 
12 Here we do not think of a harmful action inside the organization, which might be subject to legal issues and 
would make the case for whistleblowing and not only a case of non-herding or speaking up. Although 
whistleblowing is a closely related topic, we do not consider it here. We follow the argument of Premeaux and 
Bedeian (2003, p. 1538) and define speaking up and non-herding as evolving “from a desire to improve an 
organization by suggesting different approaches” rather than evolving from “perceived violations of personal 
principles,” as in the case of whistleblowing (Miceli et al. 2008). 
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Zwiebel’s (1995) extension makes the reputational herding model more realistic because in 
his version it is not always better to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.13 
This means that the benchmarking of the managers’ performances allows the managers of 
mediocre ability to hide in the herd, but the most able managers still have an incentive to 
deviate and build up an outstanding reputation. Similarly, Prendergast (1993) and his theory 
about “yes men” directly explore how conformity can emerge when firms use subjective 
performance evaluations. Instead of collecting and communicating important information 
about a project, workers try to elicit and represent their supervisors’ opinion in order to please 
them and to further their careers. 
Research by Graham (1999) and Hong et al. (2000) empirically supports the existence of 
reputation-based herding of financial analysts and reveals the different incentives at work 
depending on the stage of the analyst’s career and other individual determinants. For example, 
they provide evidence that younger analysts herd more because they lack reputation. 
Similarly, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that the same holds for portfolio managers. 
The literature includes many other empirical studies focusing on herding behavior in financial 
markets (see, e.g., Lakonishok et al. 1992; Christie and Huang 1995; Grinblatt et al. 1995; 
Nofsinger and Sias 1999; Wermers 1995). However, devising empirical tests to reveal the 
existence of truly inefficient and harmful herding might be “easier said than done and may 
even be impossible” (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001, p. 281). It is very difficult to 
distinguish harmful, i.e. intentional herding, from spurious herding, which evolves due to new 
information in the market and which shows a congruent rational adaptation of market 
participants to the new information, leading to a “wise” herd (see Bikhchandani and Sharma 
2001; Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh 2003; 2009).14  
Experimental studies were partially able to show the herding behavior of market participants. 
However, the experimental testing of the different models showed that herding behavior can 
be explained with both information-based (Drehmann et al. 2005) and reputation-based 
models (Hey and Morone 2004), whereas the more realistic experiments favored the latter 
models (Cipriani and Guarino 2005). Alevy et al. (2007) provide evidence from a field 
experiment that under specific circumstances professionals are less prone to information 
cascades than inexperienced persons (e.g., students). 
                                                
13 This dictum was coined by John Maynard Keynes (1936, p. 158). 
14 Spurious indicates the misleading attribution of an observed conformity of individual actions to a herding 
behavior. The individuals did not depend their actions on the actions of others but inferred independently how to 
react upon certain new information in the market and come (non-intentionally) to the same conclusion.  
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Closely related to the topic of herding behavior are several sociopsychological surveys 
approaching the subject via hidden profiles. Starting with Strasser and Titus (1985), this 
strand of the literature tries to unveil the decision processes in groups: how information is 
shared and aggregated. At the beginning of the experiment, each member of the group 
receives only a piece of the whole information that the group needs to solve a problem. 
During the experiment, the researchers analyze how the various members of the group 
contribute their private information and how the group finally finds the proper solution or 
why it does not. As every group as a whole has all information necessary to find the proper 
solution, it is interesting to see that many of them fail to aggregate the information properly. 
Some members do not want to come into conflict with others and therefore do not contribute 
their contradictory but important information to the group decision process. The results of 
these experiments support the notion that non-herding is accompanied by costs and illustrate 
the resulting problems for decision processes in organizations (see, e.g., Schulz-Hardt et al. 
2006). 
The newer literature on management studies and organizational science focusing on voice and 
silence in organizations takes up many of these sociopsychological issues. This literature uses 
voice to define a situation in which the employee speaks up against a prevailing opinion and 
does not follow the herd, while silence is used as a situation in which the employee goes with 
the herd. In their seminal paper on silence in organizations, Morrison and Milliken (2000) 
touch on Janis’s (1972) idea of groupthink and the research on diversity in management teams 
(Bantel and Jackson 1989). In a special edition of the Journal of Management Studies on the 
topic of the dynamics of voice and silence in organizations, some authors refer to Noelle-
Neumann’s (1974) spiral of silence, too (see, e.g., Bowen and Blackmon 2003). They use 
Noelle-Neumann’s theory to describe the dynamics of silence in organizations or, in other 
words, the evolution of herding behavior within an organization. 
Throughout the literature on voice and silence in organizations, Hirschman’s (1970) concept 
of exit, voice, and loyalty serves as a general framework. The terms are used to describe the 
various alternatives of action of an organizational member during a decision process. The 
member can exit the organization, raise his or her voice against a certain decision, or remain 
loyal and follow the decision taken. What is particularly interesting for our purposes is that 
the empirical literature reveals valuable insights on the individual determinants of employees’ 
probability of using their voices in an organization (see, e.g., Withey and Cooper 1989; 
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Tangirala and Ramanujam 2008). Hirschman’s concept has been adjusted and modified to 
today’s view of voice and silence in organizations.15  
In 2001, Banerjee and Somanathan wrote their paper “A Simple Model of Voice” and 
completed the circle that started with Banerjee’s (1992) “Simple Model of Herd Behavior”. 
Paraphrasing Hirschman’s concept of voice in organizations, Banerjee and Somanathan 
provide a model that relies on reputation-based herding without stating it explicitly.16 
Members of a group can contribute more or less private information to the decision-making 
process and thereby exert more or less influence on the decisions taken by the leaders. The 
decision about the amount of private information to contribute is based on the costs of their 
communication to the members of the group and the costs of reaching the leader’s ear. In the 
model, these costs are defined by the level of homogeneity of opinions among the group 
members and by the level of difference in opinion between a member and a leader. In the 
most simple case of the model, moderation drives out extremism, as group members with 
extreme opinions always communicate their private information and, thus, neutralize each 
other. However, most importantly for our study, the authors are able to model a situation in 
which a leader with extreme opinions only receives extreme information which is close to his 
or her own extreme point of view. This is due to the fact that the costs of communication for 
group members with an opinion highly contrary to the extreme opinion of a leader exceed the 
benefits from it. These group members, who in the most simple case of the model would 
communicate their private information and move an extreme leader towards a more moderate 
position, remain silent in the most realistic version of the model. The mechanism that leads to 
this result is triggered by the realistic assumption that all members of the group can lie and 
that therefore a leader discounts the group members’ information, and discounts them the 
more, the further away they are from his or her own opinion. Such a mechanism provokes an 
increase in extreme opinions and a reduction of information flow in the organization, even 
though it would be most valuable, in precisely those situations involving leaders with extreme 
opinions, to balance the different views.   
The outcome of Banerjee and Somanathan’s most realistic model is in line with the qualitative 
studies by Ryan and Oestreich (1991) or Milliken et al. (2003) on employee silence. They 
show that employees often fear to speak up and tend to herd, in particular upwards (to their 
                                                
15 See, for example, how Premeaux and Bedeian (2003) differentiate between Hirschman’s (1970) notion of 
voice and their own expression of speaking up, which takes into account only that an employee uses his or her 
voice to make an improvement and not to express dissatisfaction with an organizational issue. 
16 In contrast, Banerjee’s (1992) model focused on information-based herding. 
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supervisors), because they figure that they face negative consequences which do not depend 
on the true content of the information but on the content as perceived by the supervisor. 
Paradoxically, leaders with extreme opinions drive out moderate or controversial information 
that would be most valuable to them, increasing herding behavior in their organizations and 
losing information for the decision-making process. 
In each of the theories reviewed, the costs of the individuals that are not going with the herd 
form a crucial factor which can be used when building a framework to further analyze the 
determinants of herding behavior. In addition, the theories support the notion of asymmetrical 
characteristics of the costs of non-herding, such as that every individual going with the herd 
can share the blame if the herd was proven wrong, but an individual who opposes bears the 
costs individually. The framework of the costs of non-herding and their determinants will be 
extensively discussed and qualitatively analyzed in the next chapter. 
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3. The Costs of Non-Herding in Organizations – An 
Interview Study17 
3.1. Introduction 
Aggregating the knowledge of many people is a powerful mechanism. When the employees 
of a firm do not provide their private information to the decision-making process in the firm, 
the decisions taken will be inefficient, as information will be lost. Yet, every employee that 
contributes information to an organization’s information pool faces the risk of getting into 
trouble because some other employee might be offended and could react harshly. 
Economically speaking, employees face various kinds of potential costs if they choose to 
reveal and communicate their private information in an organization. These costs can 
effectively silence the employee. For example: 
 “I raised a concern about some policies and I was told to shut up and that I was 
becoming a trouble maker. I would have pursued [the issue] further but presently I 
can’t afford to risk my job. This has made me go into a detached mode, making of 
me a ‘yes man’ (male respondent, Information Systems).”18  
This mechanism leads to two problems in organizations. First, the more employees remain 
silent, the weaker the information content of the decision-making process becomes. Second, 
the more employees remain silent and fail to criticize the prevailing opinion in an 
organization, the more the dominant opinion is perceived to be the correct one. In a dynamic 
process, this silence in organizations leads to herding behavior because the prevailing opinion 
becomes increasingly entrenched, and employees acquiesce so as not to be perceived as 
mavericks or troublemakers (Morrison and Milliken 2000; 2003). This dynamic can be seen 
as a risk-sharing mechanism (Hamilton 1971; Scharfstein and Stein 1990); expressing one’s 
own beliefs and opinions always bears the risk of being personally offended, while sharing 
                                                
17 This chapter draws on two papers written jointly with Bruno S. Frey (Cueni and Frey 2012; forthcoming). 
18 Quoted from Milliken et al. (2003, p. 1453). See also the literature review in the preceding chapter for models 
about “yes men” behavior due to reputation-based herd behavior in organizations (Prendergast 1993). 
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the prevailing opinion in an organization splits the risk among all the followers. Furthermore, 
if the individual statement leads to a change in the decision-making process, the employee has 
to bear the responsibility for the decision. Economically speaking, if an employee deviates 
from the prevailing opinion, although the deviating input might have value for the whole 
group or organization, the employee has to bear the cost of not following the herd alone. 
Therefore, the costs of non-herding (CONH) are the employee’s costs associated with 
expressing an opinion or having a voice in an organization. By lowering the CONH and 
therefore fostering the employee's participation with his or her private information, the 
organization can aggregate more information and improve its decision-making processes. 
This chapter analyzes the determinants and problems of herding behavior in organizations and 
uses the framework of the CONH to understand the underlying mechanisms. The next section 
discusses these costs of non-herding extensively and formulates a first set of general 
propositions. Section 3.3 considers options for diminishing the CONH. Therefore, it focuses 
on the institutional and individual determinants of the CONH and formulates empirically 
testable propositions. Section 3.4 provides an explanation of the empirical method of the 
qualitative interview study with chairpersons and high ranked executives working in the 
financial industry and the resulting data evaluation. Section 3.5 challenges the propositions by 
comparing them to the interview results, and the last section concludes. 
3.2. The Costs of Non-Herding 
Whenever several people make a joint decision, costs of non-herding (CONH) arise. In a 
typical situation, one could imagine a bank’s investment committee consisting of eight 
members. Assume that these members are equally ranked (later, we also discuss the case 
when the members have different hierarchy levels). These eight members of the committee 
have to decide about a specific investment, with one of them being in charge of the 
investment project. This manager makes a presentation about the anticipated opportunities 
and threats of the investment. Subsequently, the usual question-and-answer round starts, but 
nobody asks any crucial questions; the questions only scratch the surface of the possible 
problems. After hearing the answers to the harmless questions, the committee votes on the 
investment and unanimously adopts it. All of this happens although the investment project is 
not at all above suspicion. 
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Why do the committee members not ask more critical questions about the project? The 
individual members of the committee have several reasons not to raise any fundamental issue: 
Nobody wants to prolong the meeting; nobody wants to raise his or her voice against the 
project because an explanation would be required; nobody criticizes the project because they 
hope that his or her own project will also be approved smoothly; nobody wants to be the 
loner, and as long as no other member of the committee speaks up all the members keep quiet. 
In addition, because this silence has occurred several times before, nobody feels like defying 
the investment project this time, and thus everybody continues to herd. 
These are only a few examples of the possible costs members of committees could face 
during a decision-making process (see, for more examples in various real-life contexts, e.g., 
Janis 1972; Garicano and Posner 2005). We want to show, however, that such situations 
reveal typical characteristics and mechanisms that can be identified and positively influenced. 
First, if committee members use voice, they face the CONH immediately. In contrast, the 
possible benefits lie in the future and can only be calculated after the project is realized. The 
member does not know in advance whether he or she will ever gain any benefit from it, while 
the costs are imminent. This shows four types of asymmetries. The first of these is in the 
temporal dimension between short-term costs and long-term benefits, and the second is in the 
differing probabilities of the costs and benefits occurring; the costs are rather clear, whereas 
benefits are very uncertain and difficult to calculate. Third, the costs have to be borne alone 
by the individual member of the committee, at least at an early stage, until other members join 
in the critique. The critic cannot benefit from a cost- and risk-sharing mechanism and hide in 
the herd. Fourth, there exists an asymmetric dynamic, as the costs are self-reinforcing. If the 
critics do not use voice in the first meeting, they face higher costs of doing so in the second 
meeting and so forth; in addition, the lower the number of the critics in a group, the higher are 
the critics’ costs.  
If we add the element of different ranks among committee members, principal-agent problems 
have to be considered. Assume that the supervisor of a committee member presents an 
investment project. To argue against this project becomes even more costly for the 
subordinate member. The supervisor may have influence or control over the future 
promotions of the inferior and over his or her future pay. These examples illustrate that any 
dependence on a supervising person can influence the costs of not herding dramatically for a 
specific committee member (e.g., Prendergast 1993). 
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At the organizational level, the problem of the CONH is that they induce other members to 
imitate behavior. By doing so, the individual members do not contribute their private 
information during the decision-making process, and so they vote for decisions which are not 
in accordance with their personal evaluations. This imitative behavior results in a loss of 
information, which is the major cost of herding behavior for the organization. In addition, the 
CONH trigger a self-reinforcing process. The longer the committee members do not raise any 
issues, the higher are the CONH and the lower are the incentives to speak up. The CONH 
create a vicious circle which can harm the organization in several ways. Chosen paths cannot 
be changed, and new and better investments or projects are missed or ignored. As decisions 
often involve many steps and are designed as a bottom-up process, there are CONH at each 
level that reinforce the herding behavior in the organization. Therefore, organizations should 
try to reduce the CONH. 
3.2.1. Different Sources of Costs of Non-Herding  
The CONH can arise from various sources, and can affect all employees. We pool these 
different sources into three categories: costs due to personal factors, costs due to conflicts 
between equally ranked employees, and costs between employees and their superiors. 
Depending on self-perception, role behavior, and identity, the CONH can affect the individual 
employee in different ways (see, e.g., Withey and Cooper 1989; Morrison and Milliken 2000; 
Premeaux and Bedeian 2003): People who like to expose themselves or see their role as the 
devil’s advocate perceive the CONH to be lower than people without such a character trait, 
for example. The employee’s perceived costs of speaking up might also be influenced by 
individual determinants such as age, tenure with the company, experience in the job, or level 
of education. 
Another source of the CONH lies in the relationship between the employee and the 
employee’s coworkers or peers. Members of teams or committees usually experience a 
pressure to conform, and the members create their own social identity (Tajfel and Turner 
1986). The more homogeneous a team is with respect to important individual aspects 
(professional background, education, gender, etc.), the more likely it is that groupthink occurs 
(Janis 1972; Bantel and Jackson 1989; Withey and Cooper 1989). These diverse phenomena 
of social interactions in teams influence the individual perception of the CONH. The more 
conformity is needed to be accepted as a member of the team, the higher are the costs if the 
individual employee deviates from the prevailing opinion. Employees are usually in 
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competition with peers, which can reduce the CONH as it provides an incentive for the 
employees to speak up and distinguish themselves. In contrast, competition can also raise the 
CONH if the employee and his or her peers are rated by a superior manager using a 
benchmark (see Scharfstein and Stein 1990). 
The last source of the CONH stems from the character of principal-agent relationships. In 
addition to the sources mentioned above, the relationship between the employee and superior, 
their personalities, experiences, and views on leadership have a massive influence on the 
CONH (see, e.g., Ryan and Oestreich 1991; Milliken et al. 2003). If the superior has to 
evaluate the employee’s performance, and if this evaluation determines bonus payments, 
future project assignments, or promotions, the employee’s CONH increase strongly. Due to 
career and reputational concerns, the employee’s incentive to contradict the supervisor on a 
project is likely to vanish. If the superior is accorded much respect in the committee due to an 
impressive track record and extensive experience, the employee’s CONH increase even 
further. These sources spawn a wide range of CONH for the employee, from small hostilities 
to bullying and sidelining, to a career-ending transfer of the employee, or even to dismissal. In 
summary, the costs of non-herding are characterized by 
Characteristic C1: costs according to conflicts that occur before a decision is taken; 
Characteristic C2: costs of justification after a decision is made; 
Characteristic C3: temporal asymmetry, as large parts of the costs accrue in the short term 
and before a decision is made, while the benefits of non-herding only materialize in the long 
run, after a decision is made; 
Characteristic C4: asymmetry in probabilities, as the costs are usually highly probable while 
the benefits are more uncertain; 
Characteristic C5: social asymmetry, as costs have to be borne individually while benefits are 
mostly shared with other members of the organization; 
Characteristic C6: dynamic asymmetry, as the costs of non-herding are self-reinforcing. 
In addition to the characteristics, we formulate three general propositions: 
General Proposition GP1: Higher costs of non-herding induce higher herding behavior of 
employees in an organization. 
General Proposition GP2: Individual factors of employees, their co-workers and supervisors 
influence the costs of non-herding for employees.  
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General Proposition GP3: Institutional factors of organizations affect the costs of non-
herding for employees. 
3.3. The Influence of Institutional and Individual Factors on the 
Costs of Non-Herding 
3.3.1. Institutional Determinants of the Costs of Non-Herding 
We suggest that the costs of non-herding (CONH) can be influenced by various determinants. 
We pool the determinants of the CONH into three categories in line with the sources of 
CONH mentioned above: individual and institutional determinants, of which the latter are 
divided in institutional determinants at the micro and the macro levels. Examples for 
individual determinants of the CONH include the employee’s personality, experience, and 
knowledge. Institutional determinants influence the employee’s CONH due to factors at the 
micro level, i.e., the employee’s relationship and conduct with co-workers and supervisors in 
daily business, and factors at the macro level such as human resource management, or 
ownership structure of the organization. Institutions are the fundamentals that shape “the rules 
of the game” upon which employees act (North 1990, p. 3). These propositions are 
underpinned with empirical findings from the literature review in Chapter 2. We start with the 
development of quantitatively testable propositions for the institutional factors of an 
organization: Hierarchical structure, size, human resource management, risk management and 
ownership structure. 
Proposition P1: The flatter and more decentralized the hierarchical structure of the 
organization is, the lower are the costs of non-herding for the employees. 
This first proposition captures the intuition that, when stronger hierarchical structures are 
developed in an organization, the CONH are higher. If there are only a few employees or 
managers at the same hierarchy level, the allocation of power and responsibility is clearly 
defined, so that there are few incentives to be critical and not to herd. If the organization is 
dedicated to a more cooperative or participatory style of management, then there are fewer 
levels of hierarchy, and more employees are at the same level. This provides a platform for 
discussion among equals and thus may help to reduce the CONH. Stein (2002) captures this 
idea in his theoretical work on information production in decentralized and hierarchical firms, 
  23 
and Berger et al. (2005) provide relevant empirical evidence. Stein shows that, in hierarchical 
firms, information can only be processed efficiently when the information can be “hardened” 
(Stein 2002, p. 1893). “Soft” information is “information that cannot be directly verified by 
anyone other than the agent who produces it” (Stein 2002, p. 1892). Thus, soft information 
can only be used efficiently in organizations with flat hierarchies, where soft information can 
be processed and communicated fast and in a direct manner. In organizations with tall 
hierarchies, soft information needs to be hardened as it has to be communicated up many 
hierarchical layers.19 As we assume that the costs arising from non-herding behavior are 
similar to the costs of communicating and processing soft information in an organization, we 
deduce that a flatter and more decentralized organization has lower CONH. 
Proposition P2: The larger the organization is, the higher are the costs of non-herding. 
This second proposition is close to the first one, as it seems to be natural that smaller 
organizations have shorter distances of communication and, thus, the employees can convey 
their private information in a faster and more direct way. Hardening information is less 
important the smaller an organization is. Furthermore, in smaller organizations, information 
spreads much faster between non-related teams, and the interactions between employees of 
extraneous areas is much higher. 
Proposition P3: Privately held companies have lower costs of non-herding than publicly 
listed companies. 
We propose that privately held companies lower CONH, because personally liable partners, 
for example in a private bank, are more interested in carefully aggregating information and 
therefore reducing the CONH in order to reveal as many critical issues as possible. In 
contrast, we assume that in a stock corporation with a large free-float,20 few employees have 
the incentive or the power to raise critical issues due to the diffusion of responsibility. This 
proposition is related to the two propositions stated above, as size and hierarchical structure in 
firms are linked to the ownership structure as well. For example, Guadalupe et al. (2012) 
explicitly describe a new trend to organize publicly listed firms more similarly to 
                                                
19 Stein (2002, p. 1982) exemplifies “soft” information with a loan officer situation: “For example, a loan officer 
who has worked with a small-company president may come to believe that the president is honest and 
hardworking – in other words, the classic candidate for an unsecured “character loan.” Unfortunately, these 
attributes cannot be unambiguously documented [i.e. “hardened”] in a report that the loan officer can pass on to 
his superiors [over many hierarchical layers].“ 
20 The free-float of a listed company is defined as the ratio of shares that are readily tradable to outstanding 
shares. Shares that are not readily tradable are held by controlling or long-term investors, or government entities, 
for example.  
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partnerships, which is a common form of ownership for privately held firms. They suggest 
that this trend stems from the highly competitive industries that these firms operate in. These 
industries typically use less physical capital but demand more knowledge work. Such an 
environment seems to be met favorably by partnerships, as they tend to be more decentralized 
organizations with flatter hierarchies.  
Proposition P4: The lower the part of the salary that is performance related, the lower the 
costs of non-herding.  
The third proposition deals with the problem of how to remunerate the employees in such a 
way that the CONH are reduced. The literature of reputation-based herding suggests that, if a 
large part of the salary is performance related and performance is measured relative to other 
employees as a type of benchmarking, behavior that deviates from the benchmark is very 
costly (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Zwiebel 1995). Rajan (1994) provides evidence that 
rational bank managers with short horizons, which are often induced by short-term 
performance pay, herd in their credit lending policies. Hence, we conclude that incentive pay 
usually leads to an increase in CONH. Of course, we do not aim to say that incentive pay 
could not be developed in a way which could set limits to the CONH or even lower them. 
However, the last financial crisis provided ample evidence that the performance pay was 
mostly constructed in inappropriate ways (Rost and Osterloh 2009). 
Proposition P5: The more independent and established the risk management in an 
organization is, the lower are the costs of non-herding. 
The last proposition suggests an important institutional factor which we assume influences the 
CONH. If the risk management inside the organization is firmly established and unifies 
enough resources, it can systematically scrutinize prevailing opinions or provide employees 
with a base for expressing critical views. In order to keep the CONH for the risk management 
team as low as possible, a high independence of the team members from the units which they 
supervise has to be ensured. The same logic is pursued with a devil’s advocate,21 as he or she 
plays the institutionalized role of revealing all possible objections against a decision that 
seems obvious at first sight (see, e.g., Morck 2008). Similarly, Janis (1972, p. 209) proposes 
that a team leader should assign the role of critical evaluator to every team member in order to 
                                                
21 The Holy Office of the Devil’s Advocate was invented in the middle of the second millenium by the Roman 
Catholic Church to take a contraposition when members of the clerus intended to canonize someone. The devil’s 
advocate had to argue against the canonization and scrutinize the actions, attitudes and origin of the candidate, so 
that the church would not canonize a person that might bring disgrace to the organization; also, it prevented 
powerful individuals from canonizing their family and friends (see, e.g., Stanley 1981). 
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reduce groupthink. In contrast, the function of a risk manager or a risk management unit is 
assigned to a specific person or institution inside the organization. Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1999) provide a model of how agencies, similar to a devil’s advocate, can help to improve 
decision procedures in organizations, and Garicano and Posner (2005) provide anecdotal 
evidence from the U.S. intelligence system. They refer to the case of a CIA report claiming to 
have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2005. The report was built on one single 
source, which was discredited afterwards. Senior agency managers on the case could cover 
the failure for a long period as they kept to themselves and did not have to reveal the case to 
an independent body that could have discovered the deficiency earlier. Garicano and Posner 
suggest that agency managers could shift regularly. After a shift, the new manager would then 
function as a devil’s advocate (see also Hertzberg et al. 2010 for a similar case with loan 
officers).  
Institutional factors at the micro level 
Besides the institutional factors at the macro level, institutional factors at the micro level can 
also be identified that can help lower the CONH in organizations. Institutions at the micro 
level usually include the procedure for setting up meetings and selecting committees and 
teams. We do not focus on these factors and we do not formulate propositions here, as a 
comprehensive literature already exists focusing on how herding behavior can be minimized 
at the micro level (see, e.g., Janis 1972; Bantel and Jackson 1989; Morrison 2003; Garicano 
and Posner 2005; Schulz-Hardt et al. 2006). At this point, we only provide a short overview 
of the factors that have been raised in the literature cited above. The literature distinguishes 
the following institutional factors at the micro level: (1) the composition of the committee; (2) 
the agenda in meetings; (3) the information flow (e.g., sequence in which and time when 
employees receive the agenda and notes); (4) the formal communication procedure (e.g., order 
of speaking); (5) informal communication (e.g., possibility of pre-meetings, other informal 
gatherings of the group); (6) the decision rules (e.g., definition of the meeting leader, or 
voting procedures); (7) allocation of responsibility (group leader bears full responsibility or 
responsibility is shared equally among all members). 
These factors define the design of a committee and its rules. They have a strong direct 
influence on the CONH for an individual committee member. Assume that the project leader 
has the power to select the members of the committee or to set the agenda of the meeting. 
This enables him or her to raise the costs for a possible critic by electing a higher number of 
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supporters of the project (or even excluding all possible critics). Finally, the leader can place 
the vote on the most critical project at the very end of the meeting’s agenda in order to 
minimize the time available for a proper discussion and, thus, raising the CONH for an 
opposing member. The project leader can also heavily regulate the flow of information about 
the project. In addition, the formal communication rules, such as the order of speaking in a 
meeting, the decision-making procedure and the allocation of responsibility for the decisions 
taken are factors at the micro level of an organization. Nevertheless, they can be influenced by 
decisions and settings at the macro level of the organization. 
3.3.2. Individual Determinants of the Costs of Non-Herding 
Individual factors of the employee's personality (e.g, neuroticism, extraversion etc.) have an 
important influence on the CONH, as has been shown empirically in the psychological and 
sociopsychological literature (Asch 1951; Festinger 1954; Janis 1972; Bowen and Blackmon 
2003; Baron 2005). However, we are focusing on individual determinants of the CONH that 
are non-psychological, such as the age of an employee or the experience on the job (see the 
theoretical literature in Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Prendergast and Stole 1996; Hirshleifer 
and Teoh 2003; 2009). There is anecdotal and empirical evidence about various individual 
factors that increase or lower an individual’s CONH (see, e.g., Bowen and Blackmon 2003; 
Tangirala and Ramanujam 2008). In particular, empirical research employing large datasets 
on security analysts has examined the interaction of individual characteristics with respect to 
herding behavior (Graham 1999; Hong et al. 2000; Clement and Tse 2005). We condense the 
specific findings in the literature into the following propositions on the individual factors that 
influence employees’ CONH. 
Proposition P6: The more experienced the employee is, the lower are the employee’s costs of 
non-herding. 
The proposition builds on the reputational-herding model which was developed in Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990) and has been empirically examined for the herding behavior of financial 
analysts by Hong et al. (2000) and Clement and Tse (2005).22 They provide evidence that 
                                                
22 This stands in contrast to the model by Prendergast and Stole (1996), in which the old employees (“jaded old 
timers”) exhibit more conformity in an organization than the young employees (“impetous youngsters”). The 
difference in the models stems from Prendergast and Stole’s assumption that young managers are incentivized to 
distinguish themselves with their first decision from the older managers, showing ability by believing in their 
own signal. Although Scharfstein and Stein's (1990) model is highly similar, it has the decisive difference that 
the young manager also anticipates that the market (for managers) will also infer his ability from the difference 
in performance between his call and the call of the other (older) managers. By doing so, the younger manager 
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more experienced sell-side analysts exhibit less herd behavior than inexperienced analysts. 
This is mainly due to career concerns; if less experienced analysts have a lower forecast 
accuracy, they are punished more severely than the more experienced analysts, whose track 
records grant them a higher reputation. In particular, the less experienced analysts have a 
higher probability of being dismissed. 
Proposition P7: The older the employee is, the lower are the employee’s costs of non-herding. 
Proposition P7 is related to Proposition P6, as a young employee, by definition, cannot be 
experienced. However, if analyzed under the ceteris paribus condition holding experience and 
other factors constant, we predict a negative effect of age on the employees' CONH. The 
employee has a certain track record and the selection over time provides a natural effect of 
reducing the CONH. The empirical findings of Tangirala and Ramanujam (2008) on the 
relation of an employee's motivation to raise objections and his or her age are mixed. So, the 
factor merits further analysis. 
Proposition P8: The longer the tenure of the employee with an organization is, the lower are 
the employee’s costs of non-herding. 
The proposition is related to Propositions 6 and 7, as a young employee cannot have a long 
tenure in a company and cannot be experienced in an area. Still, one can envisage a case 
where an old employee with a long tenure in a company changes function inside the firm and 
faces a situation where he or she is old and has a long tenure in a company but not much 
experience in the new field of activity. We are not aware of an empirical study explicitly 
analyzing the tenure of an employee in connection with herding behavior.  
Proposition P9: The higher the employee’s hierarchical position is, the lower are the 
employee’s costs of non-herding. 
This proposition is also directly linked to the reputational-herding model in Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990), as a higher hierarchical position usually comes with a higher reputation. As 
discussed above, a difference in rank between two employees provokes higher CONH for the 
employee with an inferior rank. 
Proposition P10: The better the employee is educated, the lower are the employee’s costs of 
non-herding. 
                                                                                                                                                   
has a strong incentive to go with the herd (i.e. to adapt to the older analysts). The empirical literature supports 
the latter model more favorably. 
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We formulate this proposition in an exploratory sense, as we are aware of neither empirical 
nor theoretical studies that analyze the link between education and herd behavior directly.23 
The rationale in the proposition stems from the idea that education improves the ability to 
understand complex interdependencies and, hence, to identify possible problems in projects in 
organizations. Further, a larger knowledge lowers the employee’s CONH by increasing his or 
her reputation. This mechanism empowers the better-educated employees to join the 
discussion during a decision-making process. In addition, one can argue that better educated 
employees have better outside options and thus rely less on a specific job than less educated 
employees 
Proposition P11: The wealthier the employee is, the lower are the employee’s costs of non-
herding. 
This proposition, too, is highly exploratory. We are not aware of any research that focuses on 
herd behavior in organizations in relation to the employees’ wealth. We predict a lower 
CONH for wealthier employees simply due to the fact that they are more independent of the 
income generated by their job. We test these propositions qualitatively with in-depth 
interviews with financial market professionals 
3.4. Interview Data 
To test our theoretical propositions on the CONH, we conducted interviews with practitioners 
in the financial industry. From June to August 2010, we interviewed twelve practitioners in 
the greater area of Zurich, Switzerland’s financial center. To attain a reasonably broad insight 
into the various types of financial institutions, we interviewed four employees of large Swiss 
banks, four employees of mid-sized banks, two employees of a hedge fund company, an 
employee of a large global reinsurance company, and an employee of a small investment 
boutique. 
In addition, our sample varies with respect to the positions and functions of the employees. 
One person was a former CEO of one of the two biggest Swiss banks and another was a 
former chairman of a global reinsurance company (both companies are on the Fortune Global 
500 list); four employees worked as security analysts, one as a managing director, one as an 
                                                
23 Cipriano and Guarino (2009) show only as a side product in their laboratory experiment with financial market 
professionals, that the level of education (BA, MA or PhD) does not have a significant influence on the 
probability of engaging in an informational cascade, i.e. to engage in information-based herding. 
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investment adviser; two employees worked as chief risk officers, one as CEO of a hedge fund 
company, and one as chairman of a small investment boutique. 
The sample comprises one woman and eleven men. The sample includes companies ranging 
in size from 30 to over 60,000 employees. The median number of employees is 5,000 and the 
mean is around 20,000. The revenues of the companies in 2012 range from USD 22.5 million 
(estimate) to 48 billion.  
An outline was used in all the focused interviews24, but the order in which the questions were 
posed varied depending on the course of the conversation. The shortest interview lasted about 
one hour, the longest about one hour and a half. The interviews were analyzed by applying 
scaled and structured content analysis (Mayring 2003; Glaeser and Laudel 2006). Appendix A 
provides an extensive overview of the interview procedure, a discussion of possible biases in 
interviews, and a detailed description of the evaluation of the interview data. 
3.5. Interview Results 
3.5.1. General Propositions and Characteristics of the Costs of Non-Herding 
In general, all participants confirmed that problems of repressed voice and herding behavior 
occur in the decision-making processes of organizations. They agreed that there were 
individual costs involved which lead to silence on the part of employees and to herding 
behavior. All respondents stated that they had experienced a wide range of costs for non-
herding during their careers, starting with delicate psychological pressure to conform and 
culminating in dismissals. Several respondents made such remarks as the “bears got 
mobbed,”25 or “everybody knew the critics and sooner or later they were no longer invited to 
the important workshops” or “from then on your days are numbered.”26 Responses like these 
reveal additional types of costs such as a deterioration of career opportunities and reduced 
bonuses due to criticism and conflicts. 
Hence, we conclude that the respondents confirm our first two general propositions, namely 
that GP1 higher costs of non-herding induce a higher herding behavior of employees in an 
                                                
24 The term was coined by Merton and Kendall (1946); the procedure is explained in Kvale (1996). 
25 The term “bears” refers to people who forecast an economic downturn; see, for example, The Economist 
(2009). 
26 All the interviews are conducted in German. The excerpts presented here were translated by the authors.  
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organization; and that GP2 individual factors of employees (and their co-workers and 
supervisors) influence the costs of non-herding for the employees. 
All of the twelve interviewees mentioned various institutional factors when asked broadly 
about how to reduce CONH. A managing director of a major Swiss bank pointed to the 
hierarchical structure of an organization, without being explicitly asked: “For example, one of 
our competitors in the market for whom I worked, had a much steeper hierarchy and – I do 
not want to say fear, this would be exaggerated – but you feel much more uncomfortable 
about raising your voice and about expressing your contrary opinion.” An analyst working at 
a mid-sized bank stated: “Well, we do not have such high pressure as in the larger banks, and 
we do not exert pressure on ourselves – also because we are not remunerated in a highly 
variable way, or at least to a much smaller extent”.  
We conclude that our third general proposition is also supported by the respondents – GP3 
Institutional factors of organizations affect the costs of non-herding for employees. 
Regarding the characteristics of the CONH (Characteristics C1-C6), all managers responded 
that they perceived the costs to be self-reinforcing over time C6. The CEO of a hedge fund 
company commented: “It gets more and more difficult, especially if you did not say anything 
at the beginning [of the project]; well, this lies in the nature of things.” Other characteristics 
were also addressed, such as the temporal asymmetry between short-term costs and long-term 
benefits C3, by five of the twelve respondents; and the asymmetry in the probabilities 
between highly probable costs and very uncertain benefits C4, by six of the twelve 
respondents. A security analyst explained that sometimes he does not speak up to avoid 
forcing others to stay longer in the meeting, as he knows that this would provoke disputes and 
annoyance. Yet, he would remain silent although he does not fear any ultimate consequences 
and intrinsically admits that speaking up would be more beneficial for the aim of the meeting. 
He keeps quiet “just as a matter of kindness”, and because he likes a peaceful environment. 
This supports the first Characteristic C1 stating that the CONH are mostly obvious before the 
decision is taken; all respondents stated that they perceived such costs ex-ante. Half of the 
respondents brought up the issue of ex-post justification when they raised their voices C2. 
Finally, all respondents mentioned the fifth Characteristic C5 that non-herding behavior is 
costly for the specific employee in various forms. As a former CEO of a large Swiss bank put 
it: “I know an analyst who has lost his job because he revealed unpleasant things – I mean this 
is an extreme reaction but these are the private costs to be borne by such an employee alone.” 
  31 
3.5.2. Institutional Determinants of the Costs of Non-Herding 
Concerning our propositions of institutional factors at the macro level, the respondents 
exhibited a more heterogeneous picture. The question regarding the hierarchical structure of 
the organization – Proposition P1: The flatter and more decentralized the hierarchical 
structure of the organization is, the lower are the costs of non-herding for the employees – 
was affirmed by nine of the twelve respondents. “In general, I think that younger firms have 
an advantage, as they have less established structures and hierarchies”, a managing director of 
a major Swiss bank answered. We conclude that a flatter and more decentralized hierarchical 
structure lowers the CONH in organizations. 
Only four interviewees agreed that the size of the company had an influence on the CONH; 
the remaining eight respondents disagreed. One respondent claimed: “This is not a matter of 
size, normally even in big banks the daily work environment does not differ between a big 
bank and an institute of small or medium size.” Hence, we do not find evidence that the size 
of the organization influences the CONH. The respondents denied Proposition P2: The larger 
the organization is, the higher are the costs of non-herding. 
When asked if the ownership structure can influence the CONH, seven of the respondents 
confirmed the proposition and five of them disagreed with it. Although a minority did not 
agree, we weakly confirm that the majority of the respondents supported Proposition P3 – 
privately held companies have lower CONH than publicly listed companies. An investment 
adviser explains:  
 “My employer [a major Swiss bank] provides a nice example. […] our 
shareholders were atomized and finally, nobody is responsible for anything. So 
you drift into anonymity. If you work with a small private bank, you know that 
the partners do not want to invest in U.S. mortgages and other mortgage backed 
securities. They don’t have to engage in trends and can resist going with the 
herd.” 
On the issue of an organization’s wage policy, nine of the twelve respondents were convinced 
that a lower performance-related component of the salary decreased the CONH. One 
interviewee explained his view by stating that contributing private information was a public 
good and the existence of large personal incentives sabotaged the provision of these kinds of 
goods. In contrast, one of the three respondents who went against the proposition noted that 
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only the existence of performance pay kept him attentive as he could have lost a great deal of 
money when not providing all of his private information. However, we conclude that 
Proposition P4 – the lower the part of the salary that is performance related, the lower the 
CONH – was supported. 
Ten out of the twelve respondents confirmed Proposition P5 – the more independent and 
established the risk management in an organization is, the lower is the herding behavior in the 
organization. A risk officer of a mid-sized Swiss bank noted: “In our company, the CFO is 
also the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), and he sits on the executive board and also reports directly 
to the board of directors; I think this is essential.” Or, as the former chairman of a global 
reinsurance company put it: “From my point of view, a CRO belongs to the executive board 
as an independent unit.” An analyst of a mid-sized bank concluded: “If the CRO is positioned 
too close to the business, you should not dare to hope that he can influence anything.” Hence, 
Proposition P5 is strongly supported. 
Institutional determinants of the costs of non-herding at the micro level 
Although we did not formulate institutional propositions at the micro level, we briefly report 
our findings in this area to provide a complete picture of determinants influencing the CONH. 
Ten of the twelve interviewees spontaneously brought up several points at the micro level 
when asked which institutional factors influenced the CONH in meetings. All of the seven 
factors mentioned at the micro level were addressed by at least one respondent. Surprisingly, 
although the answers took many forms, the respondents stressed the importance of informal 
communication (5) before or after the meeting (whenever a decision has not yet been made) in 
reducing or avoiding CONH. In addition, the formal communication procedure (4) was the 
second most mentioned institutional factor at the micro level.  
Without being asked, the CEO of a small hedge fund company explained their rules on how to 
proceed in investment committee meetings: They try to rule out every imbalance by 
randomizing the order in which the topics are discussed or who starts the discussion. In 
addition, all of the members of their investment committee have veto power. Interestingly, 
over the period of four years, a veto has been cast only once. The respondent stated that the 
mere existence of the veto leads them to consider each member’s opinion and to empower 
each of the members to raise his or her voice if there is a disagreement with a proposed 
decision. 
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The majority of the respondents were aware of the importance of institutional factors at the 
micro level. However, in their companies, rules about the procedure of meetings or other 
decision-making boards were ill defined or not adequately implemented (except in the hedge 
fund firm). A managing director of a major Swiss bank stated sharply: “It is official that the 
firm wants this [employees to be able to speak up]; however, it depends very much on the 
implementation, on the kind of boss you have and on the person who leads a meeting.” The 
former CEO of a large Swiss bank mentioned that during his time in office every member of 
the executive board had to sign a declaration that obliged him to dissent with other members 
whenever he had a different opinion. Although this was not a credible gambit, the CEO 
wanted to make clear that dissent was important in finding the right solutions and taking 
proper decisions. We record these responses and infer that various institutional factors at the 
micro level influence an employee’s CONH.  
3.5.3. Individual Determinants of the Costs of Non-Herding 
Eleven of the twelve respondents agreed with the first proposition on the employees’ 
experience, P6 – The more experienced the employee is, the lower are the employee’s costs of 
non-herding. This stands in contrast to Proposition P7 – the older the employee is, the lower 
are the employee’s costs of non-herding – to which the respondents answered in a highly 
ambivalent way; six respondents supported the idea that older employees have lower CONH 
while five did not, and one interviewee even refused to give a distinct answer. The answers on 
Propositions P6 and P7 reveal the asymmetric dependency between age and experience. Hong 
et al. (2000) found empirically that experienced financial analysts were more willing to resist 
the prevailing opinion. They faced a lower probability of being dismissed after having lower 
accuracy; hence, they bore lower CONH. However, Hong et al. (2000) do not clearly 
distinguish between age and experience in their argumentation, which seems to be a 
shortcoming with regard to our results. The interviews revealed that it was the experience in 
connection with the high reputation that produced lower CONH for older employees, not age 
itself. This statement is in line with the literature on reputation-based herding (Scharfstein and 
Stein 1990) and on voice and silence in organizations (Morrison and Milliken 2000). 
As in the case of age, the responses to Proposition P8 – the longer the tenure of the employee 
with an organization is, the lower are the employee’s costs of non-herding – also revealed a 
heterogeneous picture with a slight tendency to support the proposition. Seven respondents 
agreed, while five respondents did not. Two of these five respondents stated that the effect of 
  34 
higher tenure led in the opposite direction: The longer the tenure, the higher the CONH for 
the employee. A risk officer of a mid-sized Swiss bank stated: “Well, I see both ways; either 
the longer tenure provides you with a higher identification and loyalty to your employer [i.e. 
non-herding], or you get tired and do not want to “hurt” anyone [i.e. herding].” The seven 
respondents who supported the proposition argued that the costs of speaking up were lower 
for an employee who had been with the organization for a long time, as the employee must 
have survived many years and thus must enjoy a particular status and a high reputation within 
the organization. One manager of a major Swiss bank stated: “There were issues, a year ago, 
which I avoided commenting on, because I knew perfectly well that I was the newcomer and 
all the other co-workers knew much more than I did. Now, after one year, I have a much 
higher impact on the decision-making processes and dare to speak up.” This example might 
point to a positive but diminishing marginal effect between tenure and the CONH in an 
organization. In the beginning, the growing tenure lowers the employees’ costs of speaking up 
drastically. Later, the positive impact of tenure on the CONH decreases. 
The next Proposition, P9 – the higher the employee’s hierarchical position is, the lower are 
the employee’s costs of non-herding – was fully supported by all the respondents. A security 
analyst remarked:  
 “Yes, a higher hierarchical position lowers the employee’s CONH naturally. But 
this reveals that informal communication is so important that people should know 
each other across the company and across hierarchies, so that people of a lower 
rank can talk to more senior people and point to problems which the high ranked 
executives do not know or see.” 
The proposition on education was not supported by the respondents. Only four out of twelve 
managers agreed with Proposition P10 – the better the employee is educated, the lower are 
the employee’s costs of non-herding.  
Three remained undetermined and five interviewees denied the relationship between an 
employee’s education and his or her CONH. As we cannot draw on literature relating the 
CONH of an individual to education, we need to reconsider this argument. 
In contrast, our final Proposition P11 – the wealthier the employee is, the lower are the 
employee’s costs of non-herding – was fully supported. All respondents pointed to the higher 
independence of a wealthy employee in contrast to a poor employee. The fear of not being 
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able to deal with and financially survive a dismissal creates high CONH for the employee. A 
chief risk officer pointed out: “In our industry, this is absolutely true; also because wealthy 
people have a very critical point of view on financial markets as they have to manage their 
own wealth.” The only critical remark was mentioned by an analyst: “One might argue that 
sometimes, rich people tend also to increase their fixed costs strongly and thus face even 
higher CONH and fear of losing their job. But in general, higher wealth should lead to lower 
CONH for the employee.” 
Finally, when asked if they were aware of companies with a human resource practice, which 
sought to hire people according to specific individual factors in order to maintain critical 
thinking in an organization, only two respondents agreed. One of them, a CEO of a hedge 
fund company, even introduced such a policy in his firm. The second respondent, a former 
CEO of a major Swiss bank, remarked that “You have to do that, you have to select 
independent thinkers. Everything else is boring and counterproductive.” However, we cannot 
conclude that human resource policies that aim at selecting independently thinking employees 
are an important institutional determinant, as the large majority of our respondents have no 
experience with it. Yet, it might be fruitful for directors in organizations to develop a human 
resource strategy which sought to prevent herding behavior among their employees. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Employees’ herding behavior has to be overcome for an efficient decision-making in 
organizations. Whenever employees exhibit herding behavior in an organization, they hide 
their private information. This loss of information deteriorates the organization’s decision-
making process, as the decisions taken rest upon a less complete information basis (Argyris 
and Schön 1978; Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Miliken et al. 2003; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2009). 
The question is: Why do employees not contribute their private information and instead hide 
in the herd?  
In this chapter, we argue that costs arise for employees if they do not follow the herd. Using 
in-depth interviews with high-ranked executives and analysts in the financial sector, we 
explored various facets of the costs of non-herding (CONH). The respondents stated that they 
experienced a wide range of costs during their careers, starting with delicate psychological 
pressure to conform and culminating in a call to quit a job or even in dismissal. Four 
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important characteristics leading to asymmetries of the costs of non-herding are identified and 
supported by the respondents. Firstly, the costs of non-herding bear the asymmetric dynamic 
of a self-reinforcing mechanism. Each employee that joins the herd increases the costs on all 
other employees that are still staying outside the herd. Secondly and thirdly, the costs of non-
herding possess a twofold asymmetrical relationship to possible benefits: the costs are 
imminent and forseeable, whereas possible benefits lie in the future and are uncertain. Finally, 
the costs of non-herding bear a characteristic of a public good. The costs have to be borne 
individually while the benefits have to be shared with other members of the organization. 
While the first aspect of the asymmetric dynamic is a characteristic of every herding behavior 
situation, the latter three asymmetries are features typical of organizational contexts in which 
hierarchical and economic dependence and a common goal exacerbate the impact of the costs. 
The interviewees concluded that the combination of these asymmetries makes the costs of 
non-herding so difficult to predict and the research for means to master them important. 
Further, the analysis of the interviews revealed that institutional factors of organizations 
substantially influence the employees’ CONH in an organization. The respondents confirm in 
particular that a flatter hierarchy, a private ownership structure, and less performance pay in 
organizations help to reduce the employee’s CONH. In addition, executives argue that a 
human resource policy which aims to select employees with individual factors that lower their 
CONH might succeed in improving an organization’s information aggregation. The 
interviewees indicated various individual determinants that lower the personal CONH for an 
employee. Foremost, all the respondents argued that a higher experience would diminish the 
CONH, while age and tenure, ceteris paribus, have an ambivalent influence. Interestingly, the 
respondents declined to acknowledge a direct influence of employees’ education on their 
CONH; however, they confirmed that the employees’ wealth has a negative influence on the 
CONH, leading to less herding behavior in an organization.  
We conclude that the employee’s CONH are key in overcoming herd behavior in 
organizations. Lower CONH will provide a larger amount of information to base the 
organization’s decisions on. When the CONH are high, most of this information rests 
unrevealed in the employees’ minds. Most importantly, according to the responses of the 
executives and analysts in our sample, institutional factors of organizations do influence these 
CONH and can lower them. These insights should be applied in practice.  
Furthermore, the CONH lead to pressure on the individual employee to remain silent. 
Morrison and Milliken (2000) list several implications of the costs of voicing objections (i.e. 
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CONH) and the resulting pressure on employees. First, employees have feelings of not being 
valued. Second, employees perceive a shortage of self-control. Third, employees experience 
cognitive dissonance. These impacts of the CONH also deteriorate the organization’s 
performance in an indirect way by reducing an employee’s motivation at work (Parker 1993). 
Happiness research in economics has provided evidence that an employee’s perception of 
higher self-control and autonomy fosters an employee’s job satisfaction (Benz and Frey 2008; 
Frey 2008). In order to employ more information for the decision processes and to bring forth 
more satisfied and motivated employees, managers ought to reduce the CONH faced by their 
employees. Lowering the CONH would indirectly foster employees’ motivation by 
simultaneously enhancing the organization’s efficiency in the decision-making processes.  
Other studies have analyzed how managers can support voice more effectively and reduce 
herding behavior in organizations by changing their beliefs, practices, and fear of negative 
feedback (Milliken et al. 2003; Morrison and Milliken 2003). Our study provides insights on 
the institutional and individual determinants of employees’ CONH that managers should 
focus on. Managers that aim at increasing a firm’s aggregation of private employee 
information could favorably select employees according to the individual determinants of the 
CONH presented here and might adjust the organization towards the stated institutional 
determinants. Future research should explore the relationship between the various institutional 
factors and the different individual determinants in order to enhance the informational basis of 
the decision-making process in organizations. 
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4. How Institutional Factors of Firms Influence 
Employees’ Herding Behavior: The Case of Financial 
Analysts27  
4.1. Introduction 
The aggregation of private information possessed by individuals is among the greatest 
challenges to be resolved in the social sciences, according to the scientific journal Nature 
(Giles 2011). The aggregation of independent opinions and forecasts generally leads to a 
highly accurate estimate of the actual outcome, which is often called “the wisdom of crowds” 
(Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2005). However, social influence can have detrimental effects on 
the aggregation of individuals’ private information (e.g., Lorenz et al. 2011). The pressure to 
conform can create a herding behavior that destroys the positive effects of information 
aggregation. Among other sociopsychological factors, reputational concerns are an important 
force pushing individuals to follow the herd.28 When individual forecasters know that their 
ability is judged by comparing their forecasts to the aggregated forecasts of others, herding 
can become a dominant strategy for every forecaster in the market (Scharfstein and Stein 
1990). Thus, individuals have incentives to bias the public expression of their private 
information towards the opinion prevailing among the majority when they know that their 
ability or reputation in the market is assessed in such a relative way. 
One field in which the aggregation of information is crucial is the financial market. A 
distortion of information aggregation destroys the basis for efficient asset and resource 
allocation, and, hence, shapes not only the financial sector but also all other sectors linked to 
capital markets. As security analysts29 play a key role in providing information to capital 
                                                
27 Parts of this chapter are based on a paper written jointly with Peter Fiechter (Cueni and Fiechter 2013). 
28 Please refer to Chapter 2 for an extensive review of sociopsychological factors that can drive herding behavior 
of individuals. 
29 The term security analyst indicates an analyst that is covering stocks and other securities in financial markets.  
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markets, they offer an ideal setting in which to analyze herding behavior and its determinants 
(e.g., Chang et al. 2006).  
Analysts’ herding behavior results in a loss of information, increases information asymmetry, 
and ultimately leads to misallocation of scarce resources (e.g., Trueman 1994). To avoid this 
waste of resources, it is important to understand the drivers of analysts' herding behavior. 
Prior literature on herding behavior has focused on individual analyst characteristics. For 
instance, Hong et al. (2000) and Clement and Tse (2005) have shown that individual factors 
such as job experience and self-assessed ability influence the herding behavior of analysts. 
However, the literature on analysts' herding behavior is largely silent about the influence of 
the institutional environment. The size of the broker (i.e. number of analysts employed) as a 
proxy for reputation or available resources is the only institutional factor appearing in 
previous research on analysts’ herding behavior.30 As research from other fields in economics 
generally finds a strong impact of various institutional factors on human behavior and well-
being (e.g., Veblen 1899; Williamson 1975; Frey and Stutzer 2002b), we expect that 
institutional factors influence analysts’ herding behavior beyond the individual analyst 
characteristics. In addition, recent anecdotal evidence also suggests that the institutional 
environment affects analysts’ forecasting behavior. For example, Bloomberg Markets 
Magazine subtitled one of its cover stories “Fed up with big bank’s conflicts, analysts are 
starting their own firms”, explaining that analysts “[…] grew fed up with a culture that prized 
irrational exuberance over sober analysis” (Robinson 2009, p. 46). 
This study examines the influence of institutional factors on the herding behavior of security 
analysts. First, to achieve this goal, a general framework combining individual and 
institutional factors is presented. The framework analyzes the costs of non-herding (CONH) 
that influence the forecasting behavior of analysts (and of other information-providing agents 
in general). Low CONH indicates that the costs of not following the herd are low for a 
particular analyst, and that the analyst is thus less prone to herding behavior than other 
analysts facing higher CONH. Second, based on the framework, we introduce and examine 
the influence of a new institutional factor, ownership, on the herding behavior of security 
analysts. Specifically, we investigate, firstly, whether analysts working at publicly listed 
                                                
30 We do acknowledge that the literature on analysts' forecast errors addresses institutional factors such as 
brokers’ underwriting and investment banking activities (O’Brien et al. 2005; Cowen et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et 
al. 2006; Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007, Barber et al. 2007), the geographical distance between the analyst 
and the covered company (Malloy 2005), and financial incentives in relation to analysts’ accuracy (Groysberg et 
al. 2011). 
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brokerage houses are more likely to herd than analysts from privately held brokers, and 
secondly, if this effect is different for analysts covering their own sector (i.e., financial sector 
stocks) compared to analysts covering other sectors.  
First, we predict that analysts from public brokers are less independent and, thus, more prone 
to herding behavior than analysts from private brokers, because analysts from public brokers 
face higher costs when processing soft information, i.e. information that “cannot be directly 
verified by anyone other than the agent who produces it” (Stein 2002, p. 1892). Soft 
information is crucial in establishing an independent opinion. The processing of soft 
information is more difficult in more centralized and regulated environments with taller 
hierarchies which hold the scope and size of the brokerage fixed (Stein 2002; Berger et al. 
2005). Therefore, we expect the CONH to be lower for analysts from private brokers than for 
analysts from public brokers, as the former companies generally share flatter hierarchies and 
operate in a more decentralized manner than publicly listed brokers. Lower costs are expected 
to lead to less herding behavior among analysts.  
Second, we expect that the difference in CONH between analysts from publicly listed and 
privately held brokers is substantially larger for analysts covering the financial sector. These 
analysts could face higher costs because their forecasts influence not only the valuation of the 
covered firms in the financial sector but also the valuation of their own employer, as their 
employer is listed in the same sector. Forecasts of financial sector analysts31 thus exert an 
externality on their employer’s stock valuation, thereby affecting the bonuses and career 
prospects of their own executives. Hence, we predict that the difference in herding behavior 
between analysts from publicly listed brokers and analysts from privately held brokers is 
larger among analysts covering the financial sector than among analysts covering other 
sectors. 
 To test our main research question, we investigated analyst forecast revisions32 from 1999 to 
2008. We selected this time period because the last financial crisis has provided many 
anecdotes of security analysts who did not herd and were bullied or even dismissed as a result 
(see, e.g., The Economist 2009; Robinson 2009). We constructed the herding measure 
following Gleason and Lee (2003) and Clement and Tse (2005). The empirical proxy 
                                                
31 The term financial sector analysts stands for analysts that are covering stocks of companies from the financial 
sector, like banks and other financial services firms. 
32 During a financial period (e.g., a financial year), an analyst usually revises his or her forecast on a certain 
stock several times in order to adjust his or her prediction according to new information about the listed 
company. We focus on analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts of listed U.S. companies. 
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classifies forecast revisions of earnings as bold if the analyst’s forecast revision deviates from 
both the prior forecast and the prerevision consensus, and as herding if the forecast revision is 
issued between the analyst’s prior forecast and the prerevision consensus. The prerevision 
consensus is the averaged forecast of all other analysts covering the same stock as the specific 
analyst, before the specific analyst revises his forecast.33  
To test the effect of the broker’s ownership, we hand-collected data on whether U.S. brokers 
are publicly listed or privately held and matched them with data on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. We enriched this unique dataset with data about the brokers’ underwriting 
business34 and their informational environment and included a full set of controls for the 
individual analyst characteristics. This allowed us to regress the herding measure on the 
ownership variable by controlling for differences in informational resources and reputation 
across public and private brokers, other institutional brokerage characteristics, and a full set of 
variables capturing individual analyst characteristics.  
First and foremost, we find a substantial effect of the brokers' ownership on the herding 
behavior of their analysts. Second, the findings reveal a tradeoff between the brokers' size and 
the brokers' ownership. At small brokers, the lack of resources and the lower reputation seems 
to make their analysts more prone to herding behavior; for privately held brokerages, the 
effect is more accentuated. However, this overall effect holds until a threshold of about 40 
analysts. Analysts working at a privately held brokerage that employs more than 40 analysts 
show a significantly lower probability of issuing herding forecasts of 2.6%. These findings 
reveal that analysts from private brokers face lower CONH on average, resulting in a lower 
propensity to herd, but also that this ownership effect does not become evident until a certain 
level of available resources is reached. 
Third, we can show that the ownership effect is driven by the group of analysts covering the 
sector they are working in, namely the analysts covering financial sector stocks. Again, the 
probability of issuing a herding forecast decreases with the broker’s size for analysts at both 
types of brokers, but for analysts at privately held brokers the decrease is much stronger. 
Hence, the difference in the probability of issuing a herding forecast between financial sector 
analysts working at private brokers and those at public brokers becomes significant at the 
level of broker size of 24 analysts. At this level, the probability of issuing a herding forecast is 
                                                
33 Please also refer to the data section (4.3) and Figure 1 for a more extensive explanation of the herding measure 
employed in this chapter.  
34 Many brokerage houses are engaged in underwriting business that mostly includes services for initial public 
offerings and seasoned equity offerings of firms (debt issuance and equity issuance). 
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3.0% lower for a financial sector analyst at a private broker than for the same analyst at a 
public broker. At a higher level of broker size of 60 analysts, the probability of herding for 
financial sector analysts from a private broker is 6.5% lower than for the same analysts at a 
publicly listed broker. To reach the same effect, for example, an analyst with 1 year of 
professional experience would have to gain more than 26 years of additional experience. 
These differences in the probability of herding account for an economically meaningful 
impact of the broker’s ownership on analysts’ CONH and, hence, on their herding behavior. 
Fourth, we can confirm the findings by Clement and Tse (2005) that bold forecasts are more 
accurate than herding forecasts, and not simply the result of overconfidence on the part of 
poorly informed financial sector analysts. Finally, the effect is robust to a battery of additional 
checks, all confirming our results.  
The insights we gain from our study help to understand how institutional factors in brokerage 
houses influence herding behavior. The institutional factor of ownership addresses not only a 
different channel from the institutional determinants already used in the literature, a broker’s 
reputation or available resources, but also a different channel from a broker’s investment 
banking business, as used in the forecast error literature. Our findings show that the 
environment at publicly listed brokerage houses constrains financial sector analysts, 
increasing their CONH and hindering them from revealing their private information. This 
impedes efficient information aggregation and biases the investors’ view of the future 
performance of the financial sector. As we show that a more independent analysis is provided 
by financial sector analysts working with privately held brokers, our findings inform investors 
and regulators about the factors that lower the analysts’ CONH. Thus, a higher attention to 
forecasts from privately held brokers might support a more genuine and independent 
forecasting of the future performance of financial sector stocks, enabling a more efficient 
asset and resource allocation in financial markets. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we review the related literature and introduce 
ownership as an additional institutional determinant of analysts' herding behavior. Section 4.3 
describes our data. Section 4.4 explains the methods and predictions. Our results and the 
according robustness checks are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2. Literature, Framework and New Institutional Determinant 
of Analysts’ Herding Behavior 
4.2.1. Individual Analyst Characteristics and Analysts’ Herding Behavior 
The job of sell-side analysts is to provide information about the stocks they cover. Analysts’ 
forecasts appear to reveal valuable private information for investors (e.g., Womack 1996; 
Kelly and Ljungqvist 2007). For investors, distinguishing between valuable and valueless 
information is difficult, as analysts’ forecasts can be biased due to various distorting 
incentives.35 A recent example was the discussion about the analyst Scott Devitt, who covered 
the IPO36 of Facebook in 2012 for lead underwriter Morgan Stanley. When Devitt lowered his 
earnings estimates for Facebook, there was uproar in the industry. The press called Devitt the 
“sober man in world of hype”37, as no one expected that the analyst of the lead underwriter 
would reveal pessimistic information days before the biggest IPO in history – thus clearly 
confirming that investors perceive analysts as biased (Toonkel 2012). 
In general, analysts’ performance can be measured ex-post by analyzing the forecast errors, 
which provides analysts with an incentive to issue accurate forecasts. This incentive matches 
the investors’ incentive to receive valuable information as the basis for decisions about when 
and how to invest. However, biased forecasts cannot be detected ex ante, and it also remains 
unclear ex post how much information was available to the analysts at the time the forecasts 
were made. Because of this lack of knowledge, the ability of analysts and their peers is not 
usually assessed in absolute error terms but in a relative measure, that is, by benchmarking.38  
In their seminal paper, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that such performance 
benchmarking leads to herding behavior among analysts.39 In Scharfstein and Stein’s model, 
                                                
35 For a detailed description about the job and environment the sell-side analyst works in, refer, e.g., to Michaely 
and Womack (2005). 
36 Facebook conducted its initial public offering (IPO) on May 18, 2012 at the Nasdaq stock exchange. 
37 Devitt was called “sober man in world of hype” by several news agencies, see, e.g., Jessica Toonkel’s article 
“Morgan Stanley’s Facebook analyst: Sober man in world of hype” for Reuters (May 31, 2012), retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/31/us-facebook-morganstanley-devitt-idUSBRE84U04U20120531, 
 on September 5, 2013.  
38 A substantial number of studies support the view that forecast accuracy is usually not that important for sell-
side analysts as long as their forecasts do not reach extreme errors, while how “extreme” is defined is usually a 
relative concept (see, e.g., Clement and Tse 2003; Groysberg et al. 2011). Again, this notion supports the 
importance of analyzing herd behavior among sell-side analysts and of identifying the characteristics that 
empower analysts to reveal their full private information. 
39 Herding behavior has also been studied in other contexts, such as informational cascades (see, e.g., 
Bikhchandanani et al. 1992; Banerjee 1992; Welch 1992) or availability cascades (Kuran and Sunstein 1999); for 
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analysts always herd, as it is “better to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally” 
in Keynes’s words (1936, p. 158). In contrast, in Zwiebel’s (1995) extended model it is 
always the best strategy to succeed. However, both models predict that, for the majority of 
analysts, who are of mediocre ability, hiding in the herd is the dominant strategy due to ex-
ante uncertainty about the future state of the world.  
Hong et al. (2000) empirically test the reputation-based herding behavior models of 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Zwiebel (1995). They proxy the analysts’ reputation with the 
reputation of the brokerage house they work for by counting the number of analysts that are 
employed at the same house. The larger the number of analysts, the higher is the reputation of 
the brokerage and, thus, the higher is the individual analyst’s reputation. They categorize the 
analyst’s behavior by measuring whether the analyst‘s forecast moves away from the 
consensus (i.e. bold behavior) or towards the consensus (i.e. herding behavior). They show 
that, after controlling for forecast accuracy, inexperienced analysts provide less bold forecasts 
and that they are more likely to be dismissed when issuing a bold forecast. Thus, 
inexperienced analysts face stronger incentives to herd than experienced analysts, because the 
inexperienced face higher costs if they neither herd nor make accurate enough forecasts. In 
addition, they provide evidence that being bold and inaccurate leads to bad career outcomes, 
while being bold and accurate does not significantly boost analysts’ career prospects. Hence, 
reputational concerns drive inexperienced analysts to herd because they cannot draw on their 
established reputation in the market. 
Clement and Tse (2005) confirm the association between analysts’ reputations and their 
herding behavior and expand the finding by including additional individual analyst 
characteristics. These are based on the model by Trueman (1994) who proposes that analysts’ 
self-assessed ability drives herding behavior. Clement and Tse (2005) find that the probability 
that analysts reveal their full private information (i.e., that they issue a non-herding forecast) 
increases with the experience of the analysts, their last years’ forecast accuracy (i.e., their 
self-assessed ability), and the frequency with which they issue forecasts; it decreases with 
both the number of industries or firms covered and the days elapsed since the prior forecast of 
another analyst.40  
                                                                                                                                                   
a general discussion of the context of social learning and herding behavior in financial markets see, e.g, 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003; 2009). Please refer also to Chapter 2 for an extensive discussion of studies on 
herding behavior. 
40 Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) support the positive correlation of frequency on analysts’ bold behavior of their 
stock recommendations. Also Graham (1999) studies the association of herding behavior and individual analyst 
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In contrast to Clement and Tse, Bernhardt et al. (2006) find that analysts in general exhibit 
anti-herding behavior. However, as our study focuses on forecast revisions, it is important to 
note that there is no discrepancy between both studies with regard to forecast revisions. 
Bernhardt et al (2006) and Clement and Tse (2005) both show that revisions moving further 
away from the consensus are more likely to accurately reveal new private information to the 
market than revisions that converge with the consensus. Overall, the association between the 
individual analyst characteristics and the analysts’ herding behavior is well grounded in the 
theoretical and empirical literature.  
4.2.2. Institutional Brokerage Characteristics and Herding Behavior 
The literature on herding behavior of analysts employs only one institutional characteristic, 
that is, the broker’s size measured by the number of analysts employed.41 Hong et al. (2000) 
includes the size of the brokerage as a proxy for whether the analysts experienced a favorable 
job separation. They imply that joining large brokers increases analysts’ reputations and 
prestige (see also Hong and Kubik 2003).42 Aside from the use of broker size as a measure of 
institutional reputation, Clement (1999) explains his finding that analysts working at a larger 
brokerage exhibit a higher forecast accuracy with the larger resources available to them when 
making forecasts. Clement and Tse (2005) show that the more analysts working in a 
brokerage house, the lower is the probability that the individual analyst issues a herding 
forecast. In contrast, Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) find evidence that analysts working with 
larger brokerage houses exhibit more herding behavior in their stock recommendations43. 
                                                                                                                                                   
characteristics in a model similar to Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Welch (2000) tests analysts’ herding behavior 
empirically but not explicitly reputational-herding in the sense of Scharfstein and Stein (1990). 
41 We are aware only of the study by Chen and Jiang (2006) that partly includes investment banking business 
controls and analyzes a topic similar to herding behavior. However, they specifically study the analysts’ over- 
and underweighting of their private and of public information when making forecasts. Furthermore, they do not 
include controls on the level of the brokers’ underwriting business but at the level of the individual stock the 
analyst covers. 
42 Not within the context of analyst herding behavior, but in a sociological study about conformism, Phillips and 
Zuckerman (2001) show that analysts exhibit a substantial degree of conformity when issuing sell ratings, but 
also that the analysts’ reputations have a strong influence on conformism. Analysts with very low or very high 
reputations have a higher probability of issuing a sell rating, thus conforming less. In a study analyzing 216 cases 
of alleged corporate fraud, Dyck et al. (2010) provide evidence that highly reputed analysts tend to blow the 
whistle more often. They link this finding to the enhanced information resources of large, prestigious brokerage 
houses. This indicates the importance of the information resources available to analysts when they want to make 
a credible statement against the opinion prevailing in the market. 
43 Stock recommendations are the second type of forecasts that security analysts are releasing, besides the EPS 
forecasts. Normally, the recommendations indicate if the stock should be bought or sold, and are usually labeld 
with “sell”, “hold”, or “buy” (or additionally “strong sell” and “strong buy”). In the literature, stock 
recommendations are seen as investment advice for retail or small-investors, while the EPS forecasts are seen as 
advice for institutional investors and investment professionals (see, e.g., Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2009).  
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Importantly, the studies use different herding measures, earnings estimates per share versus 
stock recommendations. Because analysts use stock recommendations and earnings estimates 
as different signals to the market (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007), the herding behavior 
might also differ. Therefore, the results reported by Clement and Tse (2005) and by Jegadeesh 
and Kim (2010) should be compared with caution.  
In contrast to the literature on analysts’ herding behavior, the literature on analysts’ forecast 
errors provides several studies emphasizing the importance of investment banking 
relationships of brokerage houses (Lin and McNichols 1998; Daniel et al. 2002; Michaely and 
Womack 2005). The studies suggest that analysts’ forecasts can be of low accuracy when the 
broker incentivizes the analyst to boost its underwriting business. The analyst could, for 
example, issue favorable forecasts for the stocks of underwriter clients or hostile forecasts for 
the stocks of clients’ competitors. The direct impact of investment banking business on 
affiliated sell-side analysts is discussed controversially in the analyst literature (see, e.g., 
Jackson 2005; O’Brien et al. 2005; Cowen et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2006; Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar 2007; Barber et al. 2007; Mehran and Stulz 2007). O’Brien et al (2005), for 
example, show that underwriting business provides incentives for affiliated sell-side analysts 
to distort their forecasting behavior. In contrast, Cowen et al. (2006), provide evidence that 
the incentive of brokers to maintain their reputation can reduce the forecast errors of sell-side 
analysts, and hence, affiliated analysts issue less biased forecasts than unaffiliated analysts. 
However, the literature of investors’ reactions to analysts’ forecasts reveals a largely clear 
view, showing that investors considerably discount the forecasts of analysts working for 
brokerage houses with a substantial underwriting business (see, e.g., Lin and McNichols 
1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Malloy 2005; Barber et al. 2007; Agrawal and Chen 
2008). This finding supports the notion that the investment banking business negatively 
affects analysts’ forecasting behavior or, at least, that it is perceived as such by investors. 
Thus, studies designed to analyze analysts’ forecasting behavior should control for the 
investment banking business done by the brokerage houses at which the analysts are 
employed. 
A last institutional factor that is discussed in the literature on analysts’ forecast errors is the 
influence of analysts’ pay. It might appear counterintuitive, but the existing evidence suggests 
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that analysts’ pay is not strongly linked to forecast accuracy (Groysberg et al. 2011).44 In 
contrast, Mikhail et al. (1999) and Hong and Kubik (2003) provide evidence that analysts who 
issue more accurate forecasts experience more favorable job separations. But, on the same tier 
of brokerage houses, analyst pay is generally not related to forecast accuracy (Groysberg et al. 
2011). Only analysts who issue highly inaccurate bold forecasts have a much higher 
probability of experiencing an unfavorable job separation. Thus, analysts from a certain tier of 
brokerage houses are party to a Mirrlees contract, in which forecast accuracy within a normal 
range is not crucial for pay. This provides incentives to go with the herd, since the herd 
defines the normal range of accuracy (see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, p. 304). In 
contrast, Groysberg et al. (2011) show that, in a large investment bank, the analysts’ ability to 
promote their employers’ investment banking business (in particular, underwriting business) 
is related to their pay, which lowers the analysts’ incentive to reveal private information if it 
is not in favor of the employer’s investment banking business.45 However, it is very difficult 
to obtain data about analyst compensation; only case studies analyzing a single firm exist, and 
these are not able to provide a meaningful overview of the compensation plans of multiple 
brokers. 
Overall, compared to the individual characteristics of analysts, the literature is largely silent 
on the influence of the institutional environment on analysts’ herding behavior; in particular, 
there is no framework integrating both groups of factors. While broker size appears in the 
herding literature, the literature on analyst forecast errors mainly tackles the institutional 
factor of investment banking business. We thus consider these two factors in our analysis. 
Due to lack of data on analyst compensation, we are not able to include the institutional factor 
in our study, which is, unfortunately, usual in the literature. However, we aim to shed further 
light on the influence of the institutional environment on analyst herding behavior. Therefore, 
we address the issue of the lack of a general framework in the literature on analysts’ herding 
behavior by explicitly combining institutional factors of the brokerage houses and the 
analysts’ individual characteristics.  
                                                
44 See also, e.g., Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) and Hilary and Hsu (2013) for a comparison of the 
incentives and intentions of analysts to distort their forecast and not simply to provide the most accurate forecast 
possible. 
45 Following this reasoning, the Sarbanes-Oxley act and the SEC’s Global Research Analyst Settlement aim at 
prohibiting the linkage of analysts’ pay with investment banking activities.   
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4.2.3. The Costs of Non-Herding Framework 
To capture the influence of both individual and institutional characteristics on analysts’ 
forecasting behavior, we introduce a simple framework. We want to know which factors 
support analysts in conveying their private information and thus exhibiting non-herding 
behavior. Thus, we subsume all incentives that hinder the analysts’ independence to reveal 
their private information and that make it costly for the analysts to engage in non-herding 
behavior (i.e. bold behavior) into the costs of non-herding (CONH). The CONH stand for all 
different kinds of costs, such as monetary, psychological or reputational costs stemming from 
the effort to establish a bold opinion in the brokerage (or the market) and from the resulting 
deterioration of career prospects.46 Based on these terms, we can summarize the discussed 
individual and institutional factors affecting the CONH.  
The literature states two individual factors that influence the CONH47: first, the analysts’ 
individual reputation, and, second, the analysts’ self-assessed ability. For the analysts’ 
reputation, prior research shows empirically that a high reputation lowers, ceteris paribus, the 
analyst’s CONH and, thus, facilitates bold behavior (see, e.g., Hong et al. 2000; Phillips and 
Zuckerman 2001; Clement and Tse 2005; Dyck et al. 2010). We also subsume the analyst’s 
experience under the individual factor reputation. Experience is mostly another proxy for 
reputation, because experience documents analysts’ track record and their survival in the 
highly competitive market, both indicating ability proxied by reputation. Clement and Tse 
(2005) show that both an analyst’s experience with a certain stock (firm) and overall 
experience on the job are positively correlated with the analyst’s probability of issuing a bold 
forecast, indicating a negative association with the CONH, in line with reputation.48 
Second, self-assessed ability is negatively correlated with analysts’ CONH (Clement and Tse 
2005). A lower self-assessed ability increases the expected CONH as it raises the probability 
of a large forecast error and, thus, makes the analyst more prone to herd behavior. 
                                                
46 For example, in Bloomberg Markets Magazine, three equity analysts tell their stories of being bullied or even 
dismissed by their internal and external peers, sales peoples and supervisors because they forecast a bold 
(negative) economic trend in their industry sectors; finally, they quit their jobs. Ex post, all of them executed a 
correct analysis (Robinson 2009). 
47 We abstract from individual differences between analysts at the psychological level. Some analysts might have 
different dispositions and preferences with regard to risk behavior or other types of behavioral differences. For a 
comprehensive survey of behavioral differences, see Daniel et al. (2002). 
48 One could argue that, in general, older people, who have worked for a long time in a well-paid job such as that 
of a financial analyst, face lower CONH due to their wealth and resulting financial independence. However, we 
do not take such characteristics into account in this study. 
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Prior literature also points at other factors that affect analysts’ herding behavior and that are 
usually seen as individual characteristics (see, e.g., Clement and Tse 2005 or Hilary and Hsu 
2013). Various studies show that the frequency with which the analyst issues forecasts, the 
days elapsed since the last forecast has been issued, and the number of days remaining until 
the end of the stock’s financial period are all positively correlated with the analyst's 
probability of issuing a bold forecast (see, e.g., Clement and Tse 2005). However, we do not 
identify these factors as either individual or institutional factors, nor as factors affecting the 
CONH of analysts directly. Instead, we classify them as factors that result from the individual 
and institutional determinants of analysts’ forecasting behavior. For example, specific 
analysts have a low frequency of issuing forecasts because they already enjoy high 
reputations and, hence, do not need to show their ability by processing all incoming 
information and updating their forecasts (see, e.g., Hong et al. 2000).  
On the other hand, institutional factors are also expected to influence the costs of non-herding. 
We are aware of four institutional factors cited in the literature as influencing analysts’ 
forecasting behavior. The first is the way the analysts’ performance is measured and 
compensated by the brokerage. As analysts’ performance is usually evaluated by using a 
relative measure (benchmarking), the analysts face higher expected CONH, the more they 
deviate from the benchmark (Scharfstein and Stein 1990). This is because analysts who are 
close to the benchmark will not be blamed for anything with certainty; they can hide in the 
herd. The benchmarking incentivizes only highly able analysts to deviate from the herd (i.e. 
the consensus), because only they have a positive expected utility when deviating (see, e.g., 
Zwiebel 1995). In addition, as prior research has shown, long-term career concerns provide 
incentives for analysts to issue accurate forecasts (Mikhail et al. 1999 or Hong and Kubik 
2003). Short term, during their appointment with a certain broker, analysts’ compensation is 
usually not linked with the accuracy of their forecasts but with their ability to support their 
employer’s investment banking business (Groysberg et al. 2011). Again, this factor raises the 
short-term CONH of analysts as they cannot independently decide to reveal their private 
information, because it will be scrutinized by investment banking executives. This shows the 
analysts’ dilemma between having short-term costs with certainty when issuing bold forecasts 
or gaining long term benefits if their bold forecasts prove to be correct ex post and thus boost 
their career prospects. 
Second, if analysts’ abilities to support the investment banking business of their employer are 
positively linked to their compensation and (in-house) reputation, it seems obvious that the 
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broker’s investment banking business influences their forecasting behavior. Thus, we expect 
that the higher the broker’s involvement in the investment banking business, the higher is the 
analyst’s CONH.49 Importantly, prior research is unclear about the effect of investment 
banking business (see, e.g., Cowen et al. 2006 or Barber et al. 2007). A larger involvement in 
investment banking business could also lead to a better access to information about the 
companies covered or could provide higher reputational costs for a brokerage house for 
issuing forecasts of low accuracy. Both effects might adjust or even exceed the negative effect 
of the broker’s investment banking business on the analyst’s CONH. 
Third, the reputation of the brokerage house, instead of the reputation of the individual 
analyst, can support independent behavior and lower the CONH for the analyst, too. Both 
institutional and individual reputations are highly correlated because analysts with a high 
reputation are actively sought by first-tier brokerage houses (Hong and Kubik 2003). 
Fourth, as Clement (1999) shows, a lower level of available resources increases the chance of 
issuing a less accurate forecast. When working in a small brokerage, the scarcity of resources 
raises the probability of missing or not receiving important information or of processing the 
information too slowly. Thus, analysts working in a scarce-resource environment face higher 
CONH, because they have to exert a higher effort to establish a bold opinion in the market 
and not to go with the herd. 
The framework of the CONH provides a systematic way to disentangle and compare the 
effects of the various individual and institutional factors influencing analysts’ forecasting 
behavior. In a next step, we introduce an additional institutional factor in order to make the 
framework on analysts’ forecasting behavior more comprehensive. 
4.2.4. The Ownership Effect and Analysts’ Herding Behavior 
Based on the framework of the CONH, we introduce an additional institutional factor that is 
expected to have a substantial impact on analysts’ forecasting behavior but has so far not been 
considered in the literature. The new factor addresses a different channel than earlier 
determinants of analysts’ forecasting behavior and focuses on one of the main differences of 
                                                
49 For example, Barber et al (2007, p. 493) state: “Perhaps the best-known example is Sanford Bernstein, which 
has been described as ‘one of the more independent research houses – it only has a small syndicate business’ 
(Financial Times, September 8, 2003, p. 26).” Accordingly, they provide evidence that unaffiliated analysts issue 
more accurate forecasts. 
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firms, namely their financing. As Rajan (2012) states in his AFA Presidential Address “The 
nature of firms and financing are intimately linked”.  
We will exploit the channel of the brokers’ financing, thereby exploring the distinctive 
differences between privately held and publicly listed brokerage houses and their impact on 
analysts’ CONH. Privately held brokerage houses are typically lower tier, employ a smaller 
number of employees, and are held by majority shareholders, who often participate in the 
management (Beatty and Harris 1999; Ke et al. 1999; Beatty et al. 2002). We expect the 
effect of the brokers’ ownership on herding behavior to be twofold: (1) analysts from public 
brokers face higher CONH than analysts from private brokers when processing soft (i.e. bold) 
information and (2) this CONH is substantially larger for the subgroup of analysts from public 
brokers covering the financial sector, as their forecasts exert an externality on their 
employer’s valuation. 
(1): We rely on Stein’s (2002) model on the information production in firms to explain 
theoretically why privately held brokerage houses might provide an institutional environment 
in which analysts face lower CONH and, hence, exhibit less herding behavior than analysts 
working in publicly listed houses. He explains theoretically how banks with flatter hierarchies 
and a more decentralized organizational setup are typically more efficient in producing and 
processing soft information, holding scope and size fixed. Soft information is costly to 
“harden” and cannot be easily transmitted inside the firm. Stein describes soft information as  
“[…] information that cannot be directly verified by anyone other than the agent 
who produces it. For example, a loan officer who has worked with a small-
company president may come to believe that the president is honest and 
hardworking – in other words, the classic candidate for an unsecured "character 
loan." Unfortunately, these attributes cannot be unambiguously documented in a 
report that the loan officer can pass on to his superiors. This situation contrasts 
sharply with, for example, an application for a home mortgage loan. Here the 
decision of whether or not to extend credit is likely to be made primarily based on 
‘hard’, verifiable information, such as the income shown on the borrower's last 
several tax returns.” (Stein 2002, p. 1892)  
A security analyst produces soft information when interpreting the existing information about 
a certain stock in an individual way, creating new information and, hence, a bold forecast. By 
doing so, the analyst cannot rely on the same interpretation of the facts as the majority of the 
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analysts. Thus, bold analysts have to explain carefully and extensively (e.g., to their 
supervisors, investors or managers of the covered firm) why they are deviating from the 
opinion currently prevailing in the market. A stronger effort to communicate soft information 
results in higher CONH. Michaely and Womack (2005, p. 414) explain in detail how forecasts 
are “scrutinized by a research oversight committee and the legal department of the brokerage 
house before release.” Based on such anecdotal evidence (see also Robinson 2009) and own 
interviews, we assume that publicly listed brokers have steeper hierarchies and more complex 
decision-making processes.50 Therefore, analysts working in such a brokerage face higher 
costs in explaining, transmitting, and achieving bold forecasts. 
Obviously, one could argue that banks without strong supervision of analysts’ forecasting 
allow them to issue even more herding forecasts. Two considerations contradict this. First, 
such oversight committees have a hard job to establish their own opinion about the forecast 
the analyst wants to issue. Usually, the forecast is compared to other analysts’ forecasts, 
which tends to make the analyst even more prone to herding behavior. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that the broker’s institutional incentives usually try to bias the analysts’ forecasts 
toward the broker’s interests as, for example, cited in Michaely and Womack (2005, p. 401) 
in the case of Morgan Stanley’s internal memo: “Our objective […] is to adopt a policy, fully 
understood by the entire firm, including the Research Department, that we do not make 
negative or controversial comments about our clients as a matter of sound business practices”. 
Second, as shown in prior studies, analysts issuing highly accurate forecasts face favorable 
career prospects (Hong and Kubik 2003). If issuing very inaccurate forecasts, analysts face 
high personal costs (turnover) and thus, are generally not motivated by individual career 
concerns to issue inaccurate forecasts per se (Hong et al. 2000; Groysberg et al. 2011). 
There is also empirical evidence that supports Stein’s (2002) model of soft and hard 
information in different organizational settings. Berger et al. (2005) confirm Stein’s model by 
providing evidence that decentralized banks with short decision-making procedures are more 
able to collect, process, and act on soft information than centralized banks with tall 
hierarchies. Likewise, Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Guadalupe et al. (2012) show that there is a 
tendency to flatten the hierarchies in public firms, supporting Stein’s notion (2002) that flat 
hierarchies deal better with soft information. Guadalupe et al. (2012) explicitly state the trend 
                                                
50 Please refer also to the interview study in Chapter 3. The interviews conducted with analysts that worked in 
privately held and publicly listed brokerage houses and top executives such as a former CEO of a Fortune 500 
Bank in Switzerland confirm that privately held banks create a different environment to collect, transmit and 
process soft information, also in relation to analyst forecasts. 
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to organize publicly listed firms closer to partnerships, as the firms are facing a highly 
competitive environment with less physical capital intensive work; privately held brokerage 
houses usually constitute as partnerships (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2001).  
(2): The effect of ownership on analyst herding behavior is particularly pronounced for the 
subgroup of analysts covering their own sector, that is, the financial sector. By providing 
information about the condition of the firms they cover, analysts influence not only the 
valuation and the access to capital of the firms involved, but also (a) the firm’s general 
reputation, its corporate strategy, and its compensation policies as well as (b) the reputation, 
compensation, and career prospects of the executives (Healy and Palepu 2001; Hribar and 
Jenkins 2004; Westphal and Clement 2008).51 Therefore, the subgroup of analysts covering 
the financial sector while working at publicly listed brokerage houses do not only cover their 
employer’s competitors and influence their valuation, but also the valuation of their own 
employer. By doing so, they also affect the reputation and compensation of their broker’s 
executives. The ownership effect unveils the externalities of analysts’ forecasts on their own 
employer’s stock and all the related consequences, resulting in higher CONH for the analyst. 
This impact can be further rationalized by the fact that investors not only invest directly in 
specific stocks but also target stocks of a certain sector altogether and herd into certain 
industry sectors (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Choi and Sias 2009). If, for example, 
analysts issue pessimistic earnings estimates about some of their employer’s competitors, they 
can harm the valuation of their own employer and thus exert a negative externality on their 
listed brokerage house. 
On the one hand, financial sector analysts from publicly listed brokerage houses have a lower 
incentive to reveal bad news and delicate information about their employers’ competitors 
because they could negatively influence their own employers’ valuation. On the other hand, 
financial sector analysts from a publicly listed brokerage do not have an incentive to 
disseminate bold positive news about a competitor either, as this could lead to a reduced 
valuation of their employer’s stock compared to its competitor. However, financial sector 
analysts have to follow the information flow on the companies covered and ought to issue 
forecasts. Hence, the easiest way to issue a forecast without facing the costs of exposing 
                                                
51 This also explains why executives are interested in maintaining a positive relationship with analysts covering 
their firms. The literature shows that executives of stocks under coverage aim to influence the analysts to 
produce relatively positive forecasts about the future condition of the executives’ firms. The analysts in turn 
aspire to receive favorable access to the top management of the firms they cover and other professional favors 
(Francis and Philbrick 1993; Lim 2001; Westphal and Clement 2008). 
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themselves to their executives or their employers’ competitors is to hide in the herd. This 
reasoning explains why we are not interested in measuring a forecast error or a unidirectional 
bias of the analysts’ earnings estimates but rather the herding behavior of analysts.  
In contrast to publicly listed firms, analysts working with a privately held brokerage house 
encounter a fundamentally different and more independent institutional environment. The 
valuation of the analysts’ employer does not depend on the stock market. Thus, they can 
reveal their private information to a larger extent independently than analysts working for 
publicly listed brokers.  
This difference between financial sector analysts working at privately held and publicly listed 
brokers allows us to test the ownership effect across two parameters: Firstly via the higher 
costs of soft information production, in general; secondly, via the capital market dependency, 
in particular. While the first parameter provides the basis of the ownership effect equal among 
all analysts, the second one pronounces the effect for financial sector analysts. We expect that 
due to the capital market dependency, the difference in CONH between an analyst from a 
public broker and an analyst from a private broker is substantially larger if they cover stocks 
from the financial sector.  
4.3. Data Sources, Variable Construction and Sample Selection 
4.3.1. Institutional Factors and Boldness Measure 
To test our hypothesis that the institutional factor of a brokerage house’s ownership 
influences the forecasting behavior of an analyst, we employ data on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts from the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (I/B/E/S) database. We matched 
the analysts’ earnings forecast data with the data on the ownership (i.e., privately held or 
publicly listed) of the brokerage house the analyst is working for. We used the I/B/E/S 
translation files to obtain the names of the brokerage houses, and we hand-collected data on 
their ownership for the entire sample period by using various sources: FINRA-BrokerCheck of 
the Financial Industry Regulation Authority, the Institution Search database of the National 
Information Center of the Federal Financials Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), the 
Investment Adviser Information Reports of the Security Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Bloomberg Businessweek, LexisNexis, Wikipedia, and company homepages. Also, we cross-
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checked our data with the data available from the appendixes of prior studies that track 
changes of broker names over several years due to M&A activities (Corwin and Schultz 2005; 
Hong and Kacperczyk 2010; Bao and Edmans 2011). We checked possible affiliations in each 
year of the data sample and classified each brokerage house for each year into the binominal 
variable Private, taking the value of 1 if the analyst was working for a privately held 
brokerage house; and 0 otherwise. If a brokerage house was a subsidiary of a publicly listed 
brokerage house or a listed financial services company, we classified this broker as not 
privately held. 
As our dependent variable, we construct a measure for herding behavior with the earnings 
estimates’ data from the detailed history file of I/B/E/S. We focus on forecast revisions 
because before issuing a revision, the analyst i has to decide whether to follow the herd or to 
trust in his or her own private information (i.e., issuing a bold forecast). We use the binominal 
boldness measure (Bold) introduced by Gleason and Lee (2003) and Clement and Tse (2005) 
to distinguish between bold and herding forecast revisions (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Measure of Analysts’ Herding Behavior 
 
 
 An analyst deviating from both, his or her own prior earnings estimate and the prerevision 
consensus reveals new private information to the market and, thus, issues a bold forecast 
(Bold = 1). In contrast, forecast revisions are classified as herding forecasts (Bold = 0) if they 
lie between the analyst’s prior forecast and the pre-revision consensus, as illustrated in Figure 
1.52 This captures the idea that the analysts exhibit herding behavior when deviating from 
their prior forecasts and revising towards the consensus. All other revisions that deviate from 
both the prior forecast and from the prerevision consensus are classified as bold, and the 
variable Bold takes on the value of 1. Prior research has documented that investors react more 
                                                
52 An additional detailed graphic explanation of the dependent variable measuring the herding behavior of an 
analyst is presented in Appendix B.  
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strongly to bold revisions than to herding revisions, providing evidence that bold revisions 
reveal more novel information to the market (Gleason and Lee 2003; Clement and Tse 2003).  
To additionally control for the investment banking business of the analyst’s brokerage house, 
we obtained data for the underwriting business from the database SDC Platinum. Again, as 
with the data for Private, we checked whether the broker was affiliated with a listed parent 
company and classified them according to their parent company. Similarly to Cowen et al. 
(2006) and Barber et al. (2007), we manually classified the various brokerage houses into four 
categories in each sample year: (1) Lead_Underwriter, brokerage houses (or their parent 
company) that served as lead underwriter in year t on at least one U.S. IPO or SEO53; (2) 
Co_Underwriter, brokerage houses (or their parent company) that acted as a co-manager in at 
least one U.S. IPO or SEO in year t; (3) Syndicate_Member, brokerages (or their parent 
company) that provided services as a syndicate member in at least one U.S. IPO or SEO in 
year t; (4) No Underwriting, brokerage houses (or their parent company) that were not 
registered in the SDC database and therefore are assumed not to have provided any 
underwriting service in year t. 
To generate a measure of the analyst’s resource environment and/or broker reputation, we 
relied on previous research and counted the number of analysts working with a specific 
brokerage house for each year (Clement 1999). We call this variable BrokerSize and use the 
log of (1+number of analysts) in our empirical analysis (see, e.g., Malloy 2005; Hilary and 
Hsu 2013). 
4.3.2. Control Variables 
To control for the analysts’ individual effects on their forecasting behavior, we constructed a 
comprehensive set of analyst-firm variables per year, that is, for analyst i who issues a 
forecast for firm j in the year t. First, we controlled for the analyst’s lagged accuracy 
(LagAccuracy), defined as the analyst i's accuracy of last year (t-1) for stock j. We calculated 
the analysts’ accuracy (Accuracy), defined as the maximum absolute forecast error (AFE)54 
for analysts covering firm j in year t (AFEmaxjt) minus the AFE of analyst i following firm j 
                                                
53 SEO stands for a seasoned equity offering and IPO for an initial public offering. An IPO indicates the going 
public of a formerly privately held company and the SEO a new equity issue of an already publicly listed 
company.  
54 The absolute forecast error (AFE) is defined as the absolute difference between the analyst’s EPS estimate (F) 
and the firm’s actual EPS (A) in year t scaled by the stock price (P) of firm j two days before the revision: 
AFEjit = |Fijt - Ajt| / Pj  (see, e.g., Hong and Kubik 2003 or Clement and Tse 2005). 
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in year t (AFEijt), with this difference scaled by the range of the maximum (AFEmaxjt) to the 
minimum (AFEminjt) of all the AFE for analysts covering stock j in year t (see, e.g., Hong and 
Kubik 2003 and Clement and Tse 2005).55 This measure takes on values between 0 and 1, 
where 1 is the most accurate estimate of an analyst covering stock j in year t and 0 is the least 
accurate estimate of an analyst covering the same stock j in the same year t (see equation 1): 	  
	  	   (1)	  
 
Next, we followed previous research to control for other individual analyst-firm 
characteristics (e.g., Lim 2001; Hong et al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003; Jackson 2005; 
Clement and Tse 2005; Hilary and Hsu 2013). DaysElapsed counts the days elapsed since the 
last forecast by any other analyst following the same firm j in year t. Horizon measures the 
number of days between the forecast date and the end of the fiscal period. Frequency is the 
number of the forecasts the analyst i issued on firm j during year t. GenExperience is the 
general experience of analyst i, measured as the number of years analyst i was employed as 
analyst. FirmExperience is calculated as the number of years analyst i covered firm j in year t. 
Both variables measure the experience of the analyst that is calculated on the base of the 
maximal range of the I/B/E/S database, starting in 1983. As we did not want to lose any 
observations due to left-censored analysts nor introduce a possible selection bias by excluding 
them, we used the full I/B/E/S sample. Companies is the number of companies analyst i is 
covering in year t. Similarly, Industries counts the number of two-digit SIC codes the analyst 
i covers in year t. 
                                                
55 For example, imagine an analyst i who issues an EPS forecast of USD 2.50 for stock j in year t. The actual 
EPS of stock j is USD 3. Thus, analysts i’s absolute forecast error equals AFEijt=(|3-2.50|/100)= 0.005 as the 
stock price of j two days before analyst i issued the EPS forecast was USD 100. The most inaccurate analyst 
covering the same stock j bears a AFEmaxjt of 0.02 because his or her EPS forecast was USD 1.00 and the most 
accurate analyst covering stock j yields AFEminjt of 0.001 as the forecast was USD 2.90. Finally, the Accuracy of 
analyst i covering stock j is in year t is Accuracyijt= (0.02-0.005)/(0.02-0.001)=(0.015/0.019)=0.789. If analyst i 
were the most accurate analyst in this example, his AFE would be equal to AFEmin, resulting in an Accuracy of 
1, which is naturally the highest value for Accuracy. 
Accuracyijt =
AFEmax jt! AFEijt
AFEmax jt! AFEmin jt
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4.3.3. Sample Selection 
We obtained the data on analysts’ earnings estimates (EPS) from the I/B/E/S Detailed 
Earnings History Files. For the translation of the I/B/E/S broker codes into the names of the 
brokerage houses, we used the I/B/E/S Broker Translation Files. As I/B/E/S (Thomson 
Reuters) ceased providing the Broker Translation File in late 2009, our sample period ends in 
2008.56 Our data starts in 1999 and spans a range of 10 years so as to have enough 
observations to provide statistically meaningful hypothesis tests, similar to previous research 
(see, e.g., Malloy 2005; Clement and Tse 2005; Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007).  
In accordance with prior studies focusing on annual earnings estimates, we retained the last 
earnings estimate an analyst i issued for a specific stock j in a particular year t, at least 30 
days and at most 1 year prior to the end of stock j’s financial period (O’Brien 1990; Sinha et 
al. 1997; Clement 1999; Clement and Tse 2005). The idea behind the focus on an analyst’s 
last EPS revision of a stock in a financial year is to achieve a homogenous group of forecasts, 
as analysts can revise their forecasts arbitrarily and in variable intervals. This leads to a 
reduction by around 75% of observations of the original data set, as an analyst typically issues 
about 4 estimates per stock per year. As we compare forecasts of a specific stock in a specific 
year, we had to eliminate all observations for which only one forecast per stock-year exists 
and observations with no prior year data on the analyst’s forecast accuracy. In addition, we 
excluded observations with no data on the ownership of the analyst’s brokerage house.57  
Further, we followed Clement and Tse (2005) and eliminated potential outliers in four steps: 
First, we obtained stock prices from The Center For Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Second, we facilitated comparisons across stocks by deflating forecast revisions and forecast 
errors (forecasted EPS – actual EPS) by the firm’s stock price 2 days before the forecast 
revision date. Third, we omitted outliers with these price-deflated forecast revisions above 
0.10 or below -0.10 and discarded observations with a price-deflated analyst error above 0.40 
or below -0.40.58 This resulted in an unbalanced panel data set of 136,428 earnings estimates 
(observations) issued by 5,760 analysts working with 228 brokerage houses during the years 
2000 to 2008.  
                                                
56 Note that because our analysis focuses on the last EPS forecast the analyst issues at least 30 days before the 
end of the reporting period, the year 2008 is the last possible sample period. 
57 Due the restriction of missing ownership data, we lose 7.8% of the final observations.  
58 Clement and Tse (2005) argue that these outliers are potentially distressed firms, suggesting that these 
observations are not comparable to the usual forecasts of analysts. In the same vein, other studies exclude 
observations in which the stock price is less than five dollars, or forecasts whose absolute forecast error exceeds 
10 dollars (see, e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk 2010). 
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4.4. Methods and Predictions 
We regress our measure for herding behavior (Bold) on our institutional factor of ownership 
(Private), controlling for other firm- and analyst-specific differences, as described in our 
framework. As Bold is a binominal variable, we use a non-linear logit model. We begin with 
the herding behavior model by Clement and Tse (2005), which controls for a full set of 
individual analyst characteristics, and extend it by adding the explanatory variable Private 
and the interaction term between Private and BrokerSize (INT_BrokerSize_Private) as well as 
controls for the broker’s underwriting business as specified in regression equation (2): 	  
Logit (Boldijt) = α0 + α1 Privateijt + α2 BrokerSizeijt  
 + α3 INT_BrokerSize_Privateijt + αm SDCmijt + αk Xkijt + εi   (2) 
 
where Bold is the binominal boldness measure for analyst i's earnings estimate for firm j in 
year t; Private is the binominal (privately held or publicly listed) ownership variable of the 
brokerage house the analyst i covering stock j is working with in year t; BrokerSize is the log 
of (1+number of analysts) working with analyst i covering stock j in year t; 
INT_BrokerSize_Private is the interaction term; SDC is the vector comprising m broker-
specific control variables for the brokerages’ underwriting activities the analyst i is working 
with (Lead_Underwriter, Co_Underwriter, Syndicate_Member, No_Underwriting);59 and the 
vector X subsumes k individual control variables for analyst i covering firm j in year t 
(LagAccuracy, Horizon, DaysElapsed, Frequency, GenExperience, FirmExperience, 
Companies, and Industries). Based on equation (2) we state our predictions as follows: 
Prediction 1: We expect the coefficient α1 of the independent variable Private to have a 
negative impact on the analyst's probability of issuing a bold forecast (i.e. 0 > α1).  
We expect a negative basic impact on the analyst’s probability of issuing a bold forecast if he 
or she is employed at a privately held broker because private brokers have on average fewer 
informational resources and less reputation to establish an autonomous bold view in the 
market, which increases their analysts’ CONH. Although we assume that the analysts from 
                                                
59  In the regression, we include binary variables for Lead_Underwriter, Co_Underwriter, and 
Syndicate_Member; No_Underwriting is the base category. 
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private brokers process soft (i.e. bold) information in a less costly way (lower CONH), we 
predict a negative general effect of Private compared to analysts from public brokers, even 
for public brokers of the same size. This is because smaller public brokers are affiliated with 
larger parent companies which provide them with access to more relevant information than 
unaffiliated, privately held brokers of the same size.  
Prediction 2: We expect the coefficient of BrokerSize α2 to have a positive impact on the 
analyst’s probability of issuing a bold forecast (i.e. 0 < α2 ). 
The positive basic impact on the analyst’s probability of issuing a bold forecast is shown in 
previous research. Hence, more resources imply lower CONH for analysts, resulting in a 
higher probability of issuing bold forecasts. 
Prediction 3: We expect the coefficient α3 of INT_BrokerSize_Private to have a positive 
impact on the analyst’s probability of issuing a bold forecast and that this effect is larger than 
the effect of BrokerSize (i.e. 0 < α2 < α3). 
For the interaction term INT_BrokerSize_Private, we state a similar prediction as for 
BrokerSize but expect a larger coefficient because, firstly, we assume that the analysts from 
private brokers process soft (i.e. bold) information in a less costly way than analysts from 
public brokers; secondly, the larger the private broker becomes, the smaller is the difference 
in informational resources. Analysts from smaller brokers that are affiliated with a public 
broker (and, thus, are naturally coded as public brokers) receive access to larger informational 
resources than analysts from unaffiliated privately held brokers of the same small size. Hence, 
the growth in size increases the probability of issuing a bold forecast more for analysts from a 
private broker than for analysts from public brokers. 
Prediction 4: We expect the overall effect of private ownership (Private and 
INT_BrokerSize_Private combined) on the analyst’s probability of issuing a bold forecast to 
become positive after the privately held brokerage reaches a certain level of BrokerSize. 
We reason that the threshold lies around the number of 25 analysts employed at a broker, as 
previous research has shown this number to define a crucial size for a brokerage, both for its 
resources and for its reputation (see, e.g., the definition of high status brokerage in Hong et al 
2000). However, compared to Hong et al. 2000, the average BrokerSize increased during our 
sample period (1999-2008). Thus, we expect a higher threshold by trend.  
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We have no clear prediction for the coefficient αm of the control variables for the underwriting 
business of the broker included in the vector SDC; prior research remains unclear about the 
effect of the broker’s investment banking business on the CONH of its analysts. We expect 
the coefficients αk of the individual characteristics captured in the vector X to behave as 
shown in prior research studies (see, e.g., Clement and Tse 2005). 
To test whether the effect of ownership on analyst herding is more pronounced for analysts 
covering their own sector (i.e. the financial sector), we split the sample into two subsamples, 
(A) analysts covering the financial sector, and (B) all other analysts.60 The split is executed 
according to the two-digit SIC codes of the stocks each group covers as used by the U.S. 
Department of Labor (Division H: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate); it allocates all SIC 
codes from 6000 to 6999 into (A) Financial sector stocks, and all other codes into (B).61 
We regress the model from equation (2) for both sub-samples on the basis of analyst-stock 
observations and compare the resulting coefficients. We expect the difference in CONH, and 
thus in herding behavior between analysts at privately held brokerage houses and analysts at 
publicly listed houses, to be substantially larger for analysts covering the financial sector than 
for analysts covering other sectors. This difference is captured for both sub-samples in the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables Private (α1) and the interaction term 
INT_BrokerSize_Private ( α3). 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample of our study. Most 
analysts make bold forecast (78%), consistent with their incentives to signal their release of 
new private information to the market. This finding is in line with prior research about the 
herding behavior of stock analysts. Gleason and Lee (2003) find 76% of forecasts in their 
sample are “high-innovation” (i.e. bold), while Clement and Tse (2005) find about 74%. 
However, these figures do not signal that there is no problem with the herding behavior of 
                                                
60 Security analysts mostly cover only one sector as they need highly specialized industry expertise.   
61 The SIC codes industry classification of the Department of Labor is accessed through their homepage 
(http://www.osha.gov) on June 16, 2012. This classification is identical to the Fama-French industry portfolios 
(industry portfolio number 12: Finance) accessible through Kenneth French’s page 
 (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french); accessed on June 16, 2012. 
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financial analysts, as about a quarter of all forecasts indicate herding behavior, not revealing 
private information to the market. That is why we want to analyze whether the institutional 
factor of ownership systematically hinders analysts from revealing their full private 
information, i.e. to issue a bold forecast. 
In the full sample, 30,437 (22%) firm-analyst observations stem from analysts who are 
employed at private brokerage houses. On average, an analyst works for a brokerage that 
employs about 67 analysts. The interquartile range lies between 24 and 109 analysts.62 The 
most firm-analyst observations, 105,991 (77%), come from analysts working with brokerage 
houses that act as lead underwriters, 10% of the observations come from brokers acting as co-
underwriters, 3% from analysts at syndicating brokers, and 9% from analysts working with 
brokerage houses that are, according to the SDC database, not involved in underwriting 
business. The average analyst has a general experience of 6 years (GenExperience), has 
experience per covered firm of almost 4 years (FirmExperience), covers about 17 different 
companies (Companies), and covers almost 4 different industries (i.e. two-digit SIC sectors, 
Industries). On average, the analysts issue their forecasts 13 days after another analyst 
covering the same stock issues a forecast (DaysElapsed), they issue almost 5 forecasts per 
covered firm per year (Frequency), and they do this 95 days before the firm’s financial period 
ends (Horizon: remember that we restricted the observations to the first 11 months of the 
firm's financial period). Most of the analysts make accurate forecasts with some analysts 
issuing very poor forecasts, indicated by the substantially skewed distribution for lagged 
accuracy (LagAccuracy, mean 0.73, median 0.85).63 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the subsample for forecasts of stocks of the financial sector. The 
subsample is very similar to the full sample. The main variables are identical in their 
distribution (e.g., Bold) or differ only marginally (e.g., BrokerSize). Compared to the full 
sample, the subsample yields only 3% more observations that come from analysts at privately 
held brokerage houses (total 25%). In addition, the individual analyst characteristics have an 
almost identical distribution as in the full sample and in the distribution of the brokerage 
houses' underwriting business variables. The only considerable difference stems from the 
                                                
62 Note that BrokerSize here shows the raw number of analysts employed at a brokerage and not the log of 
(1+number of analysts); this is to provide a meaningful statistic. 
63 The lagged accuracy is scaled between 0 and 1, where 0 is the forecast with the largest absolute forecast error 
of an analyst i covering stock j in year t-1 and 1 defines the best forecast of another analyst k also covering stock 
j fin year t-1. 
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distribution of the number of industries the analyst covers, which is simply explained by the 
restriction to forecasts on stocks from the financial sector.  
Panels C and D of Table 1 show the distribution of the different variables for the division of 
the full sample into observations from analysts working at privately held brokerage houses 
and from analysts working at publicly listed houses, respectively. There are no substantial 
differences for these two subsamples in the individual analyst's forecasting characteristics, as 
in Horizon or Frequency, whereas the privately held houses on average employ slightly fewer 
experienced analysts. Likewise, analysts at privately held houses cover slightly fewer 
Companies but more Industries.  
However, the two subsamples differ substantially across their institutional environment. 
Privately held brokerage houses employ on average far fewer analysts (22) and are not as 
involved in underwriting activities as publicly held houses. Only 51% of the observations 
stem from privately held houses acting as lead underwriters, but 22% come from brokers 
acting as co-underwriters, 11% as syndicate member, and 16% from privately held houses 
that are not involved in underwriting activities at all. In contrast, publicly listed houses on 
average employ almost 80 analysts. Furthermore, a larger number of the analysts from public 
brokers are involved in underwriting business, as expected. Some 85% of all observations 
come from publicly listed houses acting as lead underwriters, and only 7% from houses 
operating as co-underwriters, almost no observations from syndicate member houses (1%), 
and again, only 7% of all observations stem from houses not involved in underwriting 
business.64  
Panels E and F of Table 1 (see Appendix B, Table B2) manifest the same differences between 
the two subsamples, although restricted to forecasts of stocks from the financial sector. The 
differences in BrokerSize and the underwriting business of the diverse brokerage houses 
remain. Again, the forecasting behavior (Bold) does not differ in essence across private and 
public brokers. This univariate finding reflects the trade-off between the size of private 
brokers and their independence, affecting the analysts’ CONH, and, hence, the likelihood of 
bold forecasts. Private brokers are, on average, smaller and thus have fewer informational 
resources available, increasing the CONH and reducing the probability of their analysts 
issuing bold forecasts. However, analysts from private brokers face lower CONH and, thus, 
might have a higher probability of issuing a bold forecast.  
                                                
64 This is usually the case for smaller U.S. broker that are subsidies of larger foreign banks that are not involved 
in the U.S. IPO or SEO underwriting market. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Analyst and Institutional Broker Characteristics 
 
  
Panel A: Full Sample
(N=136,428)
Variables Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
Bold 0.78 0 1 1 1 1
Private 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
BrokerSize 66.69 1 24 51 109 229
LagAccuracy 0.73 0 0.59 0.85 0.97 1.00
DaysElapsed 13.33 1 1 5 16 90
Horizon 95.41 31 59 69 110 357
Frequency 4.80 2 3 4 6 33
GenExperierience 6.07 0 3 5 8 26
FirmExperience 3.79 0 1 3 5 26
Companies 17.11 1 12 16 20 104
Industries 3.87 0 2 3 5 22
Lead_Underwriter 0.77 0 1 1 1 1
Co_Underwriter 0.10 0 0 0 0 1
Syndicate_Member 0.03 0 0 0 0 1
No_Underwriting 0.09 0 0 0 0 1
Panel B: Financial Sector Coverage
(N=21,823)
Variables Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
Bold 0.77 0 1 1 1 1
Private 0.25 0 0 0 0 1
BrokerSize 58.87 1 21 38 85 229
LagAccuracy 0.71 0 0.56 0.84 0.97 1.00
DaysElapsed 13.22 1 1 5 16 90
Horizon 94.74 31 60 70 103 348
Frequency 4.55 2 3 4 6 21
GenExperience 5.83 0 3 5 7 26
FirmExperience 3.63 0 1 3 5 24
Companies 18.92 1 13 18 23 87
Industries 2.83 1 2 2 3 22
Lead_Underwriter 0.75 0 1 1 1 1
Co_Underwriter 0.13 0 0 0 0 1
Syndicate_Member 0.04 0 0 0 0 1
NoUnderwriting 0.08 0 0 0 0 1
Panel C: Privately Held Brokers 
(N=30,437)
Variables Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
Bold 0.78 0 1 1 1 1
BrokerSize 21.67 1 11 20 29 61
LagAccuracy 0.71 0.00 0.54 0.84 0.97 1.00
DaysElapsed 15.29 1 1 5 19 90
Horizon 93.87 31 59 68 108 346
Frequency 4.60 2 3 4 6 21
GenExperience 5.63 0 3 5 7 26
FirmExperience 3.47 0 1 2 4 26
Companies 16.77 1 12 15 20 78
Industries 4.37 0 2 4 6 22
Lead_Underwriter 0.51 0 0 1 1 1
Co_Underwriter 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Syndicate_Member 0.11 0 0 0 0 1
No_Underwriting 0.16 0 0 0 0 1
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Continuation of Table 1 
 
 
4.5.2. Regression Results 
Table 2 shows five models on the basis of regression equation (2). The first, model (1), 
includes only the individual analyst characteristics and one institutional factor, BrokerSize, 
identically to Clement and Tse (2005); the last, model (5), incorporates the ownership 
variable Private, the interaction term between Private and BrokerSize, and the full set of 
controls as specified in regression equation (2). Models (2) to (5) show the development of 
the coefficients when adding our explanatory variables of interest (Private and 
INT_Private_BrokerSize) and other controls. 
Panel D: Publicly Listed Brokers 
(N=105,991)
Variables Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
Bold 0.78 0 1 1 1 1
BrokerSize 79.62 1 35 63 121 229
LagAccuracy 0.73 0.00 0.60 0.85 0.97 1.00
DaysElapsed 12.76 1 1 4 15 90
Horizon 95.85 31 59 69 111 357
Frequency 4.86 2 3 4 6 33
GenExperience 6.19 0 3 5 8 26
FirmExperience 3.88 0 1 3 5 26
Companies 17.21 1 12 16 21 104
Industries 3.72 0 2 3 5 22
Lead_Underwriter 0.85 0 1 1 1 1
Co_Underwriter 0.07 0 0 0 0 1
Syndicate_Member 0.01 0 0 0 0 1
No_Underwriting 0.07 0 0 0 0 1
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the full sample (Panel A), the subsample of analysts covering
the financial sector (Panel B), the subsamples of analysts from privately held (Panel C) and publicly listed
brokers (Panel D), and the subsamples of analysts covering the financial sector from privately held (Panel E)
and publicly listed brokers (Panel F). We retain only the last forecast an analyst i is issuing on a specific stock
j in year t. The variable Bold equals 1 if the analyst’s revised estimate deviates from both his last estimate and
the prerevision consensus estimate, and 0 otherwise (see also Figure 1). Private equals 1 if the broker is
privately held, and 0 if the broker is either a listed company or owned by a listed company. BrokerSize is the 
number of analysts employed at a specific broker. LagAccuracy is analyst i's last year accuracy on stock j. 
DaysElapsed is the number of days that are elapsed between analyst i's forecast an the most recent forecast of
another analyst. Horizon is the number of days analyst i's forecast is issued before the end of the financial
period. Frequency is the number of forecasts analyst i makes during the financial year t for a stock j. 
FirmExperience is the number of consecutive years analyst i covers stock j. GenExperience is the number of
consecutive years in which analyst i filed at least one forecast in the Institutional Brokerage Estimation
System (IBES) since 1983. Companies and Industries are the numbers of stocks and sectors, respectively,
which are covered by analyst i. Lead_Underwriter, Co_Manager, and Syndicate_Member equal 1 if the
brokerage house acts in year t as either a lead underwriter, a co-manager, or a syndicate member in a U.S. IPO
or SEO. No_Underwriting equals 1 if the brokerage house is not engaged in underwriting activities in year t.  
Data sources: I/B/E/S, SDC Platinum Database, own compilation based on information from FINRA, FFIEC,
SEC, Bloomberg Businessweek, Lexis Nexis, Wikipedia and company home pages.
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Model (2) includes the ownership variable Private. The coefficient for Private is positive 
(0.031) and statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting that analysts working with 
privately held brokers are, on average, more likely to issue bold forecasts. The coefficient of 
BrokerSize is positive and highly significant, indicating that analysts from larger brokers with 
more available resources have a higher probability of releasing bold forecasts. 
Model (3) includes the interaction effect between Private and BrokerSize. The positive 
(0.066) and significant effect of INT_Private_BrokerSize and the negative (−0.174) and 
significant effect of Private show that privately held brokers face a trade-off: On the one 
hand, privately held brokers on average have fewer resources available, leading to higher 
CONH and fewer bold forecasts; on the other hand, analysts working with privately held 
brokerage houses face lower costs of processing soft information, resulting in lower CONH. 
If the number of analysts employed at a private broker increases, the resources available 
increase. Similar to model (2), BrokerSize is still positive and significant in model (3); thus, 
an additional analyst lowers the analysts’ CONH and increases the probability of issuing a 
bold forecast for publicly listed brokers, too. However, in model (3), the coefficient is almost 
three times smaller for public brokers than for private brokers. 
We analyze the average marginal effect (AME) of a change in ownership (Private) in model 
(3) by calculating the predictive probability for all observations and averaging the effect of 
working for a privately held or for a publicly listed broker. This procedure yields a positive 
AME of 1.7% for Private, highly significant at the 1% level, indicating a higher probability of 
issuing a bold forecast for an analyst working with a private broker than for the same analyst 
working with a public broker.65 In model (4), we include the set of underwriting variables as 
additional institutional controls. First and foremost, the main variables of interest, Private and 
INT_Private_BrokerSize, remain constant in both magnitude and significance, confirming that 
the ownership effect is distinctly different from the effect of the broker’s underwriting 
business. In contrast, the coefficient of BrokerSize drops substantially and loses statistical 
significance.  
  
                                                
65 The standard errors are calculated with the delta method to account for the finite, discrete change of Private (0 
to 1). We also conduct an analysis of the discrete probability effect (DPE) of being with a privately held or 
publicly listed brokerage house calculated at the means of the variables in the model. The analysis yields that the 
average analyst working with a privately held house has a 1.8% higher probability of issuing a bold forecast than 
the same analyst with a public broker. The effect is significant at the 1% level. The similar result of the DPE to 
the AME supports the robustness of the effect. 
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Table 2: Regression of Forecast Boldness on Institutional Factors and Analyst Characteristics 
(Full Sample) 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bold
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private 0.0311* -0.1743** -0.1712** -0.1712**
(1.68) (-2.36) (-2.32) (-1.99)
INT_Private_BrokerSize 0.0663*** 0.0662*** 0.0662**
(2.87) (2.87) (2.15)
BrokerSize 0.0262*** 0.0333*** 0.0235*** 0.0067 0.0067
(3.68) (4.03) (2.62) (0.67) (0.41)
LagAccuracy 0.1148*** 0.1153*** 0.1153*** 0.1144*** 0.1144***
(5.39) (5.41) (5.41) (5.36) (5.45)
DaysElapsed 0.0041*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040***
(11.49) (11.43) (11.37) (11.19) (11.51)
Horizon 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(3.56) (3.61) (3.61) (3.81) (3.14)
Frequency -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.04)
GenExperience 0.0039 0.0040* 0.0041* 0.0036 0.0036
(1.62) (1.65) (1.70) (1.50) (1.16)
FirmExperience -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0016 -0.0016
(-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.70) (-0.51) (-0.46)
Companies -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0059*** -0.0059***
(-6.99) (-6.90) (-6.96) (-7.04) (-4.12)
Industries 0.0159*** 0.0155*** 0.0155*** 0.0165*** 0.0165***
(5.41) (5.28) (5.27) (5.58) (3.63)
Lead_Underwriter 0.1448*** 0.1448**
(6.13) (2.06)
Co_Underwriter 0.1123*** 0.1123*
(3.82) (1.68)
Syndicate_Member 0.0916** 0.0916
(2.21) (1.15)
Constant 1.0107*** 0.9750*** 1.0146*** 0.9491*** 0.9491***
(23.82) (20.53) (20.51) (18.01) (11.19)
Clustered by brokerage house No No No No Yes
Observations 136,428 136,428 136,428 136,428 136,428
Chi2 245.0 248.0 255.1 292.0 306.9
Notes: The table reports logit coefficient estimates, and in parentheses, robust z-statistics. In model (5), standard errors are
clustered by broker. We retain only the last forecast an analyst i is issuing on a specific stock j in year t. The dependent variable
Bold equals 1 if the analyst’s revised estimate deviates from both his last estimate and the prerevision consensus estimate, and 0
otherwise (see also Figure 1). Private equals 1 if the broker is privately held, and 0 if the broker is either a listed company or
owned by a listed company. BrokerSize is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed at a specific broker.
INT_Private_BrokerSize is the interaction term between Private and BrokerSize. We control for the analyst’s individual
characteristics: LagAccuracy is analyst i's last year accuracy on stock j. DaysElapsed is the number of days that are elapsed
between analyst i's forecast an the most recent forecast of another analyst. Horizon is the number of days analyst i's forecast is
issued before the end of the financial period. Frequency is the number of forecasts analyst i makes during the financial year t for a
stock j. FirmExperience is the number of consecutive years analyst i covers stock j. GenExperience is the number of consecutive
years in which analyst i filed at least one forecast in the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (IBES) since 1983.  Companies 
and Industries are the numbers of stocks and sectors, respectively, which are covered by analyst i. In models (4) and (5), we also
include controls for underwriting activities: Lead_Underwriter, Co_Manager, and Syndicate_Member equal 1 if the brokerage
house acts in year t as either a lead underwriter, a co-manager, or a syndicate member in a U.S. IPO or SEO. 
 ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.
Data sources: I/B/E/S, SDC Platinum Database, own compilation based on information from FINRA, FFIEC, SEC, Bloomberg
Businessweek, Lexis Nexis, Wikipedia and company home pages.
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Because observations from analysts of the same brokerage house are nested in model (4), we 
cluster the standard errors at the brokerage level in model (5).66 The results from model (5) 
with clustered standard errors confirm the ownership effect. However, due to the nonlinearity 
of our model, we should interpret marginal effects with caution, particularly as we use 
interaction effects.67  Again, we first conduct an analysis of the AME of a change in 
ownership (Private) in model (5), yielding a positive difference of 1.8% for analysts working 
with private brokers compared to the same analysts working with public brokers, significant 
at the 10% level.68 So far, analysts from private brokers face lower CONH on average and, 
hence, issue more bold forecasts revealing new private information to the market. 
To provide a more insightful analysis of the ownership effect, we calculate the marginal 
effects of Private restricted to the common support for BrokerSize, which ranges from 0 to 61 
analysts, as the largest privately held broker employs 61 analysts. The marginal effects of 
ownership for model (5) are plotted in Figure 2. We show the AME conditional on BrokerSize 
and determine the underwriter level to be the highest (i.e., Lead_underwriter = 1), because the 
majority of the observations of both ownership types belong to this group.69  
Panel A in Figure 2 presents a steeper slope of BrokerSize for privately held brokerage 
houses, indicating a larger positive marginal effect of BrokerSize when the broker is privately 
owned. In contrast, for publicly listed brokers, there is virtually no marginal effect of an 
additional analyst employed, indicating diminishing marginal returns and the existence of a 
maximum for the impact of informational resources on the probability of issuing bold 
forecasts.   
                                                
66 We cluster at brokerage level, as we are interested in the effect of institutional factors idiosyncratic to all the 
observations of all the analysts working with the same specific broker. As the brokerage level is superior to a 
clustering at the analyst level, we apply the more stringent test for significance. When we cluster at the analyst 
level, we arrive at smaller standard errors for all the main coefficients. 
67 We acknowledge possible problems concerning the interpretation of marginal effects in non-linear models as 
well as the additional complicacy with regard to interaction effects. Please refer to our robustness section, where 
we conduct additional tests to address such concerns more extensively. 
68 The difference in significance of the AME between model (4) and model (5) stems mainly from the clustering 
of the standard error at the brokerage level. The analysis of the DPE at means of being with a privately held or 
publicly listed brokerage house yields that the average analyst working with a privately held house has a positive 
difference of 1.4 percentage points in the probability of issuing a bold forecast compared to the same analyst 
from a public broker. The effect is significant at the 10% level. The similar result to the AME again supports the 
robustness of the effect. 
69 All other underwriting variables (Co_Underwriter, Syndicate_Members and No_Underwriting) are kept at 
zero. This procedure is also called marginal effects at representative values (MERs). 
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Figure 2: Plotted Marginal Effects of Private for Different BrokerSizes (Full Sample) 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
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(Continuation of Figure 2) 
 
Panel C 
 
 
The difference between the marginal effects of BrokerSize for the two ownership types of 
brokerage houses, as shown in Panels B and C of Figure 2, has its break-even point around 12 
analysts (which corresponds to a BrokerSize of 2.5 on the x-axis of the figures).70 At the 5% 
significance level, the difference does not attain significance over the range from 0 to 61 
analysts, as shown in Panel B. At the 10% level in Panel C, the difference becomes significant 
around 40 analysts.71 Thus, analysts working for privately held brokers that employ more than 
40 analysts show a significantly higher probability of issuing a bold forecast than a similar 
analyst at a listed broker. At this threshold, the difference in probability of around 2.6% 
predicts an economically meaningful effect of ownership on analysts’ forecasting behavior in 
relation to the large number of forecast revisions issued by stock analysts.72  
A comparison of the models (1) to (5) indicates that both the coefficients and the significance 
levels of the individual characteristics remain virtually unchanged. This finding supports the 
clear distinction between the individual and the institutional channel. Additionally, the 
                                                
70 The x-axis of the graphs shows the BrokerSize calculated as the log of (1+ number of analysts), 12 analysts 
corresponds to a log of 2.5 (i.e. (12+1) = e^2.5). 
71 A BrokerSize of 3.7 on the x-axis corresponds with the number of 40 analysts employed at a broker. 
72 The 2.6% higher probability is calculated using the difference in probability of 2 percentage points as 
indicated on the y-axis in Panel C of Figure 2 on the basis of the public brokers’ probability of issuing a bold 
forecast (77%) at the level of BrokerSize of 40 analysts employed; (0.02/0.767)=2.6%. 
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goodness of fit of the model increases gradually, as documented by the increasing value of the 
log likelihood chi-square test, explaining that the inclusion of the institutional channel of 
ownership and underwriting controls yields an improved explanation of the model of analysts’ 
herding behavior. Overall, we find that institutional factors of the brokerage houses have a 
significant influence on the analysts’ CONH, when controlling for a full set of individual 
analyst characteristics as well as for the broker’s underwriting business.  
 
Financial sector analysts vs. analysts covering other sectors 
To test the prediction that the effect of the broker’s ownership on analysts’ forecasting 
behavior is more pronounced for analysts covering the financial sector, we split the sample 
into two subsamples according to the two-digit SIC sector codes of the stocks the analysts 
cover.73 We define subsample (A) as the Financial Sector Coverage and subsample (B) as the 
Other Sector Coverage. We run the logit model from regression equation (2) for each 
subsample with Bold as the dependent variable. We present the results in Table 3. For both 
subsamples, we start with the reduced models (1) and (5), and we add our main institutional 
variable of interest Private (models (2) and (6)), the interaction term INT_BrokerSize_Private 
(models (3) and (7)), and the SDC variables to control for the brokers’ underwriting business 
(models (4) and (8)).74 
In models (1) and (5), BrokerSize is significant in both subsamples, similar to the full sample. 
In models (2) and (6), the new institutional ownership variable Private is not significant in 
either subsample. However, BrokerSize remains significant in both subsamples. We then 
interact Private with BrokerSize in models (3) and (7) and find a highly significant and large 
negative coefficient of Private (−0.550) and a highly significant and large positive coefficient 
of 0.210 for INT_Private_BrokerSize for analysts covering the financial sector.  
 
                                                
73 The two-digit SIC codes (from 60 to 69) of the Financial Sector defined by the U.S.Department of Labor is 
identical to Fama and French’s industry portfolio number 11. Finance taken from their compilation of all SIC 
codes for 12 industry portfolios, available at Kenneth French’s homepage.  
74 As we expect the observations to be nested at the brokerage level, we cluster the standard errors at the 
brokerage level in each of the models. As the brokerage level is superior to the analyst level, the findings are also 
robust to clustering at the analyst level, which we checked without reporting in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Regression of Forecast Boldness on Institutional Factors and Analyst Characteristics Split by Analyst Coverage 
 
Dependent variable: Bold
Column A: Financial Sector Coverage Column B: Other Sectors Coverage
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private 0.0850 -0.5504*** -0.6109*** 0.0187 -0.0981 -0.0952
(1.57) (-3.67) (-3.70) (0.37) (-0.92) (-0.97)
INT_Private_BrokerSize 0.2105*** 0.2308*** 0.0375 0.0384
(4.17) (4.15) (0.91) (1.07)
BrokerSize 0.0426** 0.0626*** 0.0340* 0.0445* 0.0237* 0.0279* 0.0223 0.0000
(2.23) (2.84) (1.68) (1.84) (1.85) (1.88) (1.42) (0.00)
LagAccuracy 0.0002 0.0027 0.0017 0.0023 0.1400*** 0.1402*** 0.1403*** 0.1388***
(0.00) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (6.47) (6.53) (6.53) (6.45)
DaysElapsed 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0038***
(5.57) (5.44) (5.34) (5.40) (9.60) (9.23) (9.03) (9.64)
Horizon 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(2.07) (2.07) (2.03) (2.04) (2.57) (2.66) (2.66) (2.82)
Frequency 0.0321*** 0.0316*** 0.0296*** 0.0295*** -0.0051 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0046
(2.86) (2.83) (2.66) (2.67) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-0.88)
GenExperience 0.0113* 0.0117* 0.0118* 0.0119* 0.0028 0.0029 0.0030 0.0023
(1.76) (1.82) (1.85) (1.86) (0.86) (0.88) (0.91) (0.73)
FirmExperience -0.0053 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0010
(-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.27)
Companies -0.0035* -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0062*** -0.0062*** -0.0063*** -0.0063***
(-1.81) (-1.55) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-3.25) (-3.12) (-3.16) (-3.49)
Industries 0.0111 0.0111 0.0090 0.0113 0.0168*** 0.0165*** 0.0166*** 0.0175***
(0.87) (0.86) (0.72) (0.88) (3.62) (3.69) (3.69) (4.01)
Table to be continued
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Lead_Underwriter 0.0738 0.1610**
(0.88) (2.06)
Co_Underwriter 0.1353 0.1117
(1.57) (1.50)
Syndicate_Member 0.1908 0.0830
(1.53) (0.89)
Constant 0.7927*** 0.6891*** 0.8093*** 0.6861*** 1.0364*** 1.0150*** 1.0376*** 0.9798***
(6.71) (4.91) (6.32) (4.51) (13.43) (12.52) (12.13) (10.55)
Clustered by brokerage houseYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,823 21,823 21,823 21,823 114,605 114,605 114,605 114,605
Chi2 41.04 50.14 72.38 70.76 164.3 198.4 229.5 217.2
Notes: The table reports logit coefficient estimates, and in parentheses robust z-statistics clustered by broker. In Column A, we use a subsample
of analysts covering firms from the financial sector according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). In Column B, the sample consists
of analysts covering all other non-financial sectors. We retain only the last forecast an analyst i is issuing on a specific stock j in year t. Bold 
equals 1 if the analyst’s revised estimate deviates from both his last estimate and the prerevision consensus estimate, and 0 otherwise (see also
Figure 1). Private equals 1 if the broker is privately held, and 0 if the broker is either a listed company or owned by a listed company.
BrokerSize is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed at a specific broker. INT_Private_BrokerSize is the interaction term
between Private and BrokerSize. We control for the analyst’s individual characteristics: LagAccuracy is analyst i's last year accuracy on stock j. 
DaysElapsed is the number of days that are elapsed between analyst i's forecast an the most recent forecast of another analyst. Horizon is the
number of days analyst i's forecast is issued before the end of the financial period. Frequency is the number of forecasts analyst i makes during
the financial year t for a stock j. FirmExperience is the number of consecutive years analyst i covers stock j. GenExperience is the number of
consecutive years in which analyst i filed at least one forecast in the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (IBES) since 1983.  Companies 
and Industries are the numbers of stocks and sectors, respectively, which are covered by analyst i. In models (4) and (8), we include controls for
underwriting activities: Lead_Underwriter, Co_Manager, and Syndicate_Member equal 1 if the brokerage house acts in year t as either a lead
underwriter, a co-manager, or a syndicate member in a U.S. IPO or SEO. 
 ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.
Data sources: I/B/E/S, SDC Platinum Database, own compilation based on information from FINRA, FFIEC, SEC, Bloomberg Businessweek,
Lexis Nexis, Wikipedia and company home pages.
Continuation of Table 3
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The pattern is similar to that in the full sample; however, the magnitude of the coefficients of 
Private and INT_Private_BrokerSize in subsample (A) is about three times larger than in the 
full sample, indicating a strongly pronounced effect for financial sector analysts compared to 
subsample (B). Particularly in the subsample of analysts covering other sectors (B), neither 
the coefficient for Private nor the coefficient for INT_Private_BokerSize is significant. This 
pattern remains the same when we control for the full set of underwriting variables in model 
models (4) and (8), respectively. For financial sector analysts, the coefficients of −0.61 and 
0.23 for Private and INT_Private_BrokerSize, respectively, are both highly significant and 
substantially larger in magnitude than the coefficients for analysts covering other sectors (i.e., 
−0.09 and 0.04 for Private and INT_Private_BrokerSize, respectively). Both differences 
between the two subsamples, for Private (−0.52) and for INT_Private_BrokerSize (0.19), are 
significant at the 1% level, as shown by a two-sided t-test run with two seemingly unrelated 
regressions (untabulated). The results confirm that the effect of the broker’s ownership is 
considerably more pronounced for financial analysts than for analysts covering other sectors. 
As only financial sector analysts can exert a negative externality on their employer’s 
valuation, they face higher costs when producing bold forecasts than analysts covering other 
sectors if working at a publicly listed brokerage. 
We further analyze these findings and examine the marginal effects of subsample (A), 
Financial Sector Coverage. We compute the AME between working with a privately held or 
a publicly listed brokerage (Private), yielding a positive and highly significant difference in 
the probability of issuing a bold forecast for analysts at private brokers of 4.8% at the 1% 
significance level. 75  When compared to an individual characteristic such as general 
experience (GenExperience), analysts would have to gain additional experience of about 18 
years to have the same effect on their probability of issuing a bold forecast.76 For subsample 
(B), Other Sectors Coverage, the difference in AME between analysts at private and public 
brokerage houses, is much lower (1.2%) and insignificant (z-statistic = 0.89).  
Similar to the full sample, we further investigate the marginal effects of ownership by plotting 
AME conditional on BrokerSize for both types of ownership over the common support of 
                                                
75 Likewise, the DEP at means shows a difference in probability of 5.3% at the 1% significance level. 
76 The comparison of the two different effects is calculated by dividing the AME of Private by the AME of 
GenExperience, yielding a ratio of 18.17 (years). 
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BrokerSize, which ranges from 0 to 61 analysts.77 The plots for subsample (A) and (B) are 
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. 
Figure 3: Plotted Marginal Effects of Private for Different BrokerSizes of Subsample (A) 
Financial Sector Coverage 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
                                                
77 As with the full sample, we determine the underwriter level to be the highest (i.e., Lead_underwriter = 1), 
because the majority of the observations in both subsamples also belong to this group. All other underwriting 
variables (Co_Underwriter, Syndicate_Members and No_Underwriting) are kept at zero. 
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Figure 4: Plotted Marginal Effects of Private for Different BrokerSizes of Subsample (B) 
Other Sectors Coverage 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
 
The plots confirm the earlier findings. Panel A in Figure 3 shows that the marginal effect of 
ownership increases with the size of the brokerage house. Panel B reveals that financial sector 
analysts working for privately held houses that employ more than 24 analysts (i.e. BrokerSize 
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equals 3.2 in the figure) have a significant difference at the 5% level in the probability of 
issuing a bold forecast when compared to financial sector analysts at public brokers. At this 
level of BrokerSize, the difference reflects a 3% higher probability for financial sector 
analysts from private brokers than analysts from public brokers to release a bold forecast.78 
Because the difference increases with the number of analysts employed, financial sector 
analysts from private brokers with more than 60 analysts have a 6.5% higher probability of 
issuing a bold forecast than similar analysts from public brokers.79 This accounts for an 
economically significant difference in analysts’ herding behavior. To reach the same effect 
with an individual characteristic, for example, analysts with 1 year of general experience 
would have to gain more than 27 years of additional experience.80 In contrast, Panel B of 
Figure 4 shows that, for analysts covering other sectors (subsample B), the difference between 
analysts from private brokers and analysts from listed brokers is both insignificant and 
substantially smaller in magnitude than for financial sector analysts for each level of 
BrokerSize, except around the break-even point. 
Overall, we provide evidence that the ownership effect on the analysts’ CONH is driven by 
the group of analysts covering the financial sector. As financial sector analysts working with 
publicly listed brokerage houses exert externalities on the valuation of their own employer, 
they can forecast less independently. They face higher CONH and, hence, are more prone to 
herding behavior and issue fewer bold forecast revisions than analysts who work at privately 
held brokers, which are not dependent on the stock market. In contrast, for analysts covering 
other sectors, the ownership effect vanishes. Our analysis provides evidence that the 
ownership effect does not generally lead to a difference in forecasting behavior for all 
analysts; instead, it is the group of analysts covering the financial sector that drives the 
difference. 
It is important to emphasize that, similar to the full sample, the coefficients of the individual 
analyst variables are essentially uninfluenced by the inclusion of the institutional variables for 
ownership (Private) and the variables for the brokers’ underwriting business. In addition, the 
                                                
78 As before, the 3% higher probability is calculated using the difference in probability of 2.3 percentage points 
as indicated on the y-axis in Panel B of Figure 3 on the basis of the public brokers’ probability of issuing a bold 
forecast (77%) at the level of BrokerSize of 24 analysts employed; (0.023/0.767)=3.0%.  
79  The 6.5% higher probability is calculated as above, but at the level of 60 analysts employed; 
(0.05/0.774)=6.5%. 
80 We calculate the comparison of the marginal effect by dividing the AME of Private at a BrokerSize level of 60 
analysts employed by the AME of one year additional experience (GenExperience); this yields a ratio of 27.67 
(years). 
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ownership effect of private brokers is not affected when we control for underwriting business. 
This result increases confidence in our tests.81  
Although we do not focus on individual analyst characteristics, using them instead as 
controls, we note two significant differences of individual characteristics between analysts 
covering the financial sector and analysts covering other sectors. The effect of lagged 
accuracy on the probability of issuing a bold forecast essentially does not exist for financial 
sector analysts but is significantly positive for the other sectors in subsample (B) (difference = 
−0.137, significant on the 2% level, two-sided t-test, untabulated). Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990), Trueman (1994) and Clement and Tse (2005) show theoretically and empirically that 
the herding behavior of analysts depends on their confidence in their own abilities. The 
absence of the influence of self-assessed ability, measured by lagged accuracy, on the 
probability of issuing a bold forecast (in all models (1) to (4) of subsample A) highlights 
another difference in CONH between financial sector analysts and other sector analysts. The 
finding suggests that financial sector analysts do not rely on their self-assessed ability when 
revising their forecasts.  
In contrast, the significant difference of Frequency between subsample (A) and (B) is an 
indicator of the analysts’ independent ability to reveal new information to the market in a 
timely manner. Frequency is only significant and positive for the financial sector subsample 
and the difference between subsamples (A) and (B) is highly significant at the 1% level (two-
sided t-test, untabulated). To the extent that financial sector analysts seem to face higher 
CONH if working for public brokers, they might be discouraged from frequently revising 
their forecasts. Thus, Frequency bears an additional characteristic to identify more or less 
independent financial sector analysts. 
4.5.3. Robustness Checks  
We perform three robustness checks. First, we restrict the sample to observations that share a 
common support in BrokerSize, which lies between 1 and 61 analysts employed, defined by 
the largest privately-held brokerage house that employs a maximum of 61 analysts. Due to the 
restriction, we lose about 35% of the observations of the full sample. We then run the logit 
model from regression equation (2) for both subsamples – (A), Financial Sector Coverage, 
and (B), Other Sectors Coverage. The coefficients of the two models (1) and (2) presented in 
                                                
81 In addition, the results hold when running various robustness checks (see next section). 
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Table 4 exhibit the same pattern of coefficient size and significance as in the unrestricted 
sample (i.e., models (4) and (8) of Table 3). The coefficients of Private and 
INT_Private_BrokerSize of –0.55 and 0.21, respectively, remain highly significant (1% level) 
with similar magnitude for the financial sector sample, whereas for the other sectors sample 
the coefficients remain insignificant and are of lower magnitude. Thus, the results with a 
common support sample confirm the ownership effect and its considerably different impact 
on analysts covering financial sector stocks. 
Secondly, we include year-stock fixed effects in the original model in regression equation (2). 
In a model analyzing the bias of analyst forecast errors, Clement (1999) shows that 
controlling for year-stock effects (1) raises the probability of identifying systematic 
differences in analysts’ forecast errors, and (2) reduces possible heteroskedasticity due to 
larger variations in the forecast errors for stocks with larger earnings per share. Thus, 
although Clement and Tse (2005) do not use year-stock fixed effects in their analysts’ herding 
behavior model, we apply the year-stock as a robustness check. Models (3) and (4) unveil the 
identical pattern of magnitude and significance for the coefficients of Private and the 
interaction term between Private and BrokerSize. This again supports the finding that the 
analysts covering financial sector stocks drive the effect of the broker’s ownership on the 
analysts’ CONH and, hence, on their herding behavior. 
In our setting, the use of analyst fixed effects to control for unobservable differences in 
individual analyst characteristics is not feasible. Analyst fixed effects eliminate the constant 
institutional effects of the analysts’ brokerage house, such as ownership. We would “throw 
out the baby with the bathwater” when using an analyst fixed effects model for our analysis of 
constant institutional brokerage characteristics. Furthermore, as we employ a binary 
dependent variable, the use of analyst fixed effects drops all the observations of analysts 
consistently issuing bold or herding forecasts over time (e.g., about one third of the subsample 
of analysts covering the financial sector). However, we can employ an analysts’ random-
effects model, which uses not only the within-group but also the between-group variation and, 
hence, does not drop any observations due to invariability. We obtain highly significant 
coefficients in model (3) in Table 4 of the identical pattern as shown before in Table 3, model 
(4): Private yields a negative sign, INT_Private_BrokerSize yields a positive sign, and both 
coefficients remain at nearly the identical magnitude as in the original model. 
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Table 4: Regression of Forecast Boldness on Institutional Factors and Analyst Characteristics: Robustness Checks 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: Bold
Financial Sector Other Sectors Financial Sector Other Sectors Financial Sector Other Sectors
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private -0.5475*** 0.0035 -0.6395*** -0.0273 -0.1108*** -0.0162
(-2.60) (0.03) (-2.86) (-0.28) (-3.55) (-0.94)
INT_Private_BrokerSize 0.2088*** 0.0092 0.2300*** 0.0013 0.0413*** 0.0065
(3.05) (0.24) (3.19) (0.04) (4.00) (1.05)
BrokerSize 0.0552 0.0314 0.0354 0.0070 0.0078* 0.0001
(1.17) (1.23) (1.20) (0.52) (1.81) (0.02)
LagAccuracy -0.0148 0.1202*** 0.0285 0.1477*** 0.0005 0.0239***
(-0.25) (3.85) (0.39) (4.52) (0.05) (6.33)
DaysElapsed 0.0060*** 0.0038*** 0.0055*** 0.0066*** 0.0008*** 0.0006***
(5.78) (7.22) (4.25) (11.20) (5.64) (9.80)
Horizon 0.0011*** 0.0007*** 0.0021*** 0.0013*** 0.0001** 0.0001***
(2.86) (3.60) (5.23) (7.85) (2.04) (2.78)
Frequency 0.0531*** 0.0092 0.0088 -0.0067 0.0051*** -0.0008
(4.14) (1.38) (0.70) (-1.44) (2.72) (-0.88)
GenExperience 0.0100 -0.0032 0.0170** 0.0015 0.0020* 0.0004
(1.12) (-0.87) (2.19) (0.47) (1.89) (0.73)
FirmExperience -0.0059 0.0036 -0.0119 -0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0002
(-0.65) (0.77) (-1.18) (-0.45) (-0.67) (-0.28)
Companies -0.0024 -0.0091*** -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0011***
(-1.10) (-3.70) (-0.20) (-1.23) (-1.40) (-3.30)
Industries 0.0062 0.0176*** -0.0115 -0.0097* 0.0020 0.0030***
(0.43) (3.84) (-0.67) (-1.85) (0.89) (4.13)
Common Support Year-Stock FE OLS
To be continued
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Lead_Underwriter 0.0737 0.1594** 0.1254* 0.2140*** 0.0134 0.0284**
(0.94) (2.18) (1.75) (6.92) (0.87) (1.98)
Co_Underwriter 0.1444* 0.1141* 0.1291 0.2146*** 0.0242 0.0199
(1.79) (1.68) (1.44) (5.62) (1.54) (1.45)
Syndicate_Member 0.1898 0.0872 0.1996 0.0589 0.0331 0.0149
(1.56) (1.02) (1.57) (1.04) (1.46) (0.89)
Constant 0.5205** 0.8633*** ! ! 0.6784*** 0.7306***
(2.28) (8.03) ! ! (24.93) (44.24)
Clustered by brokerage house Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-stock FE No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 14,756 67,531 15,033 80,961 21,823 114,605
R-squared ! ! ! ! 0.003 0.002
Number of year-stock ! ! 2,089 10,459 ! !
Chi2 74.31 141.7 78.57 337.9 ! !
Notes: The table reports regression results for both analyts covering the financial sector (models 1, 3, and 5) and analysts covering other sectors (models 2, 4,
and 6). In models (1) and (2), we use a common support sample by excluding brokers with more than 61 analysts (i.e., the maximum broker size of private
brokers, see Table 1). In models (3) and (4), we include year-stock fixed effects. Models (5) and (6) report OLS coefficient estimates, and in parentheses,
robust t-statistics clustered by broker. Models (1) to (4) report logit coefficient estimates, and in parentheses, robust z-statistics clustered by broker. We retain
only the last forecast an analyst i is issuing on a specific stock j in year t. The dependent variable Bold equals 1 if the analyst’s revised estimate deviates from
both his last estimate and the prerevision consensus estimate, and 0 otherwise (see also Figure 1). Private equals 1 if the broker is privately held, and 0 if the
broker is either a listed company or owned by a listed company. BrokerSize is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed at a specific broker.
INT_Private_BrokerSize is the interaction term between Private and BrokerSize. We control for the analyst’s individual characteristics: LagAccuracy is
analyst i's last year accuracy on stock j. DaysElapsed is the number of days that are elapsed between analyst i's forecast an the most recent forecast of another 
analyst. Horizon is the number of days analyst i's forecast is issued before the end of the financial period. Frequency is the number of forecasts analyst i 
makes during the financial year t for a stock j. FirmExperience is the number of consecutive years analyst i covers stock j. GenExperience is the number of
consecutive years in which analyst i filed at least one forecast in the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (IBES) since 1983. Companies and 
Industries are the numbers of stocks and sectors, respectively, which are covered by analyst i. We also include controls for underwriting activities in all
models: Lead_Underwriter, Co_Manager, and Syndicate_Member equal 1 if the brokerage house acts in year t as either a lead underwriter, a co-manager, or
a syndicate member in a U.S. IPO or SEO. 
    ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.
Data sources: I/B/E/S, SDC Platinum Database, own compilation based on information from FINRA, FFIEC, SEC, Bloomberg Businessweek, Lexis Nexis,
Wikipedia, and company home pages.
Continuation of Table 4
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A Hausman test comparing the analysts’ random effects model and the analysts’ fixed effects 
model shows that the difference in coefficients is marginally unsystematic (p-value of 0.104), 
providing further robustness of the ownership effect. 
Thirdly, to once more tackle the concerns regarding the interpretation of interaction terms in 
non-linear models, we perform our tests by using a linear (OLS) regression model. Table 4 
models (5) and (6) show the OLS output for subsamples (A) and (B), revealing the identical 
pattern of coefficient magnitudes and significance levels as before in the logit models (4) and 
(8) in Table 3. The coefficients of Private and INT_Private_BrokerSize in model (5) of Table 
4 are both highly significant (both robust |t-statistics| >3.5) and have a negative and a positive 
sign, respectively. For analysts of model (6) in Table 4, Other Sectors Coverage, the same 
variables show a much lower coefficient (almost factor ten) and no significance, which, again, 
is identical to the findings from the logit model (8) in Table 3. 
4.5.4. Accuracy, Boldness, and the Ownership Effect  
So far, we have shown that, firstly, financial sector analysts working with privately held 
brokerage houses have lower CONH and, thus, a higher probability of issuing bold forecasts, 
and that, secondly, this effect is primarily driven by the subsample of analysts covering the 
financial sector. Now, the question arises whether the bold forecasts actually contain more 
relevant information, in other words, whether bold forecasts are more accurate. Clement and 
Tse (2005) have shown that bold forecasts have a higher forecast accuracy compared to 
herding forecasts. However, we also test for our sample whether (1) analysts who issue bold 
forecasts rely on relevant private information and, thus, issue more accurate forecasts on 
average, or (2) whether they are “overconfident but poorly informed” (Clement and Tse 2005, 
p. 317). In the latter case, there would be no association between boldness and the analysts’ 
accuracy. We do not predict a direct effect of ownership on forecast accuracy; we expect that 
the broker’s ownership indirectly affects accuracy through a higher probability of issuing bold 
forecasts, as shown in the previous section.  
As before, we explore the difference between analysts that cover the financial sector and 
analysts that cover other sectors. We thus split the sample into subsamples (A), Financial 
Coverage, and (B), Other Sectors Coverage. Similar to Clement and Tse (2005), we regress 
our measure of forecast accuracy (Accuracy) on forecast boldness (Bold), our measure of 
ownership (Private), the broker’s size (BrokerSize), the interaction term 
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(INT_Private_BrokerSize), and the individual and institutional controls. The equation of the 
linear (OLS) regression is as follows: 
Accuracy  =  α0+α1 Bold ijt +α2 Privateijt+α3 BrokerSizeijt 
  +α4 INT_BrokerSize_Privateijt + αm SDCmijt+ αk Xkijt+εijt  , (3) 
where Accuracy is as defined in equation (1) and all the other variables are as defined in 
regression equation (2).  
Table 5 shows the OLS results where Accuracy is the dependent variable. Models (1), (2), (5), 
and (6) do not have year-stock fixed effects, whereas models (3), (4), (7), and (8) include 
year-stock fixed effects as an additional refinement of our model.82 To provide a consistent 
setting throughout the paper, the first models of each pair are regressed without Bold, and 
have the same set of independent variables as in the earlier regression equation (2), where 
Bold was the dependent variable. We are thus able to compare the influence of the addition of 
Bold on the other relevant variables. The second models of each pair are estimated as shown 
in regression equation (3).  
The results from models (1) and (5) of Table 5 show that the ownership has no direct effect on 
the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts in both subsamples. The coefficients Private and 
INT_Private_BrokerSize have no statistical significance, but have the same sign as before, 
when Bold was the dependent variable. When adding Bold in models (2) and (6) as 
independent variable, the variable is highly significant at the 1% level and positive. In both 
subsamples, we confirm the results of Clement and Tse (2005) that bold forecasts convey new 
relevant private information that was not yet included in other analysts’ forecasts. 
Accordingly, ownership has only an indirect effect on forecast accuracy through the increase 
in likelihood of issuing bold forecasts for analysts from private brokers above a critical size 
(BrokerSize). 
Interestingly, if we control for year-stock effects in models (3) and (4), and (7) and (8), the 
direct influence of the brokerage’s ownership becomes significant for subsample (A) 
Financial Sector Coverage: Privately held brokerage houses do marginally exhibit a direct 
influence on the forecast accuracy of their financial sector analysts. 
                                                
82 See also Clement (1999). Analyzing analyst forecast errors, he shows that controlling for year-stock effects, 
firstly, raises the probability of identifying systematic differences in analysts’ forecast errors, and secondly, 
reduces possible heteroskedasticity due to larger variations in the forecast errors for stocks with larger earnings 
per share.  
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Table 5: Regression of Forecast Accuracy on Forecast Boldness, Institutional Factors and Analyst Characteristics 
 
Dependent variable: Accuracy
Column A: Financial Sector Coverage Column B: Other Sectors Coverage
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bold 0.0482*** 0.0548*** 0.0456*** 0.0500***
(10.09) (10.18) (18.21) (22.05)
Private -0.0533 -0.0477 -0.0638** -0.0579** 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0066 -0.0063
(-1.44) (-1.30) (-2.54) (-2.31) (0.02) (0.05) (-0.63) (-0.61)
INT_Private_BrokerSize 0.0082 0.0062 0.0148* 0.0127 -0.0051 -0.0054 0.0019 0.0018
(0.65) (0.49) (1.84) (1.59) (-0.45) (-0.48) (0.58) (0.57)
BrokerSize 0.0024 0.0020 -0.0054* -0.0056* -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0036** -0.0036**
(0.45) (0.41) (-1.68) (-1.77) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-2.52) (-2.57)
LagAccuracy 0.0447*** 0.0448*** 0.0297*** 0.0295*** 0.0721*** 0.0710*** 0.0444*** 0.0433***
(5.66) (5.69) (3.73) (3.72) (13.43) (13.37) (12.69) (12.39)
DaysElapsed -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0001 -0.0001**
(-4.93) (-5.30) (0.22) (-0.12) (-16.71) (-17.32) (-1.46) (-2.27)
Horizon -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0015*** -0.0015***
(-25.94) (-26.58) (-38.59) (-39.07) (-48.90) (-49.26) (-84.68) (-85.47)
Frequency 0.0003 0.0001 0.0027** 0.0027* 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0019*** 0.0020***
(0.28) (0.09) (1.96) (1.93) (5.59) (5.59) (3.75) (3.87)
GenExperience -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0015*** -0.0015*** 0.0006 0.0005
(-0.97) (-1.07) (0.34) (0.17) (-3.72) (-3.79) (1.61) (1.59)
FirmExperience 0.0030** 0.0030** -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0033*** 0.0033*** -0.0000 -0.0000
(2.35) (2.41) (-0.15) (-0.05) (6.43) (6.48) (-0.11) (-0.08)
Companies -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-0.95) (-0.88) (1.89) (1.91) (1.32) (1.47) (-1.43) (-1.33)
Industries 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0041** -0.0040** -0.0058*** -0.0059*** -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.19) (0.13) (-2.22) (-2.17) (-7.76) (-8.03) (-0.79) (-0.68)
To be continued
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Lead_Underwriter 0.0058 0.0052 0.0288*** 0.0277*** 0.0094 0.008 0.0246*** 0.0228***
(0.83) (0.74) (3.60) (3.48) (1.18) (1.02) (7.39) (6.87)
Co_Underwriter -0.0016 -0.0026 0.0058 0.0048 0.0184** 0.0174** 0.0228*** 0.0209***
(-0.10) (-0.16) (0.59) (0.49) (2.27) (2.18) (5.53) (5.10)
Syndicate_Member 0.0136 0.0122 0.0044 0.0027 -0.0097 -0.0104 -0.0020 -0.0026
(0.94) (0.85) (0.31) (0.19) (-0.61) (-0.65) (-0.34) (-0.44)
Constant 0.7862*** 0.7530*** 0.8110*** 0.7732*** 0.7776*** 0.7445*** 0.7986*** 0.7631***
(29.26) (27.87) (41.41) (38.91) (65.27) (62.02) (103.14) (96.75)
Clustered by brokerage houseYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-stock FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 21,041 21,041 21,041 21,041 108,588 108,588 108,588 108,588
Number of year-stock ! ! 4,166 4,166 ! ! 19,451 19,451
R-squared 0.073 0.077 0.111 0.116 0.077 0.081 0.102 0.107
Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients, and in parentheses, robust t-statistics clustered by broker. The dependent variable Accuracy is the
standardized accuracy of analyst i covering firm j in the year t. Accuracy is calculated as the maximum absolut forecast error (AFE) for analysts
following firm j in year t minus the AFE for analyst i following firm j in year t,scaled by the range (max - min) of AFE for analyts following firm j in 
year t. The main independent variable Bold equals 1 if the analyst’s revised estimate deviates from both his last estimate and the prerevision consensus
estimate, and 0 otherwise (see also Figure 1). We include Bold in models (2), (4), (6), and (8), and we include year-stock fixed effects in models (3), (4),
(7), and (8). In Column A, we use a subsample of analysts covering firms from the financial sector according to the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC). In Column B, the sample consists of analysts covering all other non-financial sectors. We retain only the last forecast an analyst i is issuing on a
specific stock j in year t. BoldPrivate equals 1 if the broker is privately held, and 0 if the broker is either a listed company or owned by a listed
company. BrokerSize is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts employed at a specific broker. INT_Private_BrokerSize is the interaction term
between Private and BrokerSize. We control for the analyst’s individual characteristics: LagAccuracy is analyst i's last year accuracy on stock j. 
DaysElapsed is the number of days that are elapsed between analyst i's forecast an the most recent forecast of another analyst. Horizon is the number of
days analyst i's forecast is issued before the end of the financial period. Frequency is the number of forecasts analyst i makes during the financial year t 
for a stock j. FirmExperience is the number of consecutive years analyst i covers stock j. GenExperience is the number of consecutive years in which
analyst i filed at least one forecast in the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (IBES) since 1983. Companies and Industries are the numbers of
stocks and sectors, respectively, which are covered by analyst i. We include controls for underwriting activities in all models: Lead_Underwriter, 
Co_Manager, and Syndicate_Member equal 1 if the brokerage house acts in year t as either a lead underwriter, a co-manager, or a syndicate member in
a U.S. IPO or SEO. 
    ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.
Data sources: I/B/E/S, SDC Platinum Database, own compilation based on information from FINRA, FFIEC, SEC, Bloomberg Businessweek, Lexis
Nexis, Wikipedia, and company home pages.
Continuation of Table 5
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In model (3), the coefficient of Private is significantly negative (−0.06; robust t-statistic: 
−2,54) and the coefficient of the interaction term INT_Private_BrokerSize is positive and 
weakly significant (0.01; robust t-statistic: 1.84). The results indicate that financial sector 
analysts working with a privately held brokerage that employs more than five analysts have a 
higher accuracy than analysts with listed brokers. The results virtually remain the same when 
controlling for Bold in model (4). Similar to the results when Bold is the dependent variable, 
we do not find significant evidence of an ownership effect for analysts covering other sectors 
(models (5) – (8)). 
Thus, in both subsamples, we confirm the results of Clement and Tse (2005) that bold 
forecasts convey new relevant private information that was not yet included in other analysts’ 
forecasts. Accordingly, ownership bears a mostly indirect effect on forecast accuracy through 
the reduction in CONH and the consequent increase in likelihood of issuing bold forecasts for 
analysts from private brokers with sufficient resources (i.e., number of analysts employed). 
When controlling for year-stock effects, the coefficient of BrokerSize becomes significantly 
negative in both subsamples, indicating that analysts from public brokers with more resources 
and/or higher reputation do not necessarily produce more accurate forecasts, but rather more 
inaccurate ones. Finally, it is notable that the self-assessed ability (measured with 
LagAccuracy) in each of the models is highly significant and substantially positive. Thus, 
self-assessed ability is clearly one of the drivers of accurate forecasts, as it is a necessary 
condition for an analyst to have confidence in his or her private information. 
4.6. Conclusion 
As security analysts play a key role in providing information to capital markets, analysts’ 
herding behavior results in a loss of information and leads to a misallocation of scarce 
resources. To avoid this waste of resources, it is important to understand the drivers of 
analysts’ herding behavior. Prior literature has focused on individual analyst characteristics 
and herding behavior (Hong et al. 2000; Clement and Tse 2005; Bernhardt et al. 2006; 
Jegadeesh and Kim 2010). The literature on analysts’ herding behavior is largely silent about 
the influence of the institutional environment. If any, broker size as a proxy for reputation or 
available resources is the only institutional factor that appears in previous research on 
analysts’ herding behavior. Only the related literature on analysts’ forecast errors explicitly 
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addresses the brokers’ underwriting business as an institutional influence on forecasting 
behavior and touches on other determinants such as geographical distance. 
This study examines the influence of institutional factors on the herding behavior of security 
analysts. For this purpose, we provide a general framework combining individual and 
institutional factors. The framework allows the analysis of herding behavior based on the 
costs of non-herding (CONH). High CONH indicate that a specific analyst has to bear high 
psychological, social, or economic costs if he or she does not follow the prevailing opinion 
(i.e. the herd), and that such analysts are thus more prone to herding behavior than other 
analysts facing low CONH.  
Based on the framework, we introduce and examine the influence of a new institutional 
factor, ownership, on the herding behavior of security analysts. Specifically, we examine, 
firstly, whether analysts working at publicly listed brokerage houses are more likely to herd 
than analysts from privately held brokers, and secondly, if this effect is different for analysts 
covering their own sector (i.e., for financial sector analysts). According to Stein’s (2002) 
theory of soft and hard information production in firms, we predict that analysts from publicly 
listed brokers are less independent and, hence, more prone to herding behavior than analysts 
from private brokers. Analysts from public brokers face higher CONH (e.g., effort, scrutiny, 
or longer chains of command) when processing bold information. The processing of 
information that deviates from a prevailing opinion (i.e. the herd) is more difficult in more 
centralized and regulated environments with taller hierarchies, holding size and scope fixed 
(Stein 2002 and Berger et al. 2005). In contrast, privately held brokerage houses share 
generally flatter hierarchies and more decentralized operations than public brokers.  
To test the effect of the broker’s ownership, we hand-collected data on whether U.S. brokers 
are publicly listed or privately held. We enriched this unique data set with data about the 
brokers’ underwriting business and their informational environment and included a full set of 
controls for the individual analyst characteristics. 
We find that the broker’s ownership (i.e., public vs. private) has a substantial effect on its 
analysts’ CONH and thus on their herding behavior when issuing forecasts. Second, 
concerning the analysts’ CONH, we reveal a tradeoff between the broker’s size and the 
broker’s ownership. Lack of resources and a lower reputation seem to constitute handicaps for 
analysts working at small (and, hence, mostly private) brokerages, making them more prone 
to herding behavior. However, the effect that private brokers process soft information more 
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easily, resulting in lower CONH for analysts when issuing a bold forecast, begins to dominate 
after a threshold of 40 analysts is reached. Analysts working with more than 40 colleagues at 
a privately held brokerage exhibit a significantly higher probability of issuing a bold (i.e. non-
herding) forecasts of 2.6% than similar analysts working at public brokers. 
Third, we provide strong evidence that this effect is driven by the group of analysts covering 
the financial sector; financial sector analysts at publicly listed brokers face substantially 
higher CONH and are, hence, more prone to herding behavior than analysts at private brokers. 
We argue that this is due to the externalities that financial sector analysts working at publicly 
listed brokers can exert on the valuation of their employer and on related issues such as their 
executives’ compensation. Financial sector analysts working at privately held brokerage 
houses employing 24 or more analysts show significantly lower CONH than when employed 
at a publicly listed brokerage. At this threshold, the probability of issuing a bold (i.e. non-
herding) forecast is on average 3.0% higher for analysts from larger private brokers than for 
analysts from listed brokers. As the difference increases with the number of analysts 
employed, the probability of issuing a bold forecast for analysts from private brokers with 
more than 60 analysts is 6.5% higher than for the same analysts from a publicly listed broker, 
which accounts for an economically meaningful difference in herding behavior. 
Fourth, we confirm the findings by Clement and Tse (2005) that these bold forecasts (i.e. non-
herding forecasts) are more accurate, and not simply the result of overconfident or poorly 
informed analysts. Fifth, the effect is robust to a battery of additional checks, all supporting 
our results.  
Taken together, our insights provide strong evidence that the institutional factors of brokerage 
houses substantially shape the herding behavior of their analysts. We show that the ownership 
effect is an important new institutional factor in our framework. The effect constitutes a 
different channel from earlier institutional determinants of analysts’ forecasting behavior, 
such as the volume of investment banking, the reputation, or the resources of a brokerage 
house.  
For investors and regulators, our findings indicate that information about financial sector 
stocks is more independent, and thus, less prone to herding behavior, if it stems from analysts 
working at privately held brokerage houses that are large enough to provide their analysts 
with adequate resources. 
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Our study also has implications for resolving the current reliability issues of information 
dissemination in financial markets. The literature mainly cites two sources for fundamental 
firm information, financial analysts and credit rating agencies. There is evidence that these 
two players discipline each other’s actions (Fong et al. 2012). However, for financial sector 
stocks, an agency problem seems to occur for both players. First, rating agencies are paid by 
financial firms to provide ratings for their financial products, and hence, the agencies are 
often reluctant to reveal bold information about their clients, as has been learned in the 
aftermath of the last financial crisis (Mathis et al. 2009). Second, our findings suggest that 
financial sector analysts from publicly listed brokerages have incentives to herd and not to 
reveal bold information about the financial stocks they cover. So, taken together, the two most 
important players in the market for information about financial sector stocks (i.e., the rating 
agencies and the analysts from the large, publicly listed brokerage houses) seem to have only 
limited incentives to reveal genuine private information about financial sector stocks. Thus, it 
is important to shed further light on the institutional characteristics of information providers 
in financial markets and on how the institutional factors can be changed. These changes 
should aim at increasing the amount of independent information available about the future 
condition of financial sector companies. This may result in a more efficient asset and resource 
allocation in financial markets and could increase the probability of detecting a looming 
financial crisis earlier.  
  90 
 
5. Forecasts and Reactivity: A Theoretical Examination83 
5.1. Introduction 
Forecasts are ubiquitous. There is virtually no place in society from which forecasts are 
excluded. Before we decide to take the train, an application on our mobile phone tells us 
which train to choose in order to avoid the bulk of passengers, or, for car drivers, which route 
will be the fastest. The future freshman tries to forecast the best college place based on the 
latest undergraduate school rankings. Households try to predict periods of particularly low 
real estate prices when searching for a new house. Firms seek to predict the best moment to 
invest in a new product, industry or country. Shareholders try to predict the highest prices to 
sell their shares, and governments issue predictions about the general economic outlook and 
take measures according to it.  
But there is always one fundamental question: Which forecast should we follow and how 
much do we believe in it? Maybe we follow the forecast provider that issued the most 
accurate forecast last time and assume that the same provider will also be successful next 
time. But what if most of the train passengers employ the same forecast service, because it 
was the most accurate one in the previous period, and therefore switch to the same train? The 
train will be crowded. This time, the formerly best forecast service might no longer be 
perceived as the most accurate one although it had been ex-ante (before the forecast was 
publicly issued). In contrast, what if all the talented students apply to the university that is 
highest ranked in the recent college ranking? This university will acquire the most talented 
applicants and, thus, the best selection of students. It will therefore be ranked number one in 
the future rankings, although ex-ante the ranking might have been wrong.  
In markets in which participants react to forecasts, the ex-post analysis of the forecast 
accuracy is always doubtful. Given a high degree of reactivity in a market, individuals' 
reliance on the previous periods' best-performing forecasters can create a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The accuracy of a forecaster's past predictions provides no guarantee that future 
                                                
83 This chapter is based on a paper written jointly with Bruno S. Frey (Cueni and Frey 2013). 
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predictions will be correct. However, the fact that many individuals believe the prediction of 
the best former forecaster to be the most correct one and act upon it makes the market move 
in the direction of this prediction. Under such circumstances, it becomes rational to follow the 
herd and to stick to the forecaster with the most accurate past prediction, because it will 
become the most correct one again due to the self-fulfilling prophecy induced by reactivity. In 
the train example, in contrast, a self-defeating prophecy may arise if a large majority of 
people starts following the previously most accurate forecast provider. 
Reactivity is not only of concern for the forecast users (i.e. market participants). The 
forecasters themselves suffer equally from reactivity. It affects the actual outcome and thus 
hampers the ex-post calibration of their models and their learning in general. Reactivity in a 
market makes the distinction between a good and a bad forecast very difficult or in many 
cases impossible. Although the forecasters and the market participants may act in a fully 
rational way, they are both deceived by reactivity. 
Of course, there are early contributors to the analysis of reactive behavior in the social 
sciences. Venn (1866), Morgenstern (1928) and Merton (1936; 1948) approached the problem 
of reactivity in anthropogenic markets using concepts such as self-fulfilling or self-defeating 
prophecies.84 This paper pursues four aims. First, we intend to draw attention once more to 
the forecasting problems that are evoked by reactivity and that cannot be solved with more 
data or faster information technology. The modern economic forecasting literature is mostly 
enthusiastic about the amount of new data (big data) that has become accessible due to the 
new information technologies. It points toward an increasing ability to provide much more 
accurate and timely forecasts in the near future (see, e.g., Elliott and Timmermann 2008; 
Clements and Hendry 2011, Part II and III). We intend to show that the new technological 
possibilities do not improve forecasts in reactive markets, and we support our proposition 
with empirical evidence.  
Second, we point out several areas where the neglect of reactivity by scientists may lead to 
biased results. Examples are security analysts’ forecasts (see, e.g., Kothari 2001; Clement and 
Tse 2005; Beyer 2008; Liu and Natarajan 2012), art auctioneers' presale price forecasts (see, 
                                                
84 Venn (1866, p. 187) used the term “suicidal prophecies”, similar to Morgenstern’s (1928, p. 107) “[...]the 
publicized prediction has destroyed its own foundation.” (Translated into English by the authors, but stated 
originally in German: “[…] die bekanntgegebene Prognose [hat] ihre eigene Basis zerstört.”); Merton wrote 
that (1936, p. 903) “[…]the “realization” of values may lead to their renunciation”, and finally coined the term in 
his essay in 1948 with the title “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy”, referring to Venn and his “suicidal prophecy” as 
the antonym. 
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e.g., Ashenfelter and Graddy 2003; 2006; Mei and Moses 2005; Beggs and Graddy 2009), and 
forecasts based on query reports from Internet searches, such as the Google Flu Trends 
(Ettredge et al. 2005; Ginsberg et al. 2009; Butler 2008; 2013).    
Third, we outline how reactivity could be analyzed empirically by a comparative approach 
among different markets, which has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been applied. 
Finally, we identify how institutions understood as the “rules of the game” can be used to 
minimize the negative and enhance the positive effects of reactivity (North 1990, p. 3). 
In the following section we discuss the literature and background of reactive behavior. 
Section 5.3 treats the externalities in reactive markets. Section 5.4 provides insights from a 
comparison of reactive and non-reactive markets. Section 5.5 discusses institutions as a way 
of coping with reactivity. The last section concludes.  
5.2. Background and Literature 
As the idea of reactivity to forecasts touches on a large number of topics, we focus this 
literature review on how the topic has been approached in the social sciences and in particular 
in economics.85 As early as 1866, John Venn explained the problem of reactivity: “But when 
the inference is about the conduct of human beings it is often forgotten that in the inference 
itself, if published, we may have produced an unsuspected source of disturbance” (Venn 
1866, p. 345).  
Years later, Morgenstern (1928) adapted the problem of reactivity to economic forecasting 
and stated his impossibility theorem of a correct prediction in an economic context, where 
individuals react to predictions. Merton (1936; 1948) coined the idea of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in a sociological context, also referring to economic case studies such as bank-runs. 
Interestingly, he emphasized a reactivity that has a positive impact on the forecasters’ 
accuracy if the market participants were to believe in the forecast strongly enough. This 
stands in contrast to Morgenstern's claims. Grunberg and Modigliani (1954) showed that 
Morgenstern’s impossibility theorem in a theoretical model (cobweb cycles) does not hold, 
yet their assumptions have been criticized as partially unrealistic, even by themselves (see, 
e.g., Henshel 1995). At the same time, Machlup (1955) discussed the problems due to 
                                                
85 As Merton (1936, p. 894) stated: “The diversity of context and variety of terms by which this problem has 
been known, however, have tended to obscure the definite continuity in its consideration.” 
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reactivity from the forecasters’ point of view and stated that a verification problem hinders the 
learning of forecasters. Whenever a model is tested with new data, it remains unclear if the 
deviations stem from the faultiness of the model or from other unpredictable changes in the 
system modeled, making systematic model corrections impossible.  
Simon (1954) and Baumol (1957) argued that polls and other pre-election predictions can lead 
to both self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies. Both scholars stated that the assumption 
in their models, which are based on Gruenberg and Modigliani’s work, can be criticized in 
assuming a reaction function of market participants (i.e. in the case of voters) that has to be 
both known to the forecaster and known to be continuous. Kemp (1962) showed theoretically 
that correct public forecasting in economics (and other social applications) is impossible. 
However, his assumptions, in turn, have been criticized by Grunberg and Modigliani (1963). 
Rotschild (1964) showed that forecasts, although imperfect, can have positive effects in 
dampening the fluctuations and improving the stability of economic systems.  
According to Henshel (1993; 1995) and Hands (1990), the emergence of the idea of (fully) 
rational expectations (Muth 1961) almost ousted the idea of reactivity. Nevertheless, even 
under the assumption of fully rational expectations, the quest for reactivity went on. 
Expectations can be seen as forecasts, thus it is interesting to understand the market outcome 
to which fully rational “forecasts” would lead. Samuelson explored the problem in 1965, 
stating that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly (i.e. follow a Martingale process). 
His “random walk hypothesis” became influential especially in relation to financial markets 
(Samuelson 1965, p. 48; see also Malkiel 1973; Samuelson 1974). The hypothesis states that 
the reactivity between expectations (i.e. forecasts) and actions in a market leads to a randomly 
oscillating market outcome. Grossman (1977), among others, showed that reactivity in 
markets produces “noisy” rational expectations, leading to informational externalities. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) considered the impossibility of informationally efficient 
markets, showing that markets therefore can “rest in an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium” 
(Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, p. 393). The foundation of this idea is close to Rothschild 
(1964). 
Other important issues concerning reactivity and forecasting were raised in the fifties in 
sociology and social psychology, and in the seventies in economics. Most prominent in 
economics is Lucas’s critique (1976), stating that it is naïve to try to forecast the outcome of a 
change in policy with a macroeconomic model based on aggregate data. The change in policy 
would also lead to a change in the microfoundation of the forecasting model, resulting in 
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wrong policy advice. Campbell (1957) and Goodhart (1975) had previously made a similar 
point, approaching reactivity from the market participants’ point of view, who are seen to 
produce the forecasted outcome: “A reactive measure is one which modifies the phenomenon 
under study, which changes the very thing that one is trying to measure” (Campbell 1957, p. 
298).86 The manipulation of targets is due to the reaction of the individuals being measured. 
Thus, the forecaster has to deal with a reactive outcome when trying to predict a new target. 
The sociological literature analyzing the problem of reactivity is growing. Since Campbell 
(1957), it has become a tradition in sociology and social psychology (and psychology in 
general) to address the problem of the observer and measurement effect as a reactivity 
problem.87 Callon (1998) and later MacKenzie (2006) and Esposito (2013) addressed the 
problem under the term “performativity,” which leads to the unpredictability of anthropogenic 
market outcomes. MacKenzie and Esposito apply their research directly to financial markets. 
They try to show how the problem of performativity, especially for the field of risk 
management, has become unmanageable during the recent financial crisis. The very nature of 
risk management is “that risk can be predicted with probabilistic models” (Esposito 2013, p. 
121), but this has been cast into doubt when considering the last financial crisis (MacKenzie 
2006, p. 201). In particular, the risk models led to a form of reactive behavior on the part of 
the market participants (traders) trying to exploit the models (Beunza and Stark 2012). Hence, 
the models were wrong from the very moment when at least some parameters became known 
in the market. In this paper, we call such a mechanism “reactivity”. 
The problem of reactivity involved in forecasts for anthropogenic markets has attracted less 
attention in the recent literature on economic forecasting (see, e.g., Elliott and Timmermann 
2008; Garcia-Ferrer 2012). 88  Certainly, reactivity is always captured in the structural 
parameters of the forecast models which are discussed in the literature. However, neither the 
reactivity to forecasts nor possible ways to proxy for the degree of reactivity are dealt with 
                                                
86 The idea is identical to the "observer effect" in physics (and indirectly related to Heisenberg’s (1927) 
“uncertainty principle”), which states that by measuring a certain object it is inevitable that the object itself will 
be affected and, hence, the result will deviate.  
87 In sociology, reactivity is often termed reflexivity or categorized as a form of reflexivity (see, e.g., Espeland 
and Sauder 2007, p. 6). In particular, researchers must pay attention not to evoke reactive/reflexive behavior in 
subjects, and thus bias the results of their study (Campbell and Stanley 1963). In financial theory, George Soros 
(1987) introduced the term “reflexivity” and demonstrated later that he was capable of using it successfully 
against the Bank of England in the 1992 UK pound sterling currency crisis. 
88 In their review of the literature on economic forecasting, Elliott and Timmermann (2008) do not touch on the 
problem of reactivity of forecasts; similarly, Garcia-Ferrer (2012) discusses Clive Grangers views on the next 
steps for a higher predictability in financial market and does not deal with the problem of reactivity neither.  
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(see also Clements and Hendry 2011).89 Instead, it is argued that real-time feedback will help 
the forecasters to learn more quickly and adapt their models faster and more appropriately 
(Elliott and Timmermann 2008, p. 4). In contrast, we argue that this is unlikely to hold true, 
because the market participants and their access to new technology (just as the forecasters’ 
access) will enable them to react as fast as the forecasters can recalibrate their predictions. 
Another strand of the literature explicitly dealing with a special kind of forecaster, namely 
security analysts, has so far also neglected the problem of reactivity. Security analysts try to 
forecast a firm’s earnings per share (EPS) over a certain period. Because these forecasts shape 
expectations on the security market, the managers have an incentive to meet the earnings that 
have been forecast by the analysts. This leads to a problem of reactivity between the forecast 
and the actual outcome. From an accounting perspective, the problem of earnings 
management in firms and public institutions has been analyzed since the early eighties and 
has produced an abundance of studies (Raman 1981; Healy and Wahlen 1999). The 
accounting literature since the turn of the millennium has indicated the problem of a possible 
interaction between analysts’ EPS forecasts and the company managers’ incentives to 
converge their earnings towards the analysts’ forecasts (see, e.g., Abarbanell and Lehavy 
2003; Burgstahler and Eames 2006). Still, Beyer (2008), to the best of our knowledge, is the 
first study clearly documenting and theoretically analyzing reactivity between analysts’ 
forecasts and managers’ earnings management. Yet, the newer literature on analyst forecasts 
only partly considers the effects of reactivity when calculating analysts' forecast accuracy 
(e.g., Liu and Natarajan 2012; Bissessur and Veenman 2013). 
Similarly, the literature on art auctions generally does not consider the effects of reactivity 
when treating experts’ forecasts about the value of an auctioned artwork (Ekelund et al. 1998 
being a notable exemption; for an overview of art auctions, see Ashenfelter and Graddy 2003; 
2006). Individual studies have recently opened the field for a more thorough analysis of 
auctioneer presale price estimates (i.e., art experts’ forecasts). These surveys tackle the 
problem of studying forecast accuracy when the forecast itself can influence the actual 
outcome (Mei and Moses 2005; McAndrew et al. 2012).  
                                                
89 For example, we are thinking of ways to proxy the forecasters’ reputations and to infer from this the reactivity 
of the market participants in accordance with the forecast issued. There exist, of course, many studies on 
learning and the generation of expectation in economic systems (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja 2001, for an 
overview concerning macroeconomics and Wenzelburger 2006, for an overview on mathematical economics), 
however, they do not study the institutional impact of the group of professional private or governmental 
forecaster. We focus in this chapter on the impact of these specific groups on market participants and on 
themselves.  
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When focusing on new trends in forecasting, we see a similar pattern. A new forecast 
technique is introduced and the enthusiasm engendered leads people to forget the inevitable 
reactivity of the market participants. A prominent example is the new promising forecasting 
technique that uses the flu-related Internet searches to predict flu pandemics (Eysenbach 
2006; Ginsberg et al. 2009). However, the problem of reactivity has to be kept in mind. The 
Google Flu trend forecast during the last winter season (2012/13) substantially overestimated 
the flu situation in the U.S. (Butler 2013). As argued in Butler (2013), the Google Flu forecast 
might have suffered from Internet searches looking for news about the flu situation. In 
addition, the flu hit early and extraordinarily severely last season and, hence, seems to have 
drawn the public's attention to it. This might have increased the number of searches for 
preventive measures on the Internet from people who were not ill. Such changes in people’s 
search behavior might have led to a large forecast error for Google’s Flu forecast. We assign 
this effect to the reactive behavior of individuals. But there might be another way in which 
reactivity can distort such a forecast. If the forecast predicts a severe flu, people might tend to 
mismatch symptoms of a cold to flu. This would lead to a biased result even if the individuals 
did not change their searching behavior but, instead, just started Internet searches based on 
their wrong perception of having flu. Google Flu would be powerless to adapt to this direct 
form of reactivity, although the company intends to adapt the search-based model to the 
changes in peoples’ search behavior. 
5.3. Positive and Negative Externalities of Reactivity 
5.3.1. Externalities of Reactivity 
From an economic and social point of view, it is important to analyze possible positive and 
negative externalities of reactivity. Therefore, we first identify the possible courses that 
reactivity can take and the different outcomes it can lead to: 
1. The forecast was ex-ante wrong, but the market participants reacted in such a way that 
the predicted value occurs. This leads ex-post to the judgment of a correct forecast: 
Type A (the typical case of a self-fulfilling prophecy). 
  97 
2. The forecast was ex-ante correct, but the market participants reacted in such a way that 
the predicted outcome did not occur. This leads ex-post to the judgment of a wrong 
forecast: Type B (the typical case of a self-defeating prophecy). 
3. The forecast was ex-ante correct, and the market participants reacted in such a way 
that the predicted value occurs. This leads ex-post to the judgment of a correct 
forecast: Type A.  
4. The forecast was ex-ante wrong, and the market participants reacted in such a way that 
the predicted outcome did not occur. This leads ex-post to the judgment of a wrong 
forecast: Type B. 
In cases 1 and 2, reactivity exerts negative externalities on forecasters and market participants. 
We focus initially on the market participants who are misguided and who make wrong 
resource allocations, detecting their error only when the reactive market outcome is corrected, 
or even never. An example for the first case is a bank run, where a wrong forecast that a bank 
is not solvent can actually lead to the insolvency of a bank because the forecast causes people 
to withdraw their money from the bank. Every reactive behavior in accordance with the 
wrong forecast exerts a negative externality on the other market participants. Merton (1948, p. 
194) provides anecdotal evidence that refers to the bank run on the Last National Bank in 
1932 as an example of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
It is important to recall that, for example, during a market bubble that emerges due to a 
wrong, exuberant forecast, the self-fulfilling prophecy can have positive externalities in the 
short run. Temin and Voth (2004) provide an excellent example. During the South Sea 
Bubble, even fully rational investors, informed about the existence of a bubble in the market 
and with full knowledge about the pessimistic forecasts, still promoted the price exuberance. 
As long as such rational investors assume that market sentiment is still increasing, they 
support the further inflation of the bubble, encouraging a self-fulfilling prophecy for a certain 
period. During this period, the self-fulfilling prophecy exerts a positive externality on the 
forecaster, who issues the wrong prediction, and the market participants, who believe in this 
wrong forecast. However, in the long run, when the bubble bursts, the reactive behavior of 
market participants is unveiled. The negative externalities and the resulting inefficient 
resource allocation during the bubble become visible. 
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An example for case 2, a self-defeating prophecy, is a warning about the malfunctioning of a 
market that is perceived by the market participants as a scare tactic and, thus, strengthens the 
participants' belief in their misguided actions. Reinhart and Rogoff provide ample anecdotal 
evidence (2009, p. 208-215). They demonstrate in a compelling way how the “doomsayers” 
before the financial crisis, e.g., Roubini and Setser (2004) or later Krugman (2007), warned 
against the vicious circle of borrowing money in steadily increasing amounts in the US. 
Instead of destabilizing the malign trend, the advocates of “this time it's different” gained 
ground and the vicious circle continued.90 Eventually, the predicted outcome did occur. This 
demonstrates that it is important to focus on a certain period when assigning the various cases 
to a situation. In the long run, the “doomsaysers” were mostly correct in this episode, while in 
the short run, they provide a nice example for case 2, of a self-defeating prophecy. In cases 3 
and 4, market participants generally face the positive side of reactivity, guiding them to the 
correct action, or, at least, dissuading them from going in the wrong direction.  
Next, we focus on the forecasters’ point of view. In case 1, the forecasters that initially issued 
a wrong forecast but benefit from the reactive outcome that meets their forecast are exerting 
negative externalities on the forecasters that issued initially correct forecasts. Case 2 mirrors 
the outcome of case 1 from the point of view of the ex-ante correct forecasters who face the 
negative externalities of reactivity. Cases 3 and 4 involve no negative externalities. On first 
sight, the forecasters face only positive externalities, fostering correct forecasts and revealing 
the wrong ones.  
However, a problem still remains with cases 3 and 4. As indicated above, case 3 is ex-post 
indistinguishable from case 1 (type A problem), and case 4 cannot be differentiated from case 
2 (type B problem). This leads to negative externalities imposed by the reaction of market 
participants. First, for the market participants, both type A and type B problems make it 
impossible to select the “truly” able forecasters, as ex-ante wrong forecasts can be judged ex-
post as correct and vice versa. Therefore, the market participants exert a negative externality 
on their own future behavior and prevent themselves from learning. Second, the same is true 
for the forecasters. They will never reliably know if their own forecast was initially correct 
                                                
90 Even in past times it was not easy to be a doomsayer. “The [forecasting] activity, induced by the sheer 
insatiable demand for such forecasts, silenced the pessimists and doomsayers […]”, as Bombach (1962, p. 29) 
explained. (Translated into English by the authors, but stated originally in German: “Die durch die schier 
unersättliche Nachfrage nach solchen Prognosen ausgelöste [Vorhersage-] Aktivität hat die Pessimisten und 
Warner […] verstummen lassen”.) 
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(type A problem) or was initially wrong (type B problem). Hence, the learning of forecasters 
in reactive markets is also substantially reduced.  
There is evidence that economic forecasts did indeed not improve for different periods and 
countries, supporting our analysis. Zarnowitz (1992), for example, shows that forecasts for the 
U.S. GDP did not improve between 1953 and 1989. Heilenmann and Stekler (2012) also show 
an unsteady behavior in the accuracy of forecasts for German GDP growth between 1967 and 
2001 and no trend towards improvement. Despite the massive increase of available data and 
continuously improving information technologies, there is no discernible trend towards an 
improvement in economic forecasts (see, e.g., Oeller and Barot 2000; Vogel 2007).  
We are not aware of any studies directly addressing the empirical question of the development 
of forecast accuracy of art experts or security analysts over time. In the case of forecasting 
techniques using Internet queries, anecdotal evidence exists on the failure of Google Flu 
trends during the 2012/2013 winter’s flu season (Butler 2013). Before that season (2004 to 
2008), however, the forecast accuracy of the new Google service did improve the forecast 
accuracy visibly (see, e.g., Ginsberg et al. 2009). Choi and Varian (2012) provide evidence 
for other domains, such as forecasts for automobile sales, unemployment claims or choice of 
travel destinations using web searches from Google Trends. They show that, from 2005 to 
2010, most of the algorithms for the forecasts exhibited an improved accuracy. Generally, it is 
difficult to infer any trends for these new techniques, as they were launched after the turn of 
the millennium and the short period of time restricts the amount of data available for a reliable 
empirical analysis on the forecast accuracy over time. 
5.3.2. Reactivity-Induced Herding Behavior 
The impossibility of learning for forecasters due to self-fulfilling and self-defeating 
prophecies induced by reactivity leads to several consequences. Firstly, above and beyond the 
problem of learning, the indistinguishability between a correct and a wrong forecast in 
reactive markets distorts the forecasters' incentives. It can be credibly assumed that market 
participants will follow the type A forecasters (the ones that are ex-post correct) when 
deciding on which forecasters to follow in the future, irrespective of the problem of not being 
able to distinguish between cases 1 and 3. Hence, the forecasters’ reputations rise whenever 
their forecasts are ex-post judged to be correct. In a reactive market, the forecaster with the 
highest reputation can induce a self-fulfilling prophecy, so forecasters have a strong incentive 
to adapt their forecasts towards the prediction of the forecaster with the highest reputation in 
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the market. It is not the true ability of the forecaster (as case 1 and 3 are indistinguishable) but 
the market participants’ reactivity to reputation and the possibility of a resulting self-fulfilling 
prophecy that create a herding behavior among forecasters.91 
Secondly, the reactivity-induced herding of forecasters raises two new forms of externalities: 
The first of these is that each forecaster that starts to herd with the allegedly most reputable 
forecaster (group of forecasters) in the market increases the pressure on the other forecasters 
to also follow the increasingly large herd. The second is that the larger the number of 
forecasters joining the herd, the higher is the false sense of certainty among the market 
participants and the stronger their reactivity, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Reactivity-
induced herding is, thus, a self-reinforcing process. 
Several interesting empirical findings support our proposition of reactivity and reactivity-
induced reputational herding behavior. For example, an often-cited strand of the literature on 
forecasting is the literature of security analysts who forecast the earnings per share (EPS) of 
listed companies (Elliott and Timmermann 2008). Security analysts are identified as herding 
more when they are younger and when they work with less reputable brokerage houses (Hong 
et al. 2000; Clement and Tse 2005). Further, Clement and Tse (2005) show a higher accuracy 
on the part of more experienced forecasters. This result can be interpreted by a reactivity-
based explanation, among other explanations, such as reputational herding induced by ability 
(see footnote 8).  
More reputable brokerage houses entice the most reputable forecasters away. So, on average, 
the analysts with higher reputations work for more reputable brokerage houses and are also 
older and more experienced, due to the selection process they have undergone (Hong and 
Kubik 2003). In addition, analysts who are employed by more reputable houses also show a 
higher relative accuracy, but the accuracy does not increase further once they are employed at 
the top, i.e., work with the most prestigious brokerage houses (Hong and Kubik 2003; 
Groysberg et al. 2011). Taken together, the high reactivity in the market for EPS forecasts 
provides an explanation for such a pattern: Older analysts herd less because they lead the herd 
                                                
91 It is important to separate our argument of reputation-based herding induced by reactivity from the reputation-
based herding induced by ability, as in Scharfstein and Stein (1990) among others. Our argument goes above and 
beyond the problem that incapable forecasters could mimic the able forecasters. Rather, we state that reactivity 
can change the outcome such that a wrong prediction by an incapable but ex-ante reputable forecaster may 
become reality and, thus, will ex-post be perceived as a correct prediction. Likewise, our argument here is not 
based on a simple informational cascade (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992), as the herding forecasters 
might even know that they are doing wrong, but because the actual outcome is strongly influenced by reactivity 
(self-fulfilling prophecy), they still engage in herding behavior. All our subjects act in a fully rational manner. 
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due to their higher reputation. Hence, the reaction to their reputable forecasts induces a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, once the analysts with a high reputation also work for a 
prestigious brokerage house and become leading forecasters, they cease to be relatively more 
accurate than the average forecaster, because the herd approximates their forecasts closely.  
The market for EPS forecasts is indeed highly reactive, as the executives have an incentive to 
manage their companies’ earnings in order to meet (or beat) the consensus forecast (the 
average forecast of the herd). Reactivity-induced herding behavior matches the common 
empirical evidence in the literature on security analysts. Interestingly, Beyer (2008) neither 
includes nor touches on the idea of reactivity-induced herding behavior in her model of 
reactive behavior between the forecasters and the producers of the outcome (managers of the 
firms), The latter only comprises the reactivity between a single forecaster and a single 
manager of a firm. 
The literature on economic forecasting also provides empirical evidence of herding (Ashiya 
and Doi 2001; Bewley and Fiebig 2002). However, the object of study in economic forecasts 
(e.g., predicted GDP growth) is substantially less reactive to the estimates issued than the EPS 
forecasts issued by security analysts. This can be assumed to apply in the case of large and 
stable economies. In smaller and more volatile economies, the reactivity to economic 
forecasts is likely to be higher. Interestingly, this is what the empirical evidence of a cross-
country comparison reflects. Forecasts for emerging markets tend to exhibit more herding 
behavior than forecasts for established industrial or post-industrial economies (see, e.g., 
Pierdzioch et al. 2012).  
5.4. Comparison of Markets With and Without Reactivity 
To improve our knowledge about reactivity, we propose to compare forecast markets for 
reactive and non-reactive systems.92 A prominent example of forecasts in a non-reactive 
system is that of weather forecasts. The weather does not react to the forecasts being issued. 
Self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies are not possible in such systems. None of the 
problems stemming from the indistinguishability between a self-fulfilling or self-defeating 
prophecy and a genuinely correct or incorrect forecast (type A and type B problems of 
                                                
92 Merton (1936) and Morgenstern (1928) mention the difference of forecasts in reactive and non-reactive 
markets. 
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reactivity) apply. Hence, we should be able to identify the consequences of reactivity when 
analyzing the differences between forecasters' behavior in reactive and non-reactive systems. 
First, the absence of reactivity is expected to lead to a continuous improvement of forecast 
accuracy due to the learning of forecasters. The forecasters can (up to a specific measurement 
error) fully rely on the ex-post measured outcomes, adjust their models, and calibrate their 
calculations accordingly. The learning of forecasters will establish reliable practices and rules 
on how to produce correct forecasts.  
Second, any technological progress should lead to an improvement of forecast accuracy in 
non-reactive systems. More data about the initial conditions and the dynamics of the weather 
as well as advances in the transmission, processing and storage of data will increase weather 
forecast accuracy over time. There is ample evidence that weather forecasts do steadily 
improve over time and that learning and technological progress are the drivers of this 
development (see, e.g., American Meteorological Society 2008; Buizza et al. 2010; Katz and 
Lazo 2011).  
Third, in a non-reactive system, reactive effects such as self-fulfilling or self-defeating 
prophecies cannot induce pressure on forecasters to herd with the most reputable forecasters. 
The forecasters would only herd to share the blame; if everybody else fails, the reputational 
costs fall on all forecasters and remain relatively unimportant (Scharfstein and Stein 1990). 
However, the possibility to distinguish ex-post between a wrong and a correct forecast leads 
to a correct attribution of reputation by market participants (weather-forecast consumers). 
Thus, the blame-sharing type of reputational herding behavior will also be driven out in the 
long run in a non-reactive system. Compared to a reactive system, forecasts for a non-reactive 
market do not induce a self-reinforcing herding behavior and do ultimately provide a positive 
incentive to issue the ex-ante most correct forecast possible. We are not aware of any study 
providing evidence about a possible herding behavior in the market for weather forecasts and, 
hence, provide an empirical analysis in the following chapter of the thesis testing the 
propositions stated here. 
When we compare the production of a forecast for future weather conditions with that for 
future economic conditions, both seem to be of similar complexity. As Arrow stated in an 
interview in 2000 about his military service during World War II as a weather forecaster: 
“What I found then was another example of a very complex, interacting system. It 
(meteorology) had a big advantage over economics because the fundamental theory was very 
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well understood.”93 Clearly, the steadily improving weather forecast accuracy attracts the 
attention of economic forecasters. In a working paper of the Bank for International Settlement 
(BIS), Vahey and Wakerly (2013) praise the probability forecasting stemming from the 
meteorological sciences and propose to copy the technique to attain a similar forecast 
accuracy for macroeconomic forecasting. However, we want to stress the important difference 
between forecasts in reactive markets and forecasts in non-reactive markets. We perceive the 
difference between these two types of markets to be neglected in the economic forecasting 
literature on probabilistic forecasting (Katz and Lazo 2011). The important point is that the 
market participants in anthropogenic markets not only react to a specific forecast, but also 
adapt to new forecasting techniques and even adopt them. The reactivity will absorb the 
improvement of forecast accuracy in economic, financial, or art price forecasting, among 
many other anthropogenic markets. Any putative increase in forecast accuracy due to more 
and better data will be neutralized by market participants adjusting their actions with the help 
of the same new techniques the forecasters are using. Weather forecasts are issued in a non-
reactive system and their accuracy and success will, thus, remain distinctively different from 
forecasting in reactive systems.  
Finally, consider the following example. Imagine the case of an unemployment forecast for 
the next year. The market participants (employees) are assumed to correctly infer from the 
forecast that they might lose their jobs and, hence, start to work harder and do not ask for 
higher wages. This reaction results in a self-defeating prophecy for the forecast of higher 
unemployment. The reactivity might even lead to an increasing pressure to perform among 
employees.94 The outcome, though, is desired, and the menace of unemployment is averted. 
Yet, ex-post the forecasters’ prediction is judged negatively, providing a negative incentive 
for future forecasts of the same type although they are socially and economically desirable. 
To contrast with the unemployment example, we draw on the story of Joseph in the Old 
Testament (Book of Genesis). Joseph, after having been asked to interpret a dream of the 
Egyptian Pharaoh, forecast seven years of abundance and seven years of famine. The Pharaoh 
had Joseph adopt the necessary measures. Joseph had large storehouses built and filled them 
with the excess grain during the seven abundant years. Finally, during the seven years of 
famine triggered by a severe drought, Joseph was able to provide the Egyptians with the grain 
stored to prevent famine. His own forecast proved to be wrong but was most useful. 
                                                
93 Quoted according to Katz and Lazo (2011, p. 561). 
94 Lazear et al. (2013) provide evidence that during recessions the productivity of employees increases due to the 
“work-harder” effect and not due to other effects such as a better selection of workers.  
  104 
Two issues are important when comparing the examples. First, as discussed above, the 
forecast for the reactive market of unemployment was self-defeating due to reactivity. An ex-
post assessment of the forecast would likely lead to a negative report for the forecasters. In 
contrast, Joseph was proven right, as the non-reactive weather, not paying attention to the 
forecast, produced the drought. Second, Joseph used the weather forecast to make another 
forecast, namely that there would be famine. This second forecast induced Joseph's reaction 
recommending the storage of grain and, hence, the forecast, by inducing reactivity, ended as a 
self-defeating prophecy. This example raises an interesting case in which the forecasts for a 
non-reactive system enter a stage, which we call the anthropogenic level, leading to a reactive 
system. Forecasts for non-reactive markets are naturally used to forecast probable damage. By 
doing so, the forecasts are translated into a reactive system. On the anthropogenic level, the 
forecasts stemming from a non-reactive system face the same problems as forecasts for a 
reactive market.  
Silver (2012) shows that even weather forecasters intentionally bias their weather models to 
influence consumers. For a large U.S. weather channel, Silver shows that the forecasts issued 
predicted an excessive probability of rain, but only in a relative way: When the probability of 
rain was predicted by the initial model to be very low (below 25%), the weather channel 
issued an increased probability. When the initial model, instead, predicted a probability of 
more than 25%, the forecast was issued without any adaptation. This makes sense, as 
customers will blame the weather channel for a day when there is no rain predicted and they 
suddenly find themselves unprotected against sudden rain. Thus, the weather channels impose 
a “wet bias” and forecast an increased probability of rain although their initial model would 
objectively predict no rain (Silver 2011, p. 135). The opposite case, when the initial model 
predicts a high probability of having rain (above 75%), is obviously of less importance for the 
end-users; they will be prepared for the rain anyway. In contrast to the U.S. weather channels, 
the U.S. National Weather Service releases almost perfectly calibrated predictions that 
primarily serve business clients and other weather experts. These examples illustrate that, 
even for intrinsically non-reactive forecasts, human reactions can affect forecast behavior and 
accuracy. However, the bias is less severe in such markets than in reactive systems, as the 
forecast users receive more unbiased information about the true state of the world (see, e.g., 
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). 
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5.5. Reactions to Reactivity: Institutions 
5.5.1. Institutions and Reactivity 
Institutions define the “rules of the game” that shape the incentives of economic actors (North 
1990; Bowles 1998). Institutions are important for economic prosperity and individual well-
being (Frey and Stutzer 2002a; 2002b; Besley 2003; Acemoglu et al. 2005; Frey 2008). 
Hence, institutions should be used to absorb the negative externalities of forecasts due to 
reactivity.  
Poll restrictions provide an interesting example of an institution that aims at preventing 
market participants (i.e., voters) from falling prey to reactive behavior.95 Political scientists 
discovered that polls before and during elections and ballots may induce reactive behavior on 
the part of voters, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy (“bandwagon effect”) or a self-
defeating prophecy (“underdog effect”) (see, e.g., Sudman 1986; McAllistar and Studlar 
1991, p. 720). However, the degree of influence of reactivity on voting behavior is difficult to 
estimate, and thus the implications for public policy are hotly debated (Morwitz and Pluzinski 
1996; Feasby 1997; McDonald and Thornburg 2012). Many countries have decided to restrict 
polls before and during elections and ballots, supporting the notion that forecasts such as polls 
generate negative externalities due to reactivity. As it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
internalize these externalities, poll restriction seems a valid instrument for eliminating or 
reducing reactive behavior. Chung (2012) provides new evidence that 46% of 83 countries96 
surveyed do indeed prevent the release of polls before the elections. The so-called blackout 
periods range from 1 up to 45 days. Fifty-two percent of the countries report a restriction of 
polls during the elections or ballots (exit polls).  
Another interesting example of an institution that exploits the reactive behavior of market 
participants is the ranking of colleges and universities in the market for education. During the 
last three decades, these rankings have become increasingly important for universities in the 
U.S. and, with a slight delay, in many other countries. Espeland and Sauder (2007) provide an 
insightful study about the ways rankings induce reactivity. When rankings are perceived as 
providing useful information about the quality of universities, the best students will be 
                                                
95 We interpret polls as forecasts since, from the voters’ point of view, polls provide them with information about 
the most likely outcome of future elections or ballots. 
96 The survey includes the largest and most developed countries on the different continents of the world (Africa 
(4), Asia (27), Europe (35), North America (8), South America (8) and Oceania (3)). For further details, see 
Chung (2012, p. 5). 
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attracted by those that are ranked highest. The highest ranked university can then choose 
among the most talented students and will hence perform best in the future, as their alumni 
will perform best in academia and elsewhere.  
Frank (1999) argues that the market for education provides an ideal example of a “winner-
take-all market”. Small shifts in rankings lead to an enormous shift in students’ applications. 
This is reflected in an inefficient proportion of university resources being invested in the 
factors that are most heavily weighted in the ranking. Hence, even if the forecasters (the 
producers of the rankings) try to adjust their model to forecast the best universities with an 
even higher probability, universities will react immediately and adapt to the new rankings 
(Espeland and Sauder 2007). 
The market for education is distinctively different from other product markets, since 
customers themselves produce the product. Hence, the universities have a high incentive to 
attract the most able students. This stands in contrast to a sports car manufacturer, to whose 
reputation the customers' driving skills are of no importance (Frank 1999). The students have 
a high incentive to see their university at the top of the ranking once they have been admitted. 
Taken together, the universities, students and forecast (or ranking) providers all share an 
aligned incentive to perform in accordance with the ranking. This creates a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.97 
Why are these examples important? First, they provide insights into how institutions can 
shape or limit reactivity so as to prevent negative externalities of forecasts. Second, they show 
how institutions can exploit reactivity in their favor. Third, they make clear that reactivity can 
drive out competition in forecast markets, giving way to herding behavior. The larger the 
share of voters who believe in the same pre-election poll, the stronger is the influence of that 
poll. A stronger poll, hence, leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy by provoking a reactivity-
induced herding behavior of the other poll providers towards the first poll, so that they too 
provide an ex-post accurate poll. A similar process is applicable to university rankings. 
Interestingly, only the first example has so far provoked an institutional reaction. The reaction 
leading to a prohibition of polls is reasonable, since the polls do not produce any additional 
information that is important for the voters’ decision making. In contrast, university rankings 
provide such additional information to prospective students. Rankings fulfill an informational 
                                                
97 This is particularly true if the first ranking were so well conducted that the educational landscape was mirrored 
and the initial ranking matched the perceived reputation among the universities. The highly reputed universities 
would consolidate their positions from the very first moment of the existence of the ranking. 
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function in the market for higher education. However, they also pose a problem due to their 
ability to induce reactivity.  
Fourth, the examples emphasize a structural problem of forecasts. Reactivity can give rise to 
good and bad incentives, and reactivity can produce positive as well as negative externalities. 
A forecast such as an informative university ranking can prevent market participants (i.e., 
prospective students), from making wrong decisions, like applying to the worst university and 
thus wasting time and money. This is an outcome of forecasting in which reactivity leads to a 
desirable self-fulfilling prophecy. If the forecast were correct and the worst university were to 
close due to a lack of students applying, the efficient allocation of resources would be 
increased. However, it is highly doubtful whether an institution can be established that can ex-
ante discriminate between the correct forecast (desirable reactivity) and the wrong forecast 
(undesirable reactivity).  
Fifth, the example of the unemployment forecast showed that a self-defeating prophecy can 
lead to a desirable outcome and prevent market participants from allocating resources to the 
wrong endeavor. Yet, the problem from the forecaster's perspective is that such useful 
forecasts can be perceived ex-post as wrong. The forecasters have no incentive to issue such 
an invidious forecast again. The establishment of a sound institutional reaction to the wrong 
incentive is difficult. The question is how to restore positive incentives for forecasters that 
have predicted a bad outcome, which is hopefully defeated and, thus, has led to a self-
defeating prophecy, so that the forecast is judged ex-post as wrong. 
5.5.2. Potentially Helpful Institutions 
Which institutions can be proposed to mitigate the problems of forecasts inducing reactivity? 
First, we distinguish between forecasts that provide additional information to the market 
participants (the decision makers) and forecasts that do not. The polls exemplify the 
circumstances in which there is no provision of intrinsic information, in this case to the 
voters, while the university rankings do provide information, to a prospective student. It 
makes sense to restrict or even prohibit forecasts that do not provide additional information 
can be restricted or even prohibited. Such an institutionalized ban on forecasts may interfere 
with the political right to freedom of speech. The latter has to be compared with the severity 
of the forecast's negative externalities that can be prevented with a ban.98 
                                                
98 For an example, see the discussion of the Canadian poll restrictions in Feasby (1997).    
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 For the second group of forecasts inducing reactivity problems, the informational benefit for 
the market participants provides no reason to restrict or ban them. For these forecasts, it goes 
too far to radically conclude, as Morgenstern (1928, p. 121) does, that forecasts have to be 
banned due to reactive behavior and that only “facts and figures” may be publicized. The 
problem with issuing only raw data is that for most issues an individual cannot make sense of 
the data without knowing some basics on how to read and interpret them. So, the public 
always asks for an interpretation and always receives an interpretation, which might be true or 
not. Furthermore, the increasing information load due to technological progress will not make 
it easier to keep track of the correct interpretation of specific data. Thus, we have to think 
about who should provide explanations and interpretations of data, because someone will 
provide an explanation anyway. 
Instead of prohibiting reactivity-inducing forecasts that can provide intrinsic information to 
the market participants, we propose the re-establishment of an old institution, the devil's 
advocate. The Catholic Church introduced this institution in the 15th century to prevent 
clerical decision-makers from choosing the wrong persons to canonize (see, e.g., Stanley 
1981). The devil's advocate had the duty of scrutinizing and challenging the reasons advanced 
for canonizing a certain person. This idea is also an institutionalized form of Janis’s idea that 
project leaders have to assign the role of “critical evaluators” to every member of a project 
team (Janis 1972, p. 209). 
We propose that the devil's advocate should at least scrutinize the forecast of the most 
reputable forecaster. The idea is to establish an informational counterweight to the most 
important factor inducing reactivity in a market. Of course, many questions have to be 
clarified before the proposed mechanism can be put into practice. In particular, the funding of 
the devil's advocate and the available resources have to be defined. The most efficient way 
would be to establish a tax on the forecasters' profit. Such funding would increase with the 
share and the volume of the specific forecast market, accounting for the degree of the possible 
external effects. On the other hand, one could argue that the socially desirable effects of such 
a service (the provision of information as a public good) would justify the use of public funds. 
A prominent example of such a forecasting institution involves the German Council of 
Economic Experts, which is nearly independent of the government but is still financed by 
public funds.99 The devil's advocate would inform the public about possible arguments against 
                                                
99 The German Council of Economic Experts is not completely independent of the German government, as its 
members are appointed by the Federal President, similar to the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. However, 
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the most prominent forecasts and provide information about the data backing the claims. Such 
a service would result in a less stable environment for reactive behavior as it would interfere 
with the development of self-reinforcing tendencies. The distortive effect of the devil's 
advocate on a self-fulfilling or a self-defeating prophecy could be perceived at first sight as a 
destabilizing effect in a market. However, we expect that such oscillating opinions will be 
more precise on average in the long run, causing fewer negative external effects than 
periodically stable equilibria induced by a self-fulfilling or self-defeating prophecy. 
Whenever the reactivity is interrupted, the putative stable equilibria will experience a fatal 
market breakdown, leading to a substantive deterioration of markets (see Rothschild 1964, p. 
303). 
To circumvent the problem of forecasters that ex-ante correctly predict a disastrous future 
situation but face ex-post negative consequences due to the possibility of a self-defeating 
prophecy, we propose that an independent forecast provider be established. This proposition 
can easily be linked to the idea of introducing a devil's advocate forecaster in the market. If 
the forecasting of negative events does not provide enough incentives, due to the effect of 
reactivity (self-defeating prophecy), private forecasters will refrain from providing such 
forecasts. The devil's advocate already bears the duty of publicly challenging the most 
reputable of the private forecasters, which leads to a provision of information about such 
imminent negative events. However, we do not believe that such an institution of a devil's 
advocate would provide correct forecasts. In contrast, we assume them often to be wrong. The 
important point is to provide a counterweight to the imminence of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
with harmful negative externalities. The devil's advocate will have a dampening effect on 
reactivity. The market participants should always be informed about the deficiency of the 
devil's advocate, not being able to predict the future more reliably than any other forecaster. 
5.5.3. International Organizations and Other Official Forecasters as Devil’s 
Advocates 
There already exist arguably independent institutions providing forecasts, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), various central banks, and expert advisory councils. A major problem with the 
                                                                                                                                                   
the latter council is distinctly less independent, as it reports directly to the President and issues a yearly 
“Economic Report of the President”, which is not the case for the German council, which issues a report on its 
own behalf. 
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forecasts of these bodies is, however, that their public forecasts have a direct influence on the 
decision bodies inside the organization itself. The institutions have a substantial capacity to 
influence the run of a certain economy and thereby induce a self-fulfilling or a self-defeating 
prophecy by their own actions. Hence, the incentives to forecast against the public prediction 
of such an influential institution are reduced.  
One of the most obvious examples is the Chinese government’s forecast of the country’s GDP 
growth and the officially measured growth rates. The incentives for the Chinese government 
are similar to those of the manager in the case of the EPS estimates of security analysts. It is 
always best for the managers of the companies covered to meet or beat the consensus 
expectation of the security analysts. Ever since the Asian financial crises in 1998, the figures 
officially released on China's GDP growth rate have always overshot the target issued (The 
Economist 2013). But there are also other examples of economic forecasts that are issued by 
bodies capable of influencing a whole economy: The World Economic Outlook of the IMF or 
the World Development Report of the World Bank. Of course, these institutions have to 
produce forecasts for internal use. However, the publication of their forecasts can lead to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, both because of their own actions and also because they may prevent 
others from issuing deviating forecasts. This risks inducing herding among forecasters and 
finally among market participants.100 In particular, smaller and emerging economies that 
depend more on the forecasts are expected to react more strongly to these forecasts.  
A literature has recently emerged that sheds light on these problems. Sockin and Xiong 
(2013) build on the model of Morris and Shin (2002) on the social value of public 
information. According to standard economic theory, an increase in the futures price of a 
commodity should lead to reduced real demand (e.g., Hamilton 2009). Stylized facts from 
commodities markets show instead that an increase in the futures price may lead to an 
increase in the real demand of a commodity. Sockin and Xiong (2013) provide a model to 
explain such an effect. Morgenstern (1928, p. 94-95) pointed to this paradoxical effect in his 
early treatise on forecasts in reactive markets. Sockin and Xiong (2013) are in line with 
Morgenstern’s argumentation. Market participants use the futures price of globally important 
                                                
100 Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) point to a reactive mechanism by which technical 
analysis (i.e. the use of e.g., visual inspection of time-series plots or simple moving averages) could lead to 
reasonable and useful information for predicting exchange rates, although it lacks any economic foundation. 
They show that, because market participants made use of technical analysis, the central banks also included the 
technique in their forecast of future movements in the exchange market. By basing their official interventions in 
the market on such forecasts, the reactive behavior of the central banks induced a precarious situation where 
official intervention could elevate an irrational method of analysis to a rational one.      
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commodities to predict the future demand of their customers, resulting in the forecast of their 
own future demand for the commodities. They start to buy the commodities when (or 
although) the futures prices are rising. Hence, speculative actions on the futures market 
trigger inventory market reactions, leading to a reactive effect between the forecast (i.e. the 
futures price) and the actual outcome. Now, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
economic reports from large organizations, such as the IMF or the BIS among others, have 
also started to employ commodity prices for public predictions on the future condition of the 
global economy. This leads to an exacerbated reactive behavior triggering self-fulfilling 
prophecies and herding behavior among market participants. Ultimately, the herding results in 
a boom-and-bust cycle of commodity prices, which have actually been experienced in recent 
years. We conclude that the public forecasts of powerful international organizations should be 
treated more carefully. Their forecasts provide a substantial source for reactive behavior that 
potentially leads to distorted markets. 
In contrast, the U.S. Federal Reserve System (FED) distinguishes between the release of facts 
and figures and the release of forecasts in accordance with what Morgenstern (1928, p. 122) 
recommends for governmental forecasts. The FED only releases its Beige Books (facts and 
figures) on the current economic condition in a timely manner, but keeps documents 
containing forecasts (Green Books and Blue Books) for the U.S. and international economy 
confidential and releases these with a five-year delay.101 Hence, we suggest that other official 
bodies should also discriminate between facts and forecasts. The market knows that these 
organizations will act upon their released forecasts and react accordingly. Forecasts can still 
be released, but by an independent body, not one incorporating a forecasting unit and a unit 
that will act directly on the forecasts. 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter sheds light on the problems that publicly issued forecasts can create in reactive 
markets. Reactivity exists in every anthropogenic market. The issue has been known for a 
long time (see, e.g., Venn 1866; Morgenstern 1928; Merton 1936; 1948). In these days, 
however, the stark increase in the amount of available data and in the capacity to generate, 
transmit, store and process data conjures up the assumption that forecasting in reactive market 
                                                
101 See, e.g., the Evaluation Report of the FED’s Office of Inspector General from January 18, 2013; Report 
2013-AA-A-001. 
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systems will become more accurate over time. We argue that this is unlikely to materialize 
because market participants will react to the forecasts and to the forecasters’ new techniques. 
Advances in forecast accuracy will thus be absorbed. We support our claim with empirical 
evidence from the literature on several areas in economics and the social sciences in general. 
We begin by assessing the positive and negative externalities of reactivity, which is induced 
by any forecast on anthropogenic markets. Further, we present a comparative analysis 
between reactive market systems and a non-reactive system. We discuss why forecast 
accuracy regarding non-reactive systems profits from the new achievements in information 
technology, in contrast to the reactive market system. We draw on evidence in the literature 
on forecast accuracy of non-reactive weather forecasts to back our arguments.  
However, we do not suggest that the use of meteorological models will achieve a higher 
forecast accuracy in reactive market systems. In contrast, we claim that forecasting for non-
reactive markets is distinctively different from forecasting for reactive markets. In a BIS 
working paper, Vahey and Wakerly (2013) propose that the use of probability forecasting, 
which is employed in meteorological sciences, would substantially increase the accuracy of 
economic forecasting. They expect an improvement similar to the accuracy of weather 
forecasts. In our paper, however, we show why this analogy falls short. The reactive behavior 
of market participants in the economy and the non-reactive behavior of the weather exhibit a 
distinct difference. When thinking about the use of forecasting tools and methods from the 
natural sciences in areas of the social sciences, the difference in reactivity should not be 
neglected. 
Finally, we retrace the ways in which institutions hamper, foster or even exploit the reactivity 
induced by forecasts. College rankings, as an unusual example of forecasts, represent an 
institution that changes the rules of the game in higher education by exploiting the reactivity 
in the market. As another example, we use polls as a type of forecast for voters. Poll 
restrictions constitute an institution that has been set up as a reaction to the reactivity of 
voters, because their reactive behavior can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy or self-defeating 
prophecy in elections. 
Merton (1936, p. 894) noted in his seminal article on reactive social behavior that the 
“diversity of context and variety of terms by which this problem has been known, however, 
have tended to obscure the definite continuity in its consideration.” It is surprising how the 
idea of reactivity still appears in various individual areas of the social sciences without the 
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similar roots of the problem being remarked upon. Thus, a comparative analysis is important 
for gaining further insights into how forecast users react to the forecast and how this reaction 
influences the outcome predicted.  
As a final example, not even the pursuit of happiness is free of problems due to reactivity. 
Schooler et al. (2003) argue that the individual pursuit of happiness can be self-defeating from 
a psychological perspective. To forecast individually that performing a particular act will 
make us happy often turns out to be a fallacy. On the aggregate level, Frey and Stutzer 
(2002a; 2009), and Frey and Gallus (2012), argue, drawing on empirical evidence, that the 
maximization of national happiness can have negative effects for the population. For example, 
when it becomes an official target to increase a national happiness index, the reactive 
behavior of politicians, bureaucrats and citizens could lead to biased incentives, 
manipulations and misrepresentation in a national happiness index. We, hence, expect that the 
pursuit of a national happiness forecast would induce strong reactive behavior with similar 
effects to those of electoral polls. They may be both self-fulfilling and self-defeating. While 
the use of happiness research is important when considering institutions that can help 
individuals to become happy, the pure ranking and seeking of national happiness might have 
detrimental effects due to reactivity. Even in the most human quests, we should not neglect 
reactivity when publicly releasing a forecast. 
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6. Forecasts and Reactivity: A Comparative Analysis of 
Three Markets With Different Levels of Reactivity 
In this chapter, we provide empirical evidence for the theoretical reasoning on forecasts and 
reactivity in the preceding chapter. Reactivity distorts the forecasting of anthropogenic market 
outcomes, as the market participants record and process a new forecast and react according to 
its information value. By doing so, these market participants naturally influence the outcome 
that the forecast is intended to predict. To investigate empirically how reactivity affects 
forecasting, we use large data sets to compare forecasts in three areas with different levels of 
reactivity, namely the areas of meteorology, finance, and the arts. We empirically analyze 
three main elements of the theoretical reasoning of the preceding chapter. Firstly, we intend to 
show that forecast accuracy increases over time for non-reactive outcomes, but does not do so 
for forecasts on reactive outcomes.102 Secondly, we provide evidence about how reactivity is 
influenced by fundamentals and market sentiment and about how temporal changes of 
reactivity can affect ex-post measured forecast accuracy in reactive markets. Thirdly, we aim 
to demonstrate empirically how the different levels of reactivity in markets can induce 
different behavior on the part of forecasters, leading to a herding behavior among forecasters 
that vitiates forecast accuracy.  
6.1. Reactivity and Changes in Forecast Error Over Time  
In reactive markets, such as the stock or the art market, forecasters cannot use measured 
outcomes as unbiased reference points to calibrate their models. Thus, forecasters in reactive 
markets face the problem of a target that is not only moving exogenously but that is also 
distorted endogenously by their own earlier input. 
We hypothesize that in reactive markets neither the advances in information technology and 
data processing nor the learning of forecasters have a positive long-term effect on the 
                                                
102 For an extensive explanation of the concept of reactivity, see the introduction to the preceding chapter.  
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predictability of outcomes. First, all market participants in these anthropogenic markets adapt 
to the new technology or the new data processing techniques. Second, the same is true for 
learning, as in a reactive market it is not only the forecasters who learn, but also the market 
participants. This impedes forecasters’ learning and its positive effect on forecast accuracy. 
In the case of financial markets, security analysts forecast company earnings of stocks they 
cover and are employed at brokerage houses or brokerage units that can be part of a larger 
bank or a financial services company. Today, analysts can rely on a much larger amount of 
macroeconomic and firm-level data and on a much faster information flow than a decade 
ago.103 On the other hand, due to the faster information flow, managers of companies that are 
covered by the analysts also learn much more quickly about the issued forecasts and, thus, can 
react to them much faster. Likewise, managers learn about new data sources and the new 
knowledge the analysts base their forecasts on and adapt to such advances as well. This 
results in a zero sum game. Bai et al. (2012) provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis. 
They find that, although the efficiency of information production in financial markets has 
improved over the last fifty years, the usefulness of stock and bond prices in forecasting 
earnings of companies has been stable over time.  
We see a similar mechanism in the art market. The fast and easy access to Internet databases 
of the historical art market prices of various providers (e.g., Artnet.com, Artprice.com, 
Artfact.com among others) has improved the informational environment drastically (Horowitz 
2011, p. 211-12). This improvement, which started in the early nineties, had a massive impact 
on the informational resources of individual art collectors and less experienced professional 
investors as they gained better and faster access to information about the past market prices of 
art objects. Before, only the old and established auction houses had access to most of these 
data, as collecting information about auction prices and estimates was always one of their 
important tools against other market participants. Most of the art market data was collected by 
the auction houses themselves; the larger and more established the house, the more auctions it 
held, hence the more precise the data received from its own sales. Old auction houses such as 
Sotheby’s and Christie’s still have an advantage over the data on old paintings that are 
                                                
103 In a conversation with two older security analysts, they stated that during the nineties, they still cut out 
newspaper articles by hand and collected them in folders of the companies they covered. They used the hard 
copy editions not because they did not have access to computers but because the newspaper articles were not 
readily available online. 
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exceptionally rarely sold. 104 The Internet databases often cannot provide any auction data 
from earlier than the seventies.  
However, if the new information on the Internet can reduce the information asymmetry 
between forecasters and bidders, the latter will become more independent of the auction 
house’s expert knowledge. The reactivity between bidders and the art experts’ forecasts will 
be reduced as a result of the better informational environment for bidders. As a result, today's 
art market prices should exhibit more anchoring on historical sales prices than before the 
drastic increase of information via the Internet. Beggs and Graddy (2009) provide evidence 
that anchoring on historical art prices existed between 1980 and 1994, before the rise of 
Internet art data bases. They show that anchoring took place on both sides, among buyers and 
in the auctioneers’ presale estimates. Yet, the authors are not able to establish whether the 
auctioneers merely reacted to the buyers’ anchoring, or whether they were affected by 
anchoring themselves.105  
Forecasting of future outcomes in the reactive art and financial market is in stark contrast to 
forecasting in a system in which no reactivity exists, namely the weather.106 The weather 
outcome is not influenced by the forecast, and the forecasters can make best use of this lack of 
reactivity. Forecasters can genuinely calibrate their models against the unbiased outcomes. 
Thus, we expect forecasters competing in the market for weather forecasts to be able to 
steadily improve their forecast in two different ways: Firstly, by continuous learning that 
improves their knowledge of the interactions and interdependencies of meteorological forces, 
and secondly, by advances in information technology (timely transmission, more data storage 
capabilities, faster data processing systems) and in the generation of big data (better sensor 
technology, more observation stations, weather satellites, ships and aircrafts). Both of these 
will have a direct, positive and steady impact on weather forecast accuracy. Thus, we predict 
that the innovations in information technology and the increase in available data (quantitative 
and qualitative) will continuously improve the forecasts in the weather market. 
                                                
104 We were told by a managing director of one of the two most famous auction houses that these houses still 
have an advantage due to their extensive price archives when it comes to the presale valuation of an 
exceptionally rarely traded old artwork. 
105 “Thus, while the auctioneers’ and sellers’ behavior may exhibit reference point effects in choosing the low 
estimate and secret reserve, it does so in a way consistent with buyers’ behavior” (Beggs and Graddy 2009, p. 
1037).  
106 Please also refer to Section 5.5 of the preceding chapter. 
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An intuitive approach to measuring the improvement of forecasts is to calculate their forecast 
error (FE), which equals the difference between the forecast and the actual outcome (forecast 
– actual = FE). Taken together, we state the following proposition: 
Proposition P1: Despite the positive technological development and learning of forecasters in 
all three markets, only the error of weather forecasts permanently and constantly decreases 
over time, while the forecast error in financial and art markets does not continuously 
improve. 
6.2. How Can Reactivity Be Identified in a Forecasting Market? 
To identify reactivity between forecasts and the actual outcome in a market is by definition a 
very challenging task due to its endogenous characteristic (see Chapter 5). Ideally, we would 
have data about the identical market situation occurring twice, once with and once without a 
forecast being issued. The difference between the two market outcomes would be due to the 
reactivity of the market participants induced by the forecast.  
As we are not aware of any data available from such an extraordinary situation, other methods 
to identify reactivity have to be found. First, one could try to reconstruct the outcome of a 
situation with a forecast as if there no forecast had been issued (i.e., to reveal the outcome 
without reactivity). Second, situations could be found in which, due to exogenous shocks, the 
level of reactivity in a market is altered. Such situations would provide an opportunity to 
explore the impact of different levels of reactivity on the forecast error. As we aim to compare 
the different markets, we do not pursue the first method. It seems impossible to find a single 
or closely comparable technique to reconstruct the “true” counterfactual in the art and 
financial markets. Furthermore, the current literature on financial accounting is rather 
arbitrary in the construction of the counterfactual, i.e., the reconstruction of “true” and 
unmanaged earnings (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Beyer et al. 2010; Simpson, forthcoming). 
The literature on the economics of art is mostly silent about the issue.107 Instead, we focus on 
situations which are assumed to alter the level of reactivity in a market, thus resulting in a 
predictable and directly measurable change in forecast errors. To do so, we first have to 
identify factors that could exogenously change the level of reactivity in a given market. 
                                                
107 Mei and Moses (2005) provide a notable exception. 
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Therefore, we scrutinize the incentives of the forecasters and the market participants who 
originate the actual market outcome.  
In the case of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts issued by security analysts in the financial 
market, the forecasters' career concerns provide incentives to produce low forecast errors (see, 
e.g., Hong et al. 2000, and the discussion of the analyst literature in Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
On the other hand, managers of stock companies that are covered by analysts share a high 
incentive to meet (or slightly beat) the expectation of the market. This expectation is usually 
represented by the average opinion (consensus) of the EPS forecasts issued by the analysts. 
The EPS consensus for a specific firm represents one of the most important accounting 
figures by which the executives’ and the firms’ performance is measured (see, e.g., 
Matsumoto 2002; Beyer 2008). If this threshold is not reached, the valuation of the firm, the 
costs of capital, and the executives’ compensation through stock or option plans are 
negatively affected. Hence, the managers have substantial incentives to meet or beat the 
expectations of the market (i.e. the analysts’ consensus) and will react and adjust the firm’s 
EPS wherever possible. Several studies document the effect of earnings management of firms 
that try to reach a certain level of EPS, mostly by over- or understating accruals in their books 
(see, e.g., DeGeorge et al. 1999; Cheong and Thomas 2011). An increasing strand of the 
financial accounting literature supports the reasoning that managers in general aim to issue 
“smooth earnings” over the years; such behavior is perceived as a safe and reassuring sign by 
investors (see, e.g., Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002, p. 762; Repenning and Henderson 
2010, p. 1). Therefore we can expect the managers to have the largest incentives to meet or 
just marginally beat (by one or two cents) the consensus forecast (see, e.g., Simpson, 
forthcoming). Combining these incentives yields a strong reactivity between the forecasts and 
the market outcomes in the case of EPS estimates. 
In the case of the auctioneers’ presale price estimates for art works, forecasters' career 
concerns provide incentives to produce low forecast errors, too. The art buyers’ incentive is to 
buy the artwork at the lowest price possible (just marginally higher than the willingness to 
pay of the second highest bidder). However, the art experts’ forecasts can still provide 
guidance to the art buyer or bidder, either by anchoring or as a reference point (see, e.g., 
Beggs and Graddy 2009).108 Mei and Moses (2005) provide evidence that the price estimates 
                                                
108 Often, the terms are used interchangeably. Yet, for example, Kahneman (1992) uses reference dependence as 
an effect that impacts the reference point in the assessment of gains and losses when they are valued 
asymmetrically, anchoring as the effect that influences judgment of what is normal more generally.  
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of auction houses influence the actual prices. They focus on the market segment of expensive 
paintings, as this segment is the most profitable in terms of commissions for the auction 
houses. The authors conclude that auction houses might rationally try to exploit credulous 
investors. This finding is in contrast to the outcome of Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) model. 
They state that in a competitive market setting with rational agents, the auction houses with an 
“honesty is the best policy” strategy make the most profits and, thus, should issue honest price 
forecasts. Ashenfelter (1989) and McAndrew et al. (2012) support the model with empirical 
evidence. On the other hand, Ekelund et al. (1998), Beggs and Graddy (1997; 2009) and Mei 
and Moses (2005) provide evidence that supports the idea that auction houses can and 
sometimes do exploit their influence on fetched prices by overestimating their price forecasts. 
The estimates also constitute a reference point for the reservation price, which is usually 
around 80% of the auctioneers’ lower estimates and can also influence the bid of a potential 
art buyer at an auction (Ashenfelter and Graddy 2006).109 
We conclude that it is reasonable to assume that (1) reactivity exists in the art market because 
auctioneers’ presale price estimates influence the art buyers, in particular if the buyers are 
poorly informed, or credulous, due to anchoring or by providing a reference for them, but that 
(2) this reactivity is substantially lower than in the case of EPS forecasts in financial markets, 
as the buyer in principle shares no incentive with the auctioneer to buy the work for a high 
price; instead, the art buyer intends to buy at the lowest price possible. 
After having analyzed the incentives of the forecasters and of the market participants, who 
finally produce the outcome in the different markets, we are able to identify the factors 
influencing these incentives. We assume the forecasters’ incentives to be stable over time and 
concentrate our analysis on the outcome producers, i.e. the art buyers and the managers. First, 
we focus on the financial sector and the EPS forecasts.  
6.2.1. Market for Earnings per Share Forecasts (Financial Market) 
Drawing on the model by Beyer (2008), we state that the managers’ reactive behavior is 
determined by the cost that the managers have to bear if they do not meet the analysts’ 
consensus. These costs define the level of reactivity in the market for EPS forecasts. The 
individual manager’s costs are influenced by three factors (Beyer 2008):  
                                                
109 Auctioneers usually issue a presale price range estimate for an artwork, defined by an upper and a lower 
bound. If the artwork does not reach a bid higher than 80% of the lower bound (sometimes also 70%, see, e.g., 
Ashenfelter and Graddy 2011), the work is not sold but “bought in” by the auction house. 
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1. Economic resources of the managers' firm 
2. Market pressure on managers to fulfill expectations 
3. The penalty and probability of detection of earnings management and financial fraud 
due to laws, regulations and investigative authorities. 
1. The firm has to have resources sufficient for the manager to manage its earnings up to the 
threshold of the consensus forecast. These resources depend on the condition of the firm, 
which in turn depends on the general economic situation. If the general economic situation 
deteriorates, the firm’s resources will decline to the point where the managers, even if fully 
exploiting earnings management, cannot generate enough earnings to meet the consensus.110 
The general economic situation provides the base for the firm's earnings as well as an upper 
bound for the earnings management: During harsh economic periods the capacity of managers 
to engage in earnings management is reduced, resulting in a decreased reactivity in the market 
for EPS forecasts. However, during flourishing economic conditions, an asymmetry in the 
incentives for the managers prevents them from beating the consensus forecast even though 
they might have the resources to do so. This asymmetry lies between the managers’ costs if 
not meeting the market's expectations and the benefits if they beat the expectations. Beating 
the expectations bears strongly decreasing marginal returns. As investors generally reward 
smooth earnings development over time (Kothari 2001; Kirschenheiter and Meluad 2002), 
managers only have limited incentives to overshoot the analysts’ consensus, even during 
booming economic periods. Without reactivity in the market, the analyst would face the same 
difficulties in forecasting a correct EPS during a booming market period and during a busting 
market period. However, the reactivity in the market for EPS forecasts induces the asymmetry 
that during flourishing periods the forecast errors are low, because the managers have the 
highest incentive to meet the forecast although they could release higher earnings. Only 
during a deteriorating market period, when the firms’ reduced resources do not allow 
managers to meet the analysts' consensus, is the forecast error expected to increase due to the 
lower reactivity. 
                                                
110 This holds unless the managers are willing to engage in blatant financial fraud, and their costs increase 
dramatically, as they might have to face litigation and personal prosecution (see, e.g., the cases of financial fraud 
in Dyck et al. 2010). 
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2. The market pressure on managers is another important factor in inducing or relaxing 
reactivity in a market. If the investors’ perceptions of the market are bullish (i.e., a strong 
upward trend is expected), managers’ costs of not meeting the EPS consensus will be high. 
During a bearish period, when the investors’ sentiment is low, the managers’ costs will be 
lower when not meeting the analysts’ consensus (see, e.g., Simpson, forthcoming). Hence, 
increasing investor sentiment (orthogonalized to the general economic conditions) leads to 
higher costs for managers if they do not meet the consensus forecast and, finally, leads to 
higher reactivity.  
3. Obviously, the degree of the expected penalty and the probability of detection of the 
earnings management influence the managers’ costs. The probability and the degree of the 
penalty represent the negative incentive in regard to the managers’ costs if not meeting (or 
beating) the consensus. The lower the expected costs from the penalty, the more the managers 
engage in earnings management, i.e., the higher is the reactivity in the market. 
Considering these three factors, we define the following propositions and recall that reactivity 
is assumed to lead to lower forecast errors: 
Proposition P2: Due to the asymmetric incentives of managers to meet the analysts’ 
consensus, reactivity induces larger forecast errors in the financial market during strong 
general economic downturns than during market upturns of the same intensity.  
Proposition P3: Due to the asymmetric incentives of managers to meet the analysts’ 
consensus, reactivity induces larger forecast errors during times of decreasing investor 
sentiment than during increasing investor sentiment of the same intensity. 
The third factor of the managers’ costs if not meeting the consensus forecast also leads to a 
proposition; however, we can state at this point that we are not able to test Proposition P4. 
This is for two reasons. First, we are not aware of data or of an index that could be used to 
track the influence of expected penalties and their probabilities on the executives’ costs in 
managing earnings over the period between 1999 and 2010. Second, the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002 seems to mark an important shock to the costs of earnings 
management, as it imposed stricter rules for financial accounting in corporations. However, it 
remains unclear if SOX finally led to a net increase in costs, as empirical evidence merely 
shows a substitution away from the stronger regulated accrual-based management in financial 
accounting statements towards the real earnings management by adjusting discretionary 
spending in R&D, advertising or the other activities of firms (see, e.g., Graham and Harvey 
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2005; Cohen et al. 2008). Therefore, we assume the costs due to potential detection and 
punishment of earnings management to remain constant for the managers over the period 
between 1999 and 2010. For the sake of completeness, we still present Proposition P4: In 
addition to the influence of the general economic condition (P2) and the investor sentiment 
(P3), an increase in the expected penalty and/or the probability of detection of earnings 
management leads to a higher forecast error as reactivity is reduced. 
6.2.2. Market for Presale Price Forecasts of Artworks (Art Market) 
In contrast to the market for financial forecasts, the market for art forecasts exhibits a much 
lower reactivity, due to the buyers’ incentive to buy at the lowest price possible. Buyers 
generally have no incentive to follow the auctioneers’ price forecast. Hence, the reactivity in 
the art market must be due to behavioral effects such as anchoring (Beggs and Graddy 2009) 
or credulity due to the limited attention of art buyers (Mei and Moses 2005). The same factors 
as in the case of the financial market have an impact on the art market:  
1. The general economic situation is also relevant for the art market and provides an upper 
bound for reactivity, as the buyers cannot spend more money on a certain artwork than they 
possess. However, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013) and Dimson and Spaenjers (2011) 
provide evidence about the lower correlation between the art market and other economic 
indicators than the correlation of the stock market and the same indicators. Similarly, while in 
the case of the EPS forecasts, most managers have only a low incentive to exceed the 
analysts’ consensus forecast (see, e.g., Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002), there is no reason 
why art buyers should perceive the auctioneers’ estimate as an upper bound and not outbid the 
estimate. We conclude that the market for presale art price forecasts has a reduced reactivity 
compared to the market for financial EPS forecasts. 
2. In the case of the art market, buyers experience no direct market pressure to achieve a 
certain level as is the case of the consensus forecasts for managers in the financial market. 
Yet, market sentiment does naturally influence the individual buyer, though not in a way that 
affects reactivity, as it does not influence the buyer’s behavior towards the auctioneer’s 
estimate. In the art market, changes in investor sentiment generally increase the difficulty to 
produce accurate pre sale forecasts. In contrast to the financial market, the difficulty in the art 
market increases with the intensity of the change, no matter in which direction. Thus, 
substantial increases and declines in investor sentiment are both expected to raise the forecast 
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error in the art market. (Recall that in the financial market only a negative change in investor 
sentiment is expected to lead to a higher forecast error due to the decline in reactivity.) 
3. As no institutions such as regulations or other accounting rules exist to define how an art 
work has to be valued and booked, there is no such influence on the art buyers' incentives and, 
thus, no influence on reactivity. 
We conclude that the factors used to analyze the changes in reactivity in the financial market 
do not have the same impact on the reactivity in the art market. We are not aware of factors 
that could be used to analyze exogenous shocks to the art buyers’ anchoring or the limited 
attention of art buyers at an aggregate level and not only at the individual level. Hence, at the 
aggregate level, we assume reactivity to exist in the art market and to be stable and 
substantially lower than in the financial market. 
Therefore, the forecast error behaves distinctively different for art price estimates than for 
financial EPS forecasts due to the different levels of reactivity and its symmetric reaction to 
changes in art investor sentiment. In the financial market, forecasters have to bear larger 
forecast errors when the reactivity collapses due to a negative change in general economic 
conditions or investor sentiment; a positive change is absorbed by the reactivity of the market 
because the managers have the incentive to meet or only marginally beat the consensus 
forecast. This stands in contrast to the art market, in which the art buyers have no such 
asymmetric incentives. The art buyers do not aim to meet the auctioneers’ presale estimates, 
and they do not face asymmetric costs for under- or overshooting the estimate. Thus, in the art 
market, the forecast errors increase with a change in art investor sentiment, no matter in 
which direction, whereas in the financial markets the forecast errors increase only due to 
negative changes. We condense these thoughts on the art market in our propositions:  
 
Proposition P5: In the weakly reactive art market, the changes in general economic 
conditions will have a much lower influence on the forecast error than in the financial 
market. 
Proposition P6: In the weakly reactive art market, the stronger the change in art investor 
sentiment is, the higher is the forecast error, independently of the change’s direction. 
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6.3. Data 
To test our propositions, we rely on three data samples from the markets for weather, art and 
financial (EPS) forecasts. All of them include forecasts and actual measured outcomes to 
calculate the forecasting quality in the form of a forecast error.  
6.3.1. Weather Data 
To analyze weather forecasts, we use data from the Swiss National Weather Service (Federal 
Office of Meteorology and Climatology – MeteoSwiss).111 Each day at noon, MeteoSwiss 
issues its main weather forecast for the next day. Therefore, the weather service produces 
detailed forecasts about the relative sunshine duration, precipitation, wind and temperature 
extremes in various regions of Switzerland. They retrieve data from their own weather 
stations spread all over the country and from other weather services that produce regional and 
global weather data models, such as the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather 
Forecasts (ECMWF) or the U.S. National Weather Service. To keep our analysis as 
comprehensible as possible and not to have to rely on partly arbitrary classifications of hit 
rates for categorical meteorological parameters such as classes of sunshine duration, we only 
retain forecasts for the maximal temperature of the following day in degree Kelvin in our 
sample. In Switzerland, as in most other countries, this temperature forecast is economically 
important for the prediction of future energy consumption. Utility companies base their 
expected demand for electricity to heat and cool offices, apartments, storage rooms, hospitals, 
and factories on such estimates. 
MeteoSwiss also provided the actual outcomes for each day from the installation of the 
OPKO System (in German: Objektive Prognose Kontrolle; in English: Objective Prediction 
Control) on January 1, 1999 until the last revision of the system on December 3, 2010. For a 
reasonable coverage of the climate in Switzerland, we received the data for six different 
regions in Switzerland, four in the Swiss midlands (Zurich, Basel, Bern, Geneva), one in the 
southern part of Switzerland (Lugano), and one in the Swiss mountain region (Sion). With 
this selection of regions, we are able to cover most of the climatic and topological 
environments for weather forecasting in Switzerland. This leaves us with a sample of 4,352 
                                                
111 We are highly indebted to Ludwig Zgraggen, Alexander Giordano, Christophe Voisard and Jaques Ambuehl 
for making the data available and for their invaluable help in understanding and compiling the data in a form that 
is usable for our econometric purposes. Furthermore, they provided important insights into the nature of weather 
forecasting. 
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observations for each of the six regions, which produces a total of 26,112 observations. 
Unfortunately, MeteoSwiss was not able to retrieve the forecasts for some time periods due to 
wrongly coded database entries. The periods concerned are July 2000 to July 2001, October to 
November 2001, and November to December 2007. We have to exclude all observations with 
missing forecast data, as we need this information for our analysis. Finally, we arrive at a data 
sample with 22,454 observations from MeteoSwiss, consisting of a forecast of day t for the 
temperature maximum on the following day (t+1) as well as the actual measured maximum 
temperature of the following day (t+1).  
6.3.2. Financial Data 
For our sample of forecasts and the actual outcomes in the financial market, we rely on the 
earnings per share (EPS) forecasts of sell-side analysts for the companies of the U.S. stock 
market (NASDAQ and NYSE). We retrieved the data from the Institutional Brokerage 
Estimation System (I/B/E/S) Detailed Earnings History Files. The database was accessed 
through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) interface. This database provides the 
yearly EPS estimates of almost all analysts covering U.S. stocks and working for a brokerage 
house in the US. The houses include such large financial services firms as Citigroup or 
Morgan Stanley which employ more than 100 analysts but also small investment advisers 
with only one or two analysts. The EPS are forecast for a specific financial year of each 
company. We only retrieved observations for companies that have their financial year ending 
at December 31, which is the vast majority of U.S. firms, and we only consider forecasts that 
were issued less than 12 months before the financial period end. We focused on the same 
period as with the other data samples, namely on the years between 1999 and 2010. This 
provided us with 1,078,380 observations. Lastly, we discarded 32,265 (2.9%) observations 
that either have a missing forecast or a missing actual EPS in the database. This left us with a 
final data sample of 1,046,115 observations with EPS forecasts and actual EPS, including 763 
brokerage houses employing more than 11,036 analysts covering 7,831 individual stocks.  
6.3.3. Art Data 
For the data on art forecasts and the actual prices fetched at the auctions, we rely on a data set 
covering the vast majority of Chinese art auction sales between 1994 and 2011 including 
more than 735,593 individual lots from 7,143 auctions that took place in 426 auction houses 
mostly in China (including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) but also in the UK and the USA; 
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the total sales turnover aggregate to more than RMB 88 billion, which equals USD 14.2 
billion (at 2013 values of RMB of 6.20 per USD). The data were obtained from 
www.artron.net, one of the largest databases covering Chinese artworks (Bai et al. 2013).112  
The data consist of classical Chinese paintings, calligraphy and oil paintings. For our final 
sample, we only retain lots, which have an auctioneer presale price estimate (the forecast) as 
well as a hammer price (the actual outcome) for the artwork in the database.113 Furthermore, 
to have the same period as for the weather or financial data, we focus on auctions between 
1999 and 2010. This reduces our final art data sample to 323,478 individual lots (i.e. 
observations) that took place in 262 auction houses and aggregate to a total sales turnover of 
more than RMB 57 billion. 
During the last decade the Chinese art market experienced a boom during our sample period 
and has advanced to one of the economically most important art market places in the world. 
In Mainland China, the sales revenue rose from RMB 97 million in 2000 to RMB 32 billion in 
2010 (equals more than USD 5 billion at 2013 values of RMB of 6.20 per USD).). Art Market 
Trends, the annual art report 2011 from Artprice, identified Beijing as the global top market 
place for art in terms of revenue covering more than 27% of the global art auction revenues 
(see also, Bai et al. 2013; Horowitz 2011).  
6.3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics of the forecasts, the actual outcomes and the 
forecast errors of the three forecast markets. Panel A shows the statistics for the weather data 
sample with 22,454 observations. On average, the daily maximum temperature measured in 
Switzerland is 288.7 in degree Kelvin (K), which corresponds to 15.6 degree Celsius (°C).114 
The minimum of the daily maximum temperature between 1999 and 2010 in one of the six 
regions was 264.2K (-9.0°C) and the maximum was 314.2 K (41.0°C). The median maximum 
temperature was 289.2K (16.0°C).  
The forecast error is measured in three different forms: (1) Temp_FE is the raw forecast error 
(FE) and is defined as FE = forecast - actual, i.e. Temp_FE = TempForecast - TempOutcome; 
                                                
112 We are thankful and highly indebted to Jia Guo, who originally collected the data, for sharing her dataset with 
us.   
113 Prices and estimates in other currencies than the Chinese Renminbi are converted with the daily average 
exchange rate of the auction day accessed through Bloomberg). 
114 Kelvin is converted to Celsius in a simple formula; Kelvin = Celsius + 273.15. This is due to fact that Kelvin 
defines the absolute zero. In degree Celsius this minimum is measured as –273.15C. 
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(2) Temp_AFE is the absolute raw forecast error and is defined as abs(Temp_FE); (3) 
Temp_AFEP is the absolute forecast error in percentage of the actual outcome and is defined 
as Temp_AFE/abs(TempOutcome). The forecast errors in panels B (Art data) and C (Financial 
data) are calculated in the same way. 
The meteorologists on average underestimate the maximum temperature but still score a low 
mean raw forecast error (Temp_FE) of -0.3K (or °C) and a median raw forecast error of -
0.4K. The outliers reach from a raw forecast error of -14.2K to an overestimation of 41.5K. 
The absolute raw forecast error (TEMP_AFE) has a mean of 1.7K, a median of 1.3K, a 
natural minimum at 0K and a maximum again of 41.5K. Next, we focus on the forecast error 
that is most comparable among the different markets, that measured in percentage of the 
actual outcome (AFEP). The Temp_AFEP shows a mean error of 0.58% and a median of 
0.45%. The minimum naturally lies at 0.00% and the maximum at 15.2% with an interquartile 
range from 0.21% up to 0.79%. The 99th percentile stands at low 2.21% and the 1st percentile 
still at 0.00%. 
Panel B of Table 6 shows the financial data sample, containing EPS forecasts of the U.S. 
stock market with more than a million observations. The average EPS forecast of USD -
124.25 and a median of only USD 1.20 falls in line with the analysis that the distributions are 
highly skewed. Both the EPSForecast and the EPSOutcome show extreme outliers in their 
distributions, with minima at USD -3,767,500 and -2,275,000, respectively, and maxima at 
USD 180,000 and 178,000, respectively. However, the interquartile ranges start at USD 0.41 
and 0.32 and end at USD 2.35 and 2.30 for the forecasts and the actual outcomes, 
respectively.  
We observe skewed distributions for the forecast errors (EPS_FE); the median EPS_FE is 
exactly 0, though its mean is 17.12. The maximum EPS_FE is USD 2,117,500 and the 
minimum USD -1,492,500, while the interquartile range is between USD -0.10 and USD 
0.17. The absolute raw forecast error (EPS_AFE) has a median of 0.12 and a mean of USD 
51.08. Its interquartile range is narrow, starting at USD 0.04 and ending at USD 0.39. The 5th 
percentile is USD 0.01 and the 95th percentile is USD 2.35. The absolute forecast error in 
percentage of the actual EPS (EPS_AFEP) has a corresponding median of 9.71%, a mean of 
55.7% and an interquartile range from 3.1% to 30%. The maximum lies at the extreme of 
435,900%. It is important to bear in mind that the skewed distribution of the forecast errors 
strongly suggests the use of the median whenever the errors are aggregated. 
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Finally, the art data sample (Panel C, Table 6) includes more than 320,000 observations. On 
average, the auctioneer presale forecast of the sale price (PriceForecast) is RMB 113,564 
(18,317 USD)115 with a minimum of RMB 6 and a maximum of RMB 403 million. The 
auctioneers usually provide an upper and a lower bound estimate to give the unskilled and 
inexperienced retail client an estimated price range rather than a precise point estimate. 
However, in order to arrive at a forecast that can be compared with the outcome, we use the 
average estimate between the upper and the lower bounds as the point forecast 
(PriceForecast). This procedure is standard in the literature on art economics (see, e.g., Mei 
and Moses 2005; Ashenfelter and Graddy 2006). The median lies at around RMB 20,000, 
much lower than the mean, which suggests a highly right-skewed distribution, as expected 
when it comes to auction prices (estimates) of artworks. The actual prices fetched 
(PriceOutcome) at the auctions show a similar picture. The mean price notes at RMB 
176,877, the minimum price is RMB 100, and the maximum is RMB 169 million.  
While here the maximum price forecast exceeds the maximum actual price by almost 240%, 
the interquartile range for the actual prices between RMB 9,900 and RMB 89,600 lie much 
closer to the range of the forecast prices from RMB 7,000 to 62,500 and surmount the 
forecasts. The auctioneers on average underestimate the sales price of artworks, which can be 
seen in the distribution of the raw forecast errors Price_FE that have a negative mean (-
63,313) and a negative median of -3,440. Further, the large difference between mean and 
median of the raw forecast error suggest a highly right-skewed distribution. The same 
skewness appears when the absolute raw forecast error is employed, as the mean Price_AFE 
lies at RMB 73,613 while the median is RMB 6,200. Still, when focusing on the minimum 
and maximum raw forecast error (Price_FE), the auctioneers overestimated the actual sales 
prices by a large extent (RMB 375 million), whereas they underestimated it by only RMB 144 
million. When focusing on the absolute forecast error as a share of the actual outcome, the 
Price_AFEP is right-skewed with a mean of 34.8% and a median of 25.8%. Again, these 
numbers strongly suggest employing the median as the aggregation instrument of choice 
when comparing forecast errors in the different markets. 
 
                                                
115 Aggregated figures in Chinese Renminbis (RMB) in this data description section are always converted at 
2013 values of RMB of 6.20 per USD unless stated otherwise. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Weather, Financial and Art Data 
 
Panel A: Weather Data  (N=22,454)
Variables Mean Min 1th 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th Max
TempForecast 288.4 264.2 271.2 274.2 281.2 289.2 295.2 302.2 306.2 314.2
TempOutcome 288.7 263.1 270.7 274.3 281.7 289.3 295.8 302.4 305.8 311.8
Temp_FE -0.3 -14.2 -5.6 -3.8 -1.7 -0.4 0.9 3.0 5.1 41.5
Temp_AFE 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 1.3 2.3 4.3 6.3 41.5
Temp_AFEP 0.0058 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0021 0.0045 0.0079 0.0150 0.0221 0.1522
Panel B: Financial Data  (N= 1,044,288)
Variables Mean Min 1th 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th Max
EPSForecast -124.25 -3767500.00 -9.50 -1.50 0.41 1.20 2.35 6.25 53.40 180000.00
EPSOutcome -141.37 -2275000.00 -14.16 -2.15 0.32 1.15 2.30 6.14 54.00 178000.00
EPS_FE 17.12 -1492500.00 -3.35 -0.75 -0.10 0.00 0.17 1.60 10.50 2117500.00
EPS_AFE 51.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.39 2.35 16.00 2117500.00
EPS_AFEP 0.5574 0.0000 0.0000 0.0039 0.0308 0.0971 0.3005 1.7500 7.4625 4359.6230
Panel C: Art Data  (N= 323,478)
Variables Mean Min 1th 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th Max
PriceForecast 113,564 6 464 1,500 7,000 20,000 62,500 400,000 1,650,000 403,000,000
PriceOutcome 176,877 100 880 2,300 9,900 30,800 89,600 599,040 2,576,000 169,000,000
Price_FE -63,313 -144,000,000 -1,060,000 -210,000 -21,800 -3,440 380 10,000 57,515 375,000,000
Price_AFE 73,613 0 0 200 1,600 6,200 25,840 220,049 1,086,390 375,000,000
Price_AFEP 0.3478 0.0000 0.0000 0.0182 0.1071 0.2584 0.5058 0.8140 0.9495 908.0909
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the weather data sample (Panel A), the financial data sample (Panel B), and the art data sample (Panel C). In all three samples we
retain only observations with non-missing forecast and actual outcome. The variable TempForecast is the forecast of the maximum temperature during the following day t+1
issued on day t measured in degree Kelvin (K=°C+273.15). TempOutcome is the actual measured maximum temperature on day t+1 for which the forecast was issue in t. 
Temp_FE is the raw forecast error defined as (TempForecast - TempOutcome). Temp_AFE is the raw absolut forecast error defined as the absolut value of Temp_FE. 
Temp_AFEP is the absolut forecast error in percentage of the outcome, defined as (Temp_AFE/abs(TempOutcome)). PriceForecast is the auctioneer presale price estimate of an
artwork. PriceOutcome is the actual price fetched of the artwork at the respective auction. Price_FE, Price_AFE and Price_AFEP are defined analogously to Temp_FE, 
Temp_AFE and Temp_AFEP. EPSForecast is the earnings per share (EPS) forecasts issued by a sell-side analyst during year t targeting the EPS of a specific company j at the
end of the financial year t. EPSOutcome is the actual EPS figure made public by company j for the financial year t. EPS_FE, EPS_AFE and EPS_AFEP are defined
analogously to Temp_FE, Temp_AFE and Temp_AFEP.
Data Sources: MeteoSwiss, I/B/E/S, www.artron.net
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6.4. Empirical Findings 
In Proposition P1, we argue that, despite the positive technological development and learning 
of forecasters in all three markets, only the quality of weather forecasts constantly improves 
over time while forecasting quality for financial and art markets does not improve (or only 
temporarily and unsteadily). Figure 5 provides evidence that supports our proposition. The 
development of the yearly median of the absolute forecast error in percentage of the actual 
outcome (AFEP) steadily decreases in the sample of weather forecasts (Temp_AFEP).116 For 
the other reactive forecast markets, finance (EPS_AFEP) and art (Price_AFEP), no 
improvement of the forecast error is visible over the years from 1999 to 2010. The fitted 
regression line in each of the figures only has a statistically significant negative coefficient (-
0.00006; t-value = -3.04) in the case of the weather forecast. This confirms the proposition 
that the forecast error for weather forecasts decrease over time. The fitted lines for the art and 
the financial forecasts bear both a positive coefficient, and the coefficient for financial EPS 
forecasts is even statistically significant at the 10% level.117  
Figure 5: Yearly Median of the Absolute Forecast Error in Percentage of the Actual Outcome 
(AFEP) for Weather, Art, and Financial Forecasts 
Weather Forecast Error (Temp_AFEP) 
 
Notes: The fitted line has a negative coefficient of -0.00006, which is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-
value= -3.04); for details, see Appendix C Table C1. Data Source: MeteoSwiss 
                                                
116 If not specified differently, throughout our analysis we use the median to aggregate the forecast error per year, 
as we have shown that the forecast errors have highly skewed distributions. However, we obtain the same results 
if we use the mean to aggregate the forecast error. 
117 In the robustness section of this chapter, we provide additional evidence for a negative stationary trend in the 
weather forecast time series and a nonexisting trend in the art and financial forecast time series. 
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(Continuation of Figure 5) 
Financial Forecast Error (EPS_AFEP) 
 
Notes: The fitted line has a statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.005 (t-value= 1.92); for details, see 
Appendix C Table C1. Data Source: I/B/E/S 
 
Art Forecast Error (Price_AFEP) 
 
Notes: The fitted line has a statistically insignificant positive coefficient of 0.006 (t-value= 1.54) ; for details, see 
Appendix C Table C1. Data Source: www.artron.net 
 
Our next step is to identify the existence of reactivity in the art and finance forecast markets 
and to provide evidence for different levels of reactivity in the two markets. We propose in 
Proposition P2 that, due to high reactivity, large aggregated forecast errors occur in the 
financial market only during general economic downturns. During economic upturns, the high 
level of reactivity leads to low forecast errors. In principle, without reactivity, the difficulty in 
forecasting the EPS during a strong downturn should be as difficult as during an economic 
upturn of the same intensity. However, Figure 6 provides evidence supporting the idea of 
asymmetry in forecasts errors between economic up- and downturns. We see that the forecast 
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error (measured as the yearly median AFEP) is lowest during periods of substantial positive 
GDP growth, as in 1999 and 2000, and between 2003 and 2006.118 Whenever the economy is 
cooling down or contracting, the forecast error increases. However, the relation does not 
always fit perfect, especially not for 2009, when the U.S. economy faced an immense 
contraction but the forecast error was not increasing. Instead, it was slightly decreasing at a 
high level. However, we have proposed two mechanisms that influence the reactivity in the 
market for EPS forecasts. After focusing on the general economic condition, we now turn to 
the second one, investor sentiment.  
Figure 6: Financial EPS Forecast Errors and U.S. GDP Growth Rate in Percentage Year-On-
Year  
 
Notes: Financial EPS forecast errors (yearly median EPS_AFEP, left axis) and U.S. GDP growth rate in 
percentage year-on-year (right axis). Data Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database, I/B/E/S. 
 
In Proposition P3, we mention investor sentiment that is orthogonal to the general economic 
condition as the other important factor determining the reactivity of EPS forecasts (Baker and 
                                                
118 We used the data on U.S. GDP growth from the IMF World Economic Outlook database 
 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx), accessed on July 12, 2013.   
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Wurgler 2006; 2007).119 A positive change in investor sentiment is expected to put pressure 
on the managers to meet the consensus forecast, thus increasing reactivity and leading to a 
lower forecast error. A negative change, instead, is expected to lead to a higher level of 
forecast error. Managers face lower pressure to meet the consensus forecast and the resulting 
lower reactivity leads to a higher forecast error. Figure 7 confirms such a relationship between 
investor sentiment and the EPS forecast error. Interestingly, the link fits in each year, even in 
2009. This strongly supports our notion of high reactivity in this market, as investor sentiment 
is calculated so as not to have any direct influence on the firms’ earnings, unlike the change of 
GDP (Baker and Wurgler 2007).  
 
Figure 7: Financial EPS Forecast Errors and Yearly Growth Rate of Baker and Wurgler’s 
Investor Sentiment Index 
 
Notes: Financial EPS forecast errors (yearly median EPS_AFEP, left axis) and yearly growth rate of Baker and 
Wurgler’s investor sentiment index (INVSENT, right axis). Data Sources: Investor sentiment index (Baker and 
Wurgler 2007; updated 2011 by Jeff Wurgler), I/B/E/S. 
 
                                                
119  We use the data on investor sentiment from Jeff Wurglers NYU homepage 
(http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/), accessed on July 12, 2013. Specifically, we employ in our figures the 
yearly average of the monthly investor sentiment data that is orthogonalized to macroeconomic factors, as 
developed in Baker and Wurgler (2007). Since 2007, the data is updated by Jeff Wurgler until January 2011. 
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Next, we compare these results from the financial market forecasts with the art market 
forecasts data. First, in Figure 8, we see no visible link between the auctioneers’ forecast 
errors and the Chinese percentage change in GDP120 as suggested in Proposition P5, because 
art prices tend not to react substantially to GDP (and other macroeconomic shocks, such as 
firms’ earnings, see, e.g., Dimson and Spaenjers 2011; Renneboog and Spaenjers 2013). 
Figure 8: Art Auctioneers’ Forecast Errors and the Yearly Growth Rate of the Chinese GDP 
 
Notes: Art auctioneers’ forecast errors (yearly median PRICE_AFEP, left axis), and the yearly growth rate of the 
Chinese GDP (NGDP_RPCH, right axis).Data sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, www.artron.net 
 
Again, we add a proxy for art investor sentiment (Proposition P6), as was the case with the 
financial market EPS forecasts. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no art market 
sentiment index tailored to the Chinese art market, so we employ the global art market 
investor sentiment index by Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013).121 Unfortunately, the index 
runs only until 2006.122 Yet, in Figure 9, it becomes visible that there is a link between the 
                                                
120 We used the data on China GDP growth from the IMF World Economic Outlook database 
 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx), accessed on July 12, 2013.   
121 The data on the art investor sentiment index is used as depicted in Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013, p. 51). 
122 Because we do not have access to the underlying data, we could not extend the index over our full period. 
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forecast error and the global art market sentiment, as proposed in Proposition P6: Only the 
intensity of the changes in sentiment determine the level of the forecast errors and not the 
direction of the changes in sentiment. The rationale is simple – if sentiment changes and 
market changes are large, the actual market outcome is more difficult to predict than when 
sentiment remains stable. This can be seen in 2001 and 2006, when an extraordinarily low 
change in art investor sentiment leads to a lower level of forecast errors than in the year 
before. 
Figure 9: Art Auctioneers’ Forecast Errors and the Yearly Growth Rate of Renneboog and 
Spaenjers’ Art Market Sentiment Index 
 
Notes: Art auctioneers’ forecast errors (yearly median PRICE_AFEP, left axis) and the yearly growth rate of 
Renneboog and Spaenjers’ art market sentiment index (YMED_PRICE_AFEP, right axis, no data available after 
2006).Data sources: Art investor sentiment index (Renneboog and Spaenjers 2013), www.artron.net. 
 
Recall that the high level of reactivity of the EPS forecasts leads to lower forecast errors only 
when the change in the investor sentiment is positive but not when it is negative. This 
asymmetry does not exist in the art market, because the art buyers have no incentive to 
smooth the auction prices, resulting in a reduced reactivity in the art market. Hence, we have 
provided evidence supporting the existence of high reactivity in the market for financial EPS 
forecasts and a low reactivity in the market for auctioneer presale art price estimates. The 
degree of reactivity in combination with the surrounding incentive-set in a market has an 
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empirically measurable influence on forecast errors and the development of forecasting 
quality over time. 
6.5. Institutional Factors and Reactivity-Induced Herding 
Behavior 
Institutions and the resulting incentives shape the behavior of forecasters, similar to North’s 
(1990, p. 3) notion of institutions as “the rules of the game”. We focus on an important 
institutional factor in virtually every market, namely on reputation. A forecaster's reputation is 
certainly among the most important institutional factors (besides technical resources and 
access to data) affecting the environment and the incentives for forecasters in a specific 
market. Reputation shapes the way market participants react to forecasts. We assume that 
market participants react the more strongly to a forecast the higher the reputation of the 
forecaster in a specific field.  
Whenever a forecaster or a specific group of forecasters learns that it bears the highest 
reputation in the market, it can exploit that reputation and try to induce a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (SFP) to its advantage by biasing the forecasts. In the art market, auctioneers might 
use their high reputation to influence the art buyer with an overestimated presale price 
estimate so as to fetch higher prices and, thus, generate more commission. In the financial 
market, a brokerage house might use its high reputation to issue an overestimated EPS 
forecast for a specific stock to support clients that are invested in that stock company. The 
reputation of the forecaster in combination with the overoptimistic forecast would support the 
positive view in the market. If the reputation is strong enough and the company has enough 
resources that its managers can react to the forecast and meet it, the reactivity induces a self-
fulfilling prophecy. At the same time, the most reputable forecasters (i.e. the reputation 
leaders) face the problem of avoiding damage to their reputation while they are exploiting it, 
as it might always happen that a manager (i.e. a company) cannot reach a biased consensus 
forecast.  
First, however, in a highly reactive market, the bulk of less reputable forecasters will also 
learn about the mechanism through which the forecasts of the reputation leaders have the 
highest probability of becoming self-fulfilling in a highly reactive market. They will start to 
adjust their forecasts towards the reputation leaders. Such a bad learning of forecasters 
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induces a herding behavior that conceals a possible forecast bias of the reputation leaders and 
dampens their risk of reputation damage as the herd provides protection from public 
accusation. In the case where the forecast is ex-post judged to be wrong, the reputation leader 
can hide in the herd. The majority of the other forecasters (i.e. the herd) will be wrong, too, so 
the reputation leader bears no reputational damage. In the case where the forecast was biased 
but induced a self-fulfilling prophecy, so that the forecast of the reputation leaders is ex-post 
judged to be correct, their reputation will even increase. 
Second, in a less reactive market, such a mechanism is less pronounced. The less reputable 
forecasters learn that, due to the lower reactivity, the reputation leaders are less able to induce 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, the less reputable forecasters share a much lower incentive to 
follow the reputation leaders’ forecasts, resulting in less herding behavior and a higher risk 
for the reputation leaders to bias their forecasts. The herd of less reputable forecasters will not 
provide the reputation leaders enough protection to hide in the herd, and the absence of the 
herd impedes the inducement of a self-fulfilling prophecy. We condense these considerations 
in two propositions: 
Proposition P7: In a highly reactive market (e.g., the market for financial EPS forecasts), the 
less reputable forecasters learn about the most reputable forecasters’ capability to induce a 
self-fulfilling prophecy and herd with the reputation leaders’ forecasts.  
Proposition P8: In a market with low reactivity (e.g., the market for presale art price 
estimates), the reputation leaders cannot induce (as often as in the financial market) a self-
fulfilling prophecy and, thus, the less reputable forecasters do not (or much less) herd with 
the leaders. 
When we compare the market for financial forecasts and the market for art forecasts, we 
arrive at the following predictions. In the case of financial EPS forecasts, we expect the 
higher reactivity to induce a substantial herding behavior among the less reputable forecasters 
towards the forecasts of the most reputable forecasters. Hence, there will be no visible 
difference between the forecast error of the group of reputation leaders and the median 
forecast error of all the forecasters. 
In contrast to the financial market, the substantially lower reactivity in the art market induces 
a much lower herding behavior of the less reputable forecasters towards the reputation 
leaders. Thus, we expect (1) a visible difference between the forecast errors of the reputation 
leaders and the forecast errors of the median forecaster, and we expect (2) that the average 
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forecast error of all forecasters is lower than the forecast error of the group of most reputable 
forecasters. Point (2) is because lower reactivity allows less reputable forecasters to issue a 
forecast that is less biased towards the reputation leaders’ forecasts. All these forecasts that 
are less biased, although not fully independent, provide a case for the wisdom-of-crowds 
effect (Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2005). We expect the median forecast error (yearly median 
AFEP) among all forecasters to be lower in the less reactive market for art forecasts. For the 
financial EPS, we predict no such difference. The median forecast error of all forecasters and 
the median forecast error of the reputational leaders are expected to be congruent. We 
anticipate that the herding behavior of less reputable forecasters weakens the wisdom-of 
crowds-effect by inducing a strong interdependence between forecasts (Lorenz et al. 2011).  
It is important to make clear that we are not able to directly measure herding behavior in this 
setting. In the financial EPS forecast market, we could use the same herding measure as in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, where we define herding behavior as the case when a forecaster 
revises his prior EPS forecast towards the herd (i.e. the EPS consensus of all the other security 
analysts). In the art market, where usually only the auctioneer publicly issues a forecast for a 
specific artwork, we are not able to build a consensus forecast for the same artwork without 
more than one forecast. Hence, we cannot apply the same measure as in the case of EPS 
forecasts. In contrast, in the art market, some authors create an artificial consensus price 
forecast for a specific artwork based on a hedonic art price index (Ashenfelter and Graddy 
2006). They finally compare this artificial consensus forecast with the auctioneers’ forecast to 
show biased forecasting behavior (see, e.g., Mei and Moses 2005 or Beggs and Graddy 2009). 
Such a measure is not (readily) applicable to the financial market, as the construction of a 
comparable hedonic price index and the resulting artificial consensus forecast would be 
perceived as arbitrary. Hence, we rely here on the temporal changes in the development of 
forecast errors of different groups. However, we argue that our comparative analysis of the 
different changes in forecast errors is able to show that herding behavior is the most obvious 
explanation for the patterns of the forecast errors and that the level of reactivity can explain 
the degree of herding behavior in a market.  
Finally, one could argue that the congruence of the median forecaster and the reputation 
leaders’ forecasts is not due to the herding behavior of the less reputable forecasters in a 
highly reactive market. Rather, it might be because all the forecasters share exactly the same 
information, the same information processing techniques based on the same theoretical 
background. In this case, reputation should play no role, and all the forecasters that have 
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similar resources and access to data should exhibit a similar forecast error. We can test this 
reasoning if we can identify a group of forecasters that shares an almost identical access to 
resources and know-how but is of different reputational market power. This third group of 
forecasters, which we call the challengers, would share a high incentive to reach the status of 
a reputation leader. They could do so by partially deviating from the reputation leaders’ 
forecasts (that also becomes the herd’s forecast) trying to achieve a lower forecast error in the 
cases of companies that could not react and meet the reputation leaders’ forecasts. 
As we assume substantial herding behavior in the market for EPS forecasts, due to the 
reactivity in the market inducing the reputation leaders’ capability to provoke a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, we expect the challengers group of forecasters to achieve a lower forecast error 
than both the reputation leaders’ forecasts and the median forecasts. If there were no herding 
behavior, the lowest forecast error should be achieved by the median forecast. Therefore, in a 
market with low reactivity such as the art market, we expect only low herding and, thus, we 
predict that the median forecast error of all the forecasters is lowest due to the wisdom-of-
crowds effect. We summarize this in two propositions: 
Proposition P9: In a highly reactive market, the herding behavior of the majority of less 
reputable forecasters increases the median forecast error and facilitates a partially lower 
forecast error of the challengers group of forecasters that are close to the status of reputation 
leaders and of similar resources and know-how. 
Proposition P10: The same (P9) is not true in markets with low reactivity, where the median 
forecast error of all forecasters is lower than the forecast error of any other group of 
forecasters. 
6.5.1. Empirical Evidence 
To test these predictions, we first have to identify the most reputable forecasters in the two 
markets. In the Chinese art market, there seems to be a rather clear ranking order among the 
auction houses, with four houses leading at the top (Bai et al. 2013; Horowitz 2011, p. 13; 
Boll 2011; Esman 2012): The domestic Poly International Auction and the China Guardian, 
and the international art auction giants Christie’s and Sotheby’s (mostly operating in the 
Chinese market from their Hong Kong-based subsidiaries). Even on a global scale, in 2011 
these auction houses occupied the first four places in the rankings of the renowned survey Art 
Market Trends 2011. Focused on the Chinese art market from 1999 to 2010, China Guardian 
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achieved total sales of RMB 9.579 billion, Poly RMB 6.426 billion, Christie’s RMB 5.210 
billion and Sotheby’s RMB 3.893 billion. For the analysis, we group the forecast errors of 
these four Chinese art market giants and use their yearly median AFEP. We compare their 
AFEP to the yearly median AFEP of all auction houses in the data sample, a total of 262 
individual auction houses.  
In the financial EPS forecast market, we identify the reputation of a brokerage house by 
counting the number of analysts a certain house employs. This reputation measure is in 
accordance with the literature and usually called “broker size” (see, e.g., Hong et al. 2000; 
Clement 1999; Hilary and Hsu 2013). Then, we rank the brokerage house according to their 
average broker size between 1999 and 2010 and identify the four largest houses, similar to the 
art market. These four brokerage houses employ a large number of analysts, from 120 
analysts to 142 analysts on average over the 12 years. For the analysis of the forecast error, 
we group the forecast errors of the four most reputable brokerage houses in the U.S. market 
and present the yearly median AFEP. We compare this forecast error to the yearly median 
AFEP of all brokerage houses in the data sample with a total of 763 individual brokerage 
houses. 
Figure 10 provides evidence in favor of the effect expected in Proposition P7. The yearly 
median forecast error (AFEP) of the group of reputation leaders and the median error of all 
forecasters in the market show a very congruent course over the years. We regard this as 
supporting evidence for our proposition that in a highly reactive market the forecasters exhibit 
a herding behavior towards the forecasts of the reputation leaders. In contrast, Figure 11 
shows a starkly diverging trend of the median forecast error (AFEP) of the reputation leaders 
and the yearly median forecast error of all forecasters in the art market, as suggested by 
Proposition P8. The low reactivity exhibits a marginal pressure on the less reputable 
forecasters to herd with the reputation leaders. Additionally, due to low herding behavior, we 
suggested that the more independent forecasts lead to the wisdom-of-crowds effect, which 
induces a lower forecast error for the larger group of less reputable forecasters. This picture is 
confirmed in Figure 11; the median forecast error (AFEP) of all forecasters is substantially 
lower than the error of the reputation leaders.  
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Figure 10: Financial Market – Yearly Median Forecast Error (EPS_AFEP) of All Forecasters 
and of the Reputation Leaders in the Market for EPS Forecasts 
 
Notes: Yearly median forecast error (EPS_AFEP) of all forecasters (YMED_EPS_AFEP) and of the reputation 
leaders (LEADERS_YMED_APS_AFEP) in the market for EPS forecasts; 1999-2000 Data source: I/B/E/S 
Figure 11: Art Market – Yearly Median Forecast Error (PRICE_AFEP) of All Forecasters and 
of the Reputation Leaders in the Market for Art Price Forecasts 
 
Notes: Yearly median forecast error (PRICE_AFEP) of all forecasters (YMED_PRICE_AFEP) and of the 
reputation leaders (LEADERS_YMED_PRICE_AFEP) in the market for art price forecasts; 1999 – 2010. Data 
source: www.artron.net 
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The challengers group of forecasters has to be identified to provide evidence about 
Propositions P9 and P10. In both markets, the forecasters in the third group should have a 
marginally lower reputation than the reputation leaders in the market but nonetheless share a 
similar access to the technical and informational resources similar to the leaders. Therefore, 
we define the third group of forecasters to be located around the 95th percentile of the 
distribution of the proxy for reputation in the specific market; i.e. on the distribution of the 
number of analysts employed at the brokerage house for the financial EPS forecasts and on 
the distribution of the auction houses’ turnover for the auctioneers presale estimates. In order 
to keep the third group comparable to the group of most reputable forecasters, we also select 
exactly four auction or brokerage houses. These challengers are, from a reputational 
perspective, close to the reputation leaders and, hence, should have an extra incentive to 
deviate from the most reputable forecasters’ forecasts so as to gain more reputation and to 
enter the group of reputation leaders in the forecast market. 
In the financial forecast market, the brokerage house at the 95th percentile of the BrokerSize 
distribution employs between 31 and 32 analysts.123 We group the forecast errors of the four 
brokerage houses in our sample employing 30, 31 and 32 (two houses) analysts and calculate 
their yearly median forecast errors (AFEP). 
In the art market, we similarly use the distribution of total sales of the auction houses. The 
auction houses of the group of reputation leaders are at the top of the distribution with average 
sales per year (1999-2010) between RMB 798 million and RMB 389 million. The challengers 
group, defined as the auction houses around the 95th percentile of the distribution, achieves 
sales per year between RMB 164 million and RMB 104 million. Unfortunately, none of the 
houses in the third group reports any auctions in the years 2000 and 2001, so we are not able 
to show a forecast error graph for these years.124 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 both support Propositions P9 and P10, respectively, and confirm the 
findings in Figures 10 and 11. In the financial market in Figure 12, the third group of 
forecasters exhibits a lower yearly median forecast error (AFEP) in most of the years than the 
yearly median forecast error (AFEP) of the reputation leaders and of all forecasters combined. 
                                                
123 The distribution of brokerage houses on the basis of BrokerSize is highly right skewed with a mean of 7.5 
analysts and a median of 2 analysts employed. In addition, identifying brokerage houses with 30 analysts is in 
line with the reputation threshold mentioned in the financial analyst literature lying around 25 to 30 analysts 
employed (see, e.g., Hong et al. 2000 or Hong and Kubik 2003). Brokerage houses with more than 30 analysts 
are perceived as belonging to a superior class of brokerage houses.  
124 Also in the art market, the distribution of average sales per year is highly right skewed, with a mean of RMB 
34.1 million and a median of RMB 7.5 million. 
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This supports our argument that in a highly reactive market the reputation leaders induce 
pressure on the less reputable forecasters to herd with them, as the leaders’ forecasts have a 
high probability of generating a self-fulfilling prophecy. In such a market setting, the third 
group of forecasters can use this mechanism and issue forecasts with a lower forecast error 
(AFEP) than the median forecast of the crowd (i.e. of all forecasters).  
As expected, the art market reveals a different picture than the financial market. Figure 13 
presents a yearly median forecast error (AFEP) of the challenger group that mostly lies 
between the median error of the reputation leaders and the median forecast error of all the 
forecasters combined. This evidence confirms the wisdom-of-crowds argument that the large 
group of all forecasters in the market will issue more precise forecasts at the median if their 
forecasts are (sufficiently) independent (i.e. in the absence of herding) due to the low level of 
reactivity. 
 
Figure 12: Financial Market – Yearly Median Forecast Error (EPS_AFEP) of All Forecasters, 
of the Reputation Leaders and of the Reputation Challengers in the Market for EPS 
Forecasts 
 
Notes: Yearly median forecast error (EPS_AFEP) of all forecasters (YMED_EPX_AFEP), of the reputation 
leaders (LEADERS_YMED_EPS_AFEP), and of the reputation challengers (CHALLENGERS_YMED_EPS_ 
AFEP) in the market for EPS forecasts; 1999 – 2010. Data source: I/B/E/S 
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Figure 13: Art Market – Yearly Median Forecast Error (PRICE_AFEP) of All Forecasters, of 
the Reputation Leaders and of the Reputation Challengers in the Market for Art 
Price Forecasts 
 
Notes: Yearly median forecast error (PRICE_AFEP) of all forecasters (YMED_PRICE_AFEP), of the reputation 
leaders (LEADERS_YMED_PRICE_AFEP), and of the reputation challengers (CHALLENGER_ 
YMED_PRICE_AFEP) in the market for art price forecasts; 1999 – 2010. Data source: www.artron.net 
6.6. Robustness 
To provide additional evidence supporting the robustness of our empirical findings for 
Proposition P1, we employ a time series analysis of the yearly absolute forecast error in 
percentage of the actual outcome (AFEP) for each of the three markets. The idea behind the 
test is to check if our analysis of the temporary changes in the aggregated forecast error of 
weather, financial and art forecasts has not fallen prey to a “spurious regression” problem 
(Granger and Newbold 1974). Such a problem would result in a wrong measurement of the 
statistical significance in our OLS regressions due to a unit root in the time series. This would 
mean that the yearly median error of the weather forecasts (TEMP_AFEP) would not 
continuously improve as suggested by the OLS regression. Instead, it would show a spurious 
correlation between time and the decline of the error.  
Therefore we scrutinize our result and use a unit root test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test) for all three time series. Proposition P1 states that the error for weather forecasts 
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(TEMP_AFEP) declines over time, while the errors for art (PRICE_AFEP) and financial 
forecasts (EPS_AFEP) do not. Accordingly, we expect the time series of the TEMP_AFEP to 
be trend stationary, i.e. to have no unit root and to exhibit a clear negative trend, even though 
there might be periodical oscillations around the trend line. In contrast, the other two markets 
for art and financial forecasts are expected to show no trend stationarity. 
Before we can use the ADF test, we have to define for how many lags we should test the 
individual time series. Therefore, we employ the improved Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC, see Ng and Perron 2001) to identify the number of lags for the test. For all three time 
series, the AIC suggests the use of 1 lag in the ADF test. Finally, the ADF test supports our 
first result. The weather forecast error (TEMP_AFEP) exhibits a highly significant trend-
stationary decline of the error over time (ADF test statistic: -4.67; critical value on the 1% 
significance level: -4.380). For the time series of the forecast errors in the financial 
(EPS_AFEP) and the art markets (PRICE_AFEP), the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be 
rejected125: the EPS_AFEP yields a test statistic of 0.063 and a critical value on the 10% 
significance level of -3.24; the PRICE_AFEP yields a test statistic of -2.23 and a critical value 
at the 10% level of significance of -3.24. We conclude that our finding of a significant decline 
in weather forecast errors and the findings of an absence of trend in the temporary change of 
the forecast errors in the art and financial markets are also robust to time-series analysis. 
6.7. Concluding Remarks 
The hassle of reactivity arises for every forecast that predicts an anthropogenic outcome; the 
market participants process the new forecast and react according to its information value. By 
doing so, the forecasts naturally influence the outcome. Hence, the actual outcome is affected 
by the very forecast that had been issued to predict it. The various problems for forecasting 
that arise from reactivity are developed in the preceding chapter. In this chapter, we employ a 
comparative analysis to scrutinize three considerations on forecasts and reactivity from the 
theoretical part. Firstly, we test the proposition that the forecast error in reactive markets does 
not improve over time, while it is expected to do so in the non-reactive market for weather 
forecasts. Secondly, we analyze several propositions regarding the influence of temporal 
changes in reactivity on the forecast error. Thirdly, we provide evidence for reactivity-
                                                
125 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test requires that the test statistic be smaller than the critical value at a certain 
level of significance to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in a time series (Greene 2002). 
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induced herding behavior that deteriorates the forecast accuracy of the majority of the 
forecasters in a highly reactive market. 
We employ large datasets in three markets with different levels of reactivity, namely the 
market for non-reactive weather forecasts, for highly reactive earnings per share forecasts (i.e. 
financial market), and for weakly reactive presale price forecasts of artworks (i.e. art market).  
We find supporting evidence for all propositions. Firstly, a comparison of the time series of 
the yearly median forecast error in all three markets reveals that the forecast error only 
diminishes in the non-reactive market for weather forecasts over time; in the other two 
reactive markets, the forecast error shows no significant trend. Secondly, a comparison 
between periods of higher and periods of lower reactivity in the same market reveals that 
reactivity has a substantial influence on the temporal changes in forecast errors. Thirdly, we 
show that reputation in reactive markets can induce herding behavior through bad learning 
and that this leads to a distortion of the median forecasts. Such herding behavior results in 
biased forecast information in highly reactive markets. We are limited in the analysis of 
herding behavior as we are not able to identify herding directly in the markets due to 
differences in the forecasting processes and the data available in the different markets. 
However, we provide evidence that supports the proposition of reactivity-induced herding 
behavior in a highly reactive market as an obvious explanation of the forecast error pattern of 
different groups of forecasters that vary in the level of reputation. 
Overall, our findings are important in light of the growing yet specious belief that more data 
and faster data processing will solve all forecasting problems in reactive markets. 
Additionally, the evidence supports the doubt that the adoption of forecasting techniques that 
are successful in non-reactive markets (like weather forecasting) will also be successful in 
reactive markets. We think that this insight is important. It might prevent decision makers 
from putting too much weight on the capacity of forecasts when using them as sources of 
policy advice in reactive markets without incorporating the possible reactivity of the market 
participants to the forecasts issued. 
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that herding behavior of individuals in organizations and on markets is 
influenced by the costs that the individuals have to bear if they do not follow the herd. A 
review of the theoretical and empirical findings in the social-science literature, as well as 
several anecdotes, reveals that the herding behavior of individuals has detrimental effects on 
the information aggregation in organizations. If employees face high costs of non-herding, 
they do not or only sparsely contribute their private information to the pool of knowledge in 
an organization. This lack of information vitiates the organization’s decision-making 
processes.  
In the first part of the thesis (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), the framework of the costs of non-herding 
is developed and several propositions are deduced and empirically tested. A qualitative study 
employing in-depth interviews with highly ranked executives, directors and analysts of 
financial services companies confirms that employees’ herding behavior is an important 
problem for practitioners in general. The study shows that both individual determinants of 
employees and institutional determinants of their companies influence the employees’ costs of 
non-herding. Furthermore, the responses provide evidence on the asymmetric mechanisms 
that amplify the detrimental effects of the costs of non-herding: First, they are self-
reinforcing. Second and third, they obey an asymmetrical relationship to possible benefits – 
the costs are both imminent and foreseeable, while the possible benefits both lie in the future 
and are uncertain. Fourth, an asymmetry exists, as between a private and a common good; the 
costs have to be borne individually, whereas the benefits are shared with other employees and 
shareholders of the company. 
 The subsequent quantitative analysis, employing a large dataset of security analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, reveals an economically and statistically significant influence of one of these 
institutional determinants, ownership, on the analysts’ costs of non-herding. Analysts working 
at large privately held brokerage houses exhibit substantially less herding behavior than 
similar analysts working at large publicly listed houses. In particular, the study shows that the 
difference in the costs of non-herding between analysts at privately held and at public 
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brokerage houses is most pronounced for analysts covering financial sector stocks. As 
security analysts are essential for the provision of information on the future state of financial 
markets, these findings bear important insights for both investors and regulators. 
In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 5 and 6), the reaction of individuals to a certain 
forecast about a future state of the world is analyzed. This reaction is called reactivity. The 
effects of reactivity on forecasts and opinion formation in several areas of the social and 
natural sciences are scrutinized. First, reactivity induces the problem that forecasters in 
reactive systems can never rely on the assessment of their forecast accuracy, as their forecast 
influences the actual outcome. Second, such first-order problems caused by reactivity produce 
externalities and biases on all other forecasters at a second-order level. These two orders of 
problems induced by reactivity are theoretically explained and empirically tested using a 
comparative analysis with a non-reactive market, namely the market for weather forecasts. It 
is shown that more data availability and better processing techniques do not solve the problem 
of reactivity and that the forecast accuracy only improves in non-reactive markets. 
Furthermore, the concept of reactivity-induced herding behavior is developed: In a reactive 
market, forecasts induce a self-fulfilling prophecy when enough market participants believe in 
a certain prediction and start acting according to it. Subsequently, forecasters in the same 
reactive markets learn about the herding behavior of market participants and understand that 
such herding behavior leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy for the most reputable forecasters’ 
predictions. Hence, in order to achieve high forecast accuracy, the other forecasters start to 
follow the forecasters who are perceived to be those with the highest reputation in the market. 
Finally, such herding behavior among forecasters also exacerbates market participants’ 
herding, because the predictions of the other forecasters are now in line with the most 
reputable forecaster’s predictions. Empirical evidence is provided that supports the 
proposition of reactivity-induced herding behavior among forecasters. It is shown that, in a 
highly reactive market, the median forecaster tends to achieve only the same forecast 
accuracy as the group of most reputable forecasters, suggesting a herding behavior on the part 
of the median forecaster.126 In a weakly reactive market, the median forecaster achieves a 
higher forecast accuracy than the group of most reputable forecasters. This suggests that a 
weak herding behavior among the bulk of other forecasters has led to a wisdom-of-crowds 
result (Galton 1907; Surowiecki 2005). The herding mechanism in highly reactive markets is 
                                                
126 The median forecaster is calculated as the median of all forecasts other than those of the group of most 
reputable forecasters.  
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important, as it distorts the usual reputation process that establishes the quality of goods in a 
market. In highly reactive markets, reputation loses its disciplining effect on the forecasters, 
because reputation helps to induce self-fulfilling prophecies which facilitate reactivity-
induced herding behavior.  
Discussion of results  
The measurement of herding behavior is a difficult issue in general. The herding measure 
employed in Chapter 4 is a simple but dynamic measure which has already been used in 
several other studies (e.g., Gleason and Lee 2003; Clements and Tse 2005). It accounts for the 
change of the forecast not only in relation to the herding forecast (i.e. the consensus forecast 
calculated as the average of all other forecasts) but also in relation to the forecaster’s prior 
forecast. As such, the measure is not static, as earlier measures were (see, e.g., Hong et al. 
2000). However, one could think of more complex herding measures that would take into 
account a larger forecast pattern, i.e. different sequences of new forecast issues, or reactions 
to other forecasts over a longer time horizon. In addition, one could criticize the fact that the 
percentage of herding forecasts of about 25% is too low; a “herd” should represent a majority 
of individuals. Although this is a reasonable objection, it must be said that a group comprising 
about one quarter of all forecasts can certainly induce herding behavior among market 
participants. Furthermore, earlier studies that employ a different data sample have about the 
same proportion of one fourth of herding forecasts (see, e.g., Gleason and Lee 2003; Clements 
and Tse 2005).  
As in most empirical studies, there are causality and self-selection concerns in the empirical 
analysis of the institutional factor ownership in Chapter 4. The direction of causality, i.e. a 
privately held brokerage house causes their analysts to exhibit less herding behavior and not 
vice versa, can be doubted. One can argue that the self-selection of analysts who are less 
prone to herding behavior into privately held brokerage houses drives this result. There are 
two arguments against this objection.  
Firstly, to identify a correlation between ownership and employees’ herding behavior is 
important above and beyond the question of causality. To know that analysts at larger, 
privately held brokerage houses engage less in herding behavior is an important message to 
investors, regulators and other market participants – irrespective of the causal question 
whether the effect is either due to self-selection or due to causal influence. Even if the 
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analysts self-select into the privately held brokerage houses only because they know that they 
can act more independently in such an environment, the institution of private ownership is 
still important for information provision in financial markets. Furthermore, the analysis in 
Chapter 4 provides evidence that supports such a notion. The analysis reveals that the 
difference in herding behavior between analysts at private and at public brokers is mostly 
driven by analysts covering financial sector stocks. This is important in two ways: First, 
analysts that cover financial sector stocks cover their own employer’s sector and the stocks of 
their employer’s peer companies. Hence, financial sector analysts working at publicly listed 
brokerage houses are under strong scrutiny by their supervisors and their management when 
they release their forecasts; financial sector analysts from private brokers are more 
independent as their employers are not listed and, thus, their employer’s valuation does not 
depend on their own and other analysts’ forecasts. Second, this channel only applies for 
analysts covering financial sector stocks, because analysts covering stocks from other sectors 
do not produce such externalities on their own employer’s valuation. Hence, we can exclude 
the possibility that the result is generally driven by self-selection of non-herding analysts into 
private brokerage houses because of concerns other than the one outlined above. This 
evidence helps us to exclude self-selection effects other than that analysts covering the 
financial sector know that they can act more independently in privately held brokerage houses 
and, hence, self-select themselves into them – if they self-select at all. This shows that the 
institutional factors of brokerage houses and banks are important when it comes to 
information provision about their peers and the financial market in general and informs 
investors that they have to select their information sources for this market particularly 
carefully.  
Secondly, one can credibly assume that the analysts’ incentive to maximize income is an 
important factor in choosing their employers. It is a well-known fact that the privately held 
brokers pay substantially lower wages (see, e.g., Hong and Kubik 2003; Groysberg et al. 
2011). The typical career of a successful analyst starts at a smaller, privately held brokerage 
house of low reputation, then goes on to a more respected, larger private broker, and up to a 
big and highly prestigious, publicly listed brokerage house (see, e.g., Michaely and Womack 
2005; Groysberg et al. 2011). The existence of this career path contradicts the argument that 
only the self-selection of analysts based on their individual characteristics and preferences – 
and not the causal effect of the brokers’ institution – is responsible for the extent of herding 
behavior. Although a few analysts might accept a large loss in income because they prefer to 
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work in a privately held brokerage house that allows them to issue more independent 
forecasts, it seems implausible to conjecture a scenario in which most of the analysts act in 
such a way. It is more reasonable to assume that on average analysts will work for some time 
during their careers for larger private brokers before they climb to a high-status position at a 
big public broker. They use the time and the environment at larger private brokers to issue 
independent, non-herding forecasts in order to present themselves and their ability to the 
market. 
When considering the second part of the thesis, the evidence provided on the interference 
between reactive market outcomes and forecasts is by necessity limited. Reactivity is, by 
definition, difficult to tackle with empirical methods. Ideally, one would prefer an identical 
situation to occur twice, once with and once without a forecast being issued. Due to the lack 
of such perfect settings and the endogeneity problem between forecasts and reactive 
outcomes, this thesis employs a simple empirical approach.127 It compares the development of 
forecast accuracy over time between three different markets and the underlying changes in 
market fundamentals and sentiments, which influence the level of reactivity in a market. 
Additionally, it scrutinizes the difference between various groups of forecast providers in the 
financial and art markets. However, such an analysis could be extended by developing 
techniques for reactive markets which would be able to reconstruct a situation with forecasts 
as if they had not been issued. Although such attempts have been made in the financial (e.g., 
Simpson, forthcoming) and art markets (Mei and Moses 2005), an approach that delivers 
comparable results in both markets by employing the same procedure still has to be 
undertaken.  
Implications for economics 
This thesis leads to several implications for economics. First, it contributes to the economics 
literature by providing robust evidence that institutional factors of organizations influence 
employees’ herding behavior. The framework of the costs of non-herding offers a theoretical 
basis on which to analyze determinants of employees’ herding behavior. The interview study 
reveals that the framework is useful for examining various factors which explain why 
employees do not differ from the prevailing opinion and how asymmetric incentives can 
                                                
127 Another way would be to conduct a laboratory experiment, in which the various situations are reproducible, 
but this approach is confronted with a major problem of external validity. The study aims at eliciting the 
existence of reactivity in a real-life setting, employing recorded data from typical market situations. 
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explain a self-reinforcing dynamic of employees’ herding behavior in organizations. 
Additionally, the study identifies several relevant institutional factors that shape the 
employees’ costs of non-herding: the hierarchical structure, the degree of decentralization in 
an organization, the ownership structure, the degree of performance pay, and the 
independence of the internal risk management. 
Second, based on the framework and supporting the qualitative evidence, the quantitative 
study shows that the ownership structure of brokerage houses and banks has an economically 
and statistically significant effect on the herding behavior of their employees. The evidence 
provided expands the literature on security analysts in particular, and the empirical literature 
on employees’ herding behavior in general.  
Third, reactivity and its effects on the ex-post assessment of forecasts influence research in 
areas of the social sciences that focus on forecasters’ and other information providers’ herding 
behavior. As market participants react to forecasts and this reaction changes the actual 
outcome, the impossibility of an unbiased ex-post analysis of the forecasts’ accuracy hinders 
the sound development of forecasting theory and its empirical testing. This thesis is not the 
first treatise on the problems of reactivity and the possibility of self-fulfilling or self-defeating 
prophecies (see, e.g., Morgenstern 1928; Merton 1936). Yet, it reminds us of the difficulties 
of economic research induced by the reactive behavior of market participants. It also links the 
various areas of the social sciences where reactivity exists. Economic research might benefit 
from the literature review, which draws extensively on works from sociology and political 
science in addition to the economic literature. Several fields of application are discussed, 
reaching from university rankings to Internet-based forecasting with Google trends. As 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the problems for forecasting induced by reactivity are not or 
only partially taken into account in economics. In particular, empirical research analyzing the 
performance and accuracy of forecasting in economics and in financial markets largely 
neglects the distorting effects of reactivity. For example, in the literature on the forecast 
accuracy of security analysts, Beyer (2008) was the first to theoretically describe the problems 
for analysts that are induced by the reactive behavior of managers, who try to meet a certain 
earnings forecast. Yet even today most empirical papers (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 2010; Clement 
et al. 2011; Bonini and Kerl 2012) do not take this problem into account (Liu and Natarajan 
2012 or Bissessur and Veenman 2013, being notable exceptions).  
Fourth, this thesis proposes a mechanism of reactivity-induced herding behavior in Chapter 5, 
adding a relevant extension to the literature on herding behavior in economics and the social 
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sciences in general. The empirical study in Chapter 6 provides evidence that a high level of 
reactivity in a market can induce herding behavior among forecasters. Herding is measured as 
an aggregated, congruent development of forecast accuracy between the different groups of 
forecasters. The mechanism is distinctively different from the usual herding theories proposed 
in the literature, such as reputational or informational herding behavior (see, e.g., 
Bhikhchandani and Sharma 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; 2009). The argument goes 
above and beyond the problem that less able forecasters could mimic more able forecasters, as 
in the case of reputation-based herding behavior (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Zwiebel 1995). 
Rather, it is stated that reactivity changes the outcome such that a wrong prediction by a less 
able but ex-ante reputable forecaster may become reality and, thus, ex-post be perceived as a 
correct prediction. Likewise, the argument here is not based on an informational cascade 
(Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). The herding forecasters might even be aware that 
they issue mistaken forecasts, but because the actual outcome is strongly influenced by 
reactivity (leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy), they still engage in herding behavior. All the 
subjects act in a fully rational manner. 
Implications for practitioners 
For practitioners, the implications of this thesis are twofold. Firstly, the interview study in 
Chapter 3 reveals that managers of banks and financial services providers are aware of the 
problems posed by herding behavior. However, they seem not to actively engage in reducing 
the costs of non-herding. In addition, managers of larger companies are aware of suggested 
internal rules of conduct in meetings, but state in the interviews that these rules are not used in 
daily life. Based on the managers’ responses, this thesis reminds us that such procedures can 
help to lower the employees’ costs of non-herding and to improve the information pool 
available for the organization’s decision-making process.  
 Secondly, the thesis primarily focuses on institutional factors at the organizational 
macro level. The interview study identifies four such factors that help to lower the employees’ 
costs of non-herding: a flatter hierarchy with a more decentralized organization; privately held 
companies; a lower portion of performance pay; and a more independent risk management. 
Managers and entrepreneurs should consider these factors when organizing or establishing a 
firm. The institutional factors at the macro level go above and beyond the usual aspects 
mentioned in the literature on herding behavior (e.g., Morrison and Milliken 2000; 2003; 
Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; 2009) and in the practitioners’ literature that mostly focuses on 
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institutional factors at the micro level, like, e.g., Robert’s Rules of Order (Robert 1876 
[2011]; Shiller 1995, p. 183) or the guides based on Janis’s (1972) ideas to restrain groupthink 
(e.g., Topchick 2007; Wilcox 2010).  
Two interesting institutional factors at the micro level are identified which have not been 
found in the practitioners’ literature. Managers propose more informal communication before 
and between meetings, and want employees to get to know each other across different units 
and ranks of an organization to help lower the employees’ costs of non-herding. They explain 
that these two factors could help share ideas that challenge the prevailing opinion in a firm at 
lower costs of non-herding. 
Implications for public policy 
The empirical study in Chapter 4 aims at informing investors and regulators about the 
importance of institutional factors of information providers in financial markets. Analysts 
covering financial sector stocks and working with larger privately held brokerage houses 
exhibit a substantially lower propensity to engage in forecast herding than identical analysts 
working with publicly listed brokers and banks. The last financial crisis provides many 
examples of analysts who were working with large and prestigious, publicly listed brokerage 
houses and did not release information about the imminence of the crisis.  
The study argues that financial sector analysts at public brokers cannot independently reveal 
their private information as their forecasts influence the valuation of their own employer, 
whose stocks are listed in the same sector. Due to the externality of their forecasts on their 
own employer, financial sector analysts at public brokers cannot reveal their private 
information to the market. Instead, they are scrutinized and restrained by their own 
management when trying to issue critical information about their own sector. Such an internal 
forecast policy creates incentives for financial sector analysts at major listed brokers and 
banks to engage in herding behavior to avoid facing the costs of non-herding when going 
against the opinion of their own management. Such distorted incentives create a lack of 
independent information provision in financial markets.  
Since the second most important source of information for financial markets, the credit rating 
agencies, depend on business with such big banks and brokers, these two important 
information providers form a kind of unholy alliance (see also Mathis et al. 2009; Fong et al. 
2012). Hence, regulators should be interested in removing the interdependence of these two 
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groups and in fostering a more independent information provision in financial markets. This 
might be achieved by supporting larger privately held brokerage houses or by barring the 
provision of financial sector forecasts from analysts working at publicly listed banks and 
brokerage houses. Investors and customers can also reduce the problem of herding behavior in 
financial markets by carefully selecting the source of financial sector forecasts and by 
refraining from reacting too credulously to forecasts from analysts of publicly listed banks or 
brokers. 
It has often been argued that the reputational concerns of forecast providers help to restore the 
incentives to deliver accurate forecasts, as consumers choose the forecaster whose prediction 
has been most accurate in the preceding period.128 It is conjectured in Chapter 5 and supported 
partially by evidence in Chapter 6 that such a mechanism does not solve the incentive 
problem for forecasters in reactive markets – in contrast, it may even have a detrimental effect 
on forecasters’ incentives. It is argued that the reactivity of the market participants, who use 
the forecasts and produce the market outcome (i.e. the price of a stock or another security) by 
reacting to the forecast, leads to distorted forecasters’ incentives. Once a forecast provider 
makes a highly accurate forecast in a certain period, the market participants might attribute a 
high reputation to this forecaster and react to his or her forecasts such that a self-fulfilling 
prophecy occurs. Such reactivity potentially leads to a high accuracy of the forecast issued by 
the same forecaster, after he or she has become highly reputed. Such a result not only distorts 
the incentive effect of reputation but induces a detrimental herding behavior among other 
forecasters. The other forecasters then engage in reactivity-induced herding behavior, because 
they anticipate that the market participants’ reactions will probably again lead to a self-
fulfilling prophecy and create a highly accurate forecast. In addition, the increasingly 
concentrated forecasts in the market as the forecasters herd provide a distorted signal of 
general agreement on the future to the market, making the market participants even more 
likely to follow the herd of forecasters. 
In systems where forecasts do not influence the actual outcome, reactivity cannot occur. 
Hence in Chapter 6, a comparative institutional analysis between the non-reactive market for 
weather forecasts and the reactive art and financial markets revealed that the forecast accuracy 
in reactive markets has not improved over the last decade. Only the forecast accuracy 
regarding the non-reactive weather system has made progress. This finding is even more 
                                                
128 See Mathis et al. 2009 for a critical analysis on the effect of reputation in the market for credit rating 
agencies. 
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interesting when it is recalled that the dramatic increase in the amount of data and the data 
processing took place in all three markets. Hence, it suggests that the transfer of forecasting 
techniques from non-reactive to reactive markets will not provide the expected improvement 
in forecast accuracy. This stands in contrast, for example, to a recent paper by the Bank of 
International Settlement (Vahey and Wakerly 2013) and in other literature on economic 
forecasting (e.g., Garratt et al. 2011).  
Reactivity develops in every anthropogenic market, where people react to forecasts and create 
the final outcome of the market. Chapter 5 proposes the institution of the devil’s advocate, 
which would have to provide counterarguments and forecasts against the most reputable 
forecast provider(s). The proposition developed in this thesis is radical, as it clearly assigns 
the function of arguing against any most reputable forecaster or prevailing opinion in the 
market to the institution of the devil's advocate. To fulfill such a role, it is important that these 
boards are independent of any private or public bodies. Hence, examples of publicly funded 
institutions which issue economic forecasts, such as the Council for Economic Advisers in the 
U.S. or the German Council of Economic Experts, do not or only partially satisfy these 
requirements. Chapter 5 also explains why many international organizations do not fulfill the 
role of a devil’s advocate. They usually incorporate not only units that generate forecasts but 
also other units that have to react officially to the forecasts when they plan and execute their 
duties. For example, the International Monetary Fund generates economic forecasts for almost 
every country in the world but also plans and executes its own financial support in accordance 
with the forecasts it releases. In relation to the organization's market power and the size of the 
countries’ economies, these forecasts potentially trigger a reactivity-induced herding behavior 
among other forecasters and market participants in anticipating the actions of the organization 
according to its forecasts. Thus, it is important that the institution of the devil’s advocate only 
produces forecasts and that it is independent of any executive body or organization that has to 
use and act upon forecasts. The German Council of Economic Experts, for example, fulfills 
this important aspect. Yet, its members are elected by the Federal President and not 
independent of the government. 
Prospects for future research 
The analysis conducted in this thesis provides insights into the phenomenon of herding 
behavior and reactivity in organizations and markets but inevitably leaves many questions 
unaddressed. Although the interview study touches on many different determinants of the 
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costs of non-herding in organizations, the quantitative study focuses mainly on the 
institutional factor of ownership while controlling for other organizational and individual 
parameters. Many other institutional factors revealed by the interview study in Chapter 3 
should be further quantitatively investigated and their interactions should be studied. For 
example, the influence of the role of risk management or the degree of performance pay 
should be scrutinized both individually and in combination with other institutional factors.  
In particular, it would be interesting to ascertain how the individually faced costs of non-
herding aggregate to a herd behavior of firms and other organizations in specific markets. 
High individual costs of non-herding engender a strong and cohesive prevailing opinion in an 
organization. This prevailing opinion inside a firm could induce herding behavior among 
firms in a specific market, depending on the firm’s market share. Finally, this could lead to a 
strongly biased perception of opinions and predictions in markets. Firms might issue similar 
forecasts about a future state of the world although in each firm only a small majority of 
employees (or even a minority) share this forecast and an almost equally large portion of 
employees contradict it. So it seems important to further analyze the aggregation of opinions 
in markets and how a higher concentration of market shares leads to a stronger bias of the 
available information in a certain market (see Hong and Kacperczyk 2010). Future research 
should examine such interdependencies between individual and aggregated herd behavior.  
In addition, future research on social learning and herding behavior should consider reactivity 
as an important part of a more extensive explanation of herding behavior in organizations and 
markets. Furthermore, the institution of the devil’s advocate proposed to reduce the reactive 
behavior of market participants has to be scrutinized empirically and developed further.  
The evidence that forecast accuracy in reactive markets has not improved over the last decade 
despite the technological progress in generating and processing big data leads to the 
conclusion that the problem of reactivity cannot be tackled by improving forecasting 
techniques per se. Sooner or later, the market participants’ reactions will erase the 
improvement. In contrast, a better balancing of the various incentives of forecasters might 
help to improve information provision in reactive markets. This thesis proposes institutional 
improvements to incorporate more balanced incentives in organizations and markets to 
provide a richer informational environment for all market participants. 
 
  158 
 
References 
Abarbanell, J., Lehavy, R., 2003. Biased forecasts or biased earnings? The role of reported 
earnings in explaining apparent bias and over/underreaction in analysts' earnings 
forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36: 105-146. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., 2005. The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, 
institutional change, and economic growth. The American Economic Review 95: 546-
579. 
Agrawal, A., Chen, M.A., 2008. Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock 
Recommendations. Journal of Law and Economics 51: 503-537. 
Akerlof, G.A., Shiller, R.J., 2009. Animal Spirits. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Alevy, J.E., Haigh, M.S., List, J.A., 2007. Information cascades: Evidence from a field 
experiment with financial market professionals. The Journal of Finance 62: 151-180. 
American, Meteorological, Society, 2008. Enhancing Weather Information with Probability 
Forecasts. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 89: 1-12. 
Argyris, C., Schön, D., 1978. Organizational Learning. Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
Arthur, W.B., 1989. Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events. The Economic Journal 99: 116-131. 
ArtPrice, 2011. Art Market Trends 2011. Available online at http://web.artprice.com/ 
artmarketinsight (accessed on April 21, 2013). 
Asch, S.E., 1951. Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of 
Judgements. In: Guetzkow M. (ed.). Groups, Leadership, and Men. Pittsburgh: 
Carnegie Press. 
Asch, S.E., 1956. Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a 
unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 70: 1-70. 
Ashenfelter, O., 1989. How auctions work for wine and art. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3: 23-36. 
Ashenfelter, O., Graddy, K., 2003. Auctions and the Price of Art. Journal of Economic 
Literature 41: 763-787. 
Ashenfelter, O., Graddy, K., 2006. Art auctions. London: Elsevier. 
Ashenfelter, O., Graddy, K., 2011. Sale Rates and Price Movements in Art Auctions. The 
American Economic Review 101: 212-216. 
Ashiya, M., Doi, T., 2001. Herd behavior of Japanese economists. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 46: 343-346. 
  159 
Aspara, J., Pajunen, K., Tikkanen, H., Tainio, R., 2008. Explaining Sacrifice of Long-Term 
Investments for Short-Term Earnings: Spiral of Silence in Financial Markets. 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 
Avery, C., Zemsky, P., 1998. Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial 
Markets. The American Economic Review 88: 724-748. 
Bai, J., Guo, J., Mandel, B., 2013. Going global: markups and product quality in the Chinese 
art market. FRB of New York Staff Report. 
Bai, J., Philippon, T., Savov, A., 2012. Have financial markets become more informative? 
FRB of New York Staff Report. 
Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2006. Investor Sentiment and the Cross Section of Stock Returns. The 
Journal of Finance 61: 1645-1680. 
Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2007. Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21: 129-152. 
Bandura, A., 1965. Influence of Model's Reinforcement Contingencies on the Aquisition of 
Imitative Responses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: 589-595. 
Bandura, A., 1976. Social Learning Theory. In: Spence J.T., Carson R.C. & Thiebaut J.W. 
(eds.). Behavioral Approaches to Therapy. Morristown NJ: General Learning Press. 
Banerjee, A., Somanathan, R., 2001. A Simple Model of Voice. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116: 189-227. 
Banerjee, A.V., 1992. A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
107: 797-817. 
Bantel, K.A., Jackson, S.E., 1989. Top Management and Innovations in Banking: Does the 
Composition of the Top Team Make a Difference? Strategic Management Journal 10: 
107-124. 
Bao, J., Edmans, A., 2011. Do Investment Banks Matter for M&A Returns? Review of 
Financial Studies 24: 2286-2315. 
Barber, B.M., Lehavy, R., Trueman, B., 2007. Comparing the stock recommendation 
performance of investment banks and independent research firms. Journal of 
Financial Economics 85: 490-517. 
Baron, R.S., 2005. So Right It's Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized 
Group Decision Making. In: Zanna M.P. (ed.). Advances in experimental social 
psychology. San Diego: Elsevier Academic Press. 219-253. 
Baumol, W.J., 1957. Interactions between successive polling results and voting intentions. 
Public Opinion Quarterly 21: 318-323. 
Beatty, A., Harris, D.G., 1999. The effects of taxes, agency costs and information asymmetry 
on earnings management: A comparison of public and private firms. Review of 
Accounting Studies 4: 299-326. 
Beatty, A.L., Ke, B., Petroni, K.R., 2002. Earnings management to avoid earnings declines 
across publicly and privately held banks. The Accounting Review 77: 547-570. 
Beggs, A., Graddy, K., 1997. Declining values and the afternoon effect: Evidence from art 
auctions. The Rand Journal of Economics: 544-565. 
  160 
Beggs, A., Graddy, K., 2009. Anchoring effects: Evidence from art auctions. The American 
Economic Review 99: 1027-1039. 
Bénabou, R., 2013. Groupthink: Collective delusions in organizations and markets. The 
Review of Economic Studies 80: 429-462. 
Benz, M., Frey, B.S., 2008. The value of doing what you like: Evidence from the self-
employed in 23 countries. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 68: 445-
455. 
Berger, A.N., Miller, N.H., Petersen, M.A., Rajan, R.G., Stein, J.C., 2005. Does function 
follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small 
banks. Journal of Financial Economics 76: 237-269. 
Bernhardt, D., Campello, M., Kutsoati, E., 2006. Who herds? Journal of Financial Economics 
80: 657-675. 
Besley, T., Case, A., 2003. Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United 
States. Journal of Economic Literature 41: 7-73. 
Beunza, D., Stark, D., 2012. From dissonance to resonance: cognitive interdependence in 
quantitative finance. Economy and Society 41: 383-417. 
Bewley, R., Fiebig, D.G., 2002. On the herding instinct of interest rate forecasters. Empirical 
Economics 27: 403-425. 
Bewley, T.F., 1998. Why not cut pay? European Economic Review 42: 459-490. 
Bewley, T.F., 1999. Why Wages Don't Fall During A Recession. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Beyer, A., 2008. Financial analysts‚ forecast revisions and managers reporting behavior. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 46: 334-348. 
Beyer, A., Cohen, D.A., Lys, T.Z., Walther, B.R., 2010. The financial reporting environment: 
Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 296-343. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., Welch, I., 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and 
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. The Journal of Political Economy 100: 
992-1026. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., Welch, I., 1998. Learning from the Behavior of Others: 
Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
12: 151-170. 
Bikhchandani, S., Sharma, S., 2001. Herd Behavior in Financial Markets. IMF Staff Papers 
47: 279-310. 
Binswanger, D., Gimes, M., 2011. Wir Brauchen schaerfere Regeln. Das Magazin, May 13, 
2011: 16-21. 
Bissessur, S., Veenman, D., 2013. The Role of Ex-Ante Uncertainty in Explaining Why Firms 
Meet or Just Beat Analysts' Earnings Forecasts. Working Paper - INSEAD. 
Blinder, A.S., Choi, D.H., 1990. A shred of evidence on theories of wage stickiness. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: 1003-1015. 
Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J., 2007. Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across 
Firms and Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122: 1351-1408. 
  161 
Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J., 2010. Why do management practices differ across firms and 
countries? Journal of Economic Perspectives 24: 203-224. 
Boll, D., 2011. Boom im Reich der Mitte. NZZ am Sonntag, April 3, 2011: 51. 
Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M., 2005. Contract theory. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Bombach, G., 1962. Ueber die Moeglichkeit wirtschaftlicher Voraussagen. Kyklos 15: 29-67. 
Bonini, S., Kerl, A., 2012. Private information, subjective valuation and target price accuracy. 
Subjective Valuation and Target Price Accuracy (October 30, 2012) 
Bowen, F., Blackmon, K., 2003. Spirals of Silence: The Dynamic Effects of Diversity on 
Organizational Voice. Journal of Management Studies 40: 1393-1417. 
Bowles, S., 1998. Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other 
economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature 36: 75-111. 
Buizza, R., Hagedorn, R., Isaksen, L., 2010. Recent  changes  of  the  ECMWF 
Ensemble  Prediction  System. In: European Center for Medium-Range Weather 
Forecasts Conference.Vitart F. (Ed.). Zurich. 
Burgstahler, D., Eames, M., 2006. Management of earnings and analysts' forecasts to achieve 
zero and small positive earnings surprises. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 
33: 633-652. 
Burt, R.S., 1982. Toward a Structural Theory of Action: Network Models of Social Structure, 
Perception and Action. London, NJ: Academic Press. 
Butler, D., 2008. Web data predict flu. Nature 456: 287. 
Butler, D., 2013. When Google got flu wrong. Nature 494: 155. 
Callon, M., 1998. The laws of the markets. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Campbell, D.T., 1957. Factors relevant to the validity of experiments in social settings. 
Psychological Bulletin 54: 297-319. 
Campbell, D.T., Stanley, J.C., 1963. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for 
research on teaching. New Haven: Ceneage Learning. 
Chamley, C., 2004. Rational herds: Economic models of social learning. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Chang, X., Dasgupta, S., Hilary, G., 2006. Analyst coverage and financing decisions. The 
Journal of Finance 61: 3009-3048. 
Chen, Q., Jiang, W., 2006. Analysts weighting of private and public information. Review of 
Financial Studies 19: 319-355. 
Cheong, F.S., Thomas, J., 2011. Why do EPS forecast error and dispersion not vary with 
scale? Implications for analyst and managerial behavior. Journal of Accounting 
Research 49: 359-401. 
Chevalier, J., Ellison, G., 1999. Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 114: 389-432. 
Choi, H., Varian, H., 2012. Predicting the present with google trends. Economic Record 88: 2-
9. 
Choi, N., Sias, R.W., 2009. Institutional industry herding. Journal of Financial Economics 
94: 469-491. 
  162 
Christie, W.G., Huang, R.D., 1995. Following the Pied Piper: Do Individual Returns Herd 
around the Market? Financial Analysts Journal 51: 31-37. 
Chung, R., 2012. The Freedom to Publish Opinion Poll Report. World Association of Public 
Opinion Research Research (Ed.). University of Hong Kong, Gallup, WAPOR. 
Cipriani, M., Guarino, A., 2005. Herd Behavior in a Laboratory Financial Market. The 
American Economic Review 95: 1427-1443. 
Cipriani, M., Guarino, A., 2009. Herd behavior in financial markets: an experiment with 
financial market professionals. Journal of the European Economic Association 7: 206-
233. 
Clement, M.B., 1999. Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio 
complexity matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 285-303. 
Clement, M.B., Hales, J., Xue, Y., 2011. Understanding analysts' use of stock returns and 
other analysts' revisions when forecasting earnings. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 51: 279-299. 
Clement, M.B., Tse, S.Y., 2003. Do investors respond to analysts' forecast revisions as if 
forecast accuracy is all that matters? The Accounting Review 78: 227-249. 
Clement, M.B., Tse, S.Y., 2005. Financial analyst characteristics and herding behavior in 
forecasting. The Journal of Finance 60: 307-341. 
Clements, M.P., Hendry, D.F., 2011. The Oxford handbook of economic forecasting: Oxford 
University Press. 
Cohen, D.A., Dey, A., Lys, T.Z., 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the 
pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83: 757-787. 
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., Malloy, C., 2010. Sell-Side School Ties. The Journal of Finance 65: 
1409-1437. 
Corwin, S.A., Schultz, P., 2005. The role of IPO underwriting syndicates: Pricing, 
information production, and underwriter competition. The Journal of Finance 60: 443-
486. 
Cowen, A., Groysberg, B., Healy, P., 2006. Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic? 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 41: 119-146. 
Credit Suisse, 2007. Annual Report.  
Cueni, R., Fiechter, P., 2013. Bold Analysts or Bold Banks: Do Institutional Factors Drive 
Herding Behavior? Working Paper (SSRN). 
Cueni, R., Frey, B.S., 2012. How to Overcome Herding Behavior in Firms. In: Towards a 
New Theory of the Firm. Rosannas J.M. & Ricart J.E. (Eds.). Bilbao: Fundacion 
BBVA. 
Cueni, R., Frey, B.S., 2013. Forecasts and Reactivity. mimeo, University of Zurich. 
Cueni, R., Frey, B.S., forthcoming. Repressed Voice and Costs of Non-Herding. In: Contract 
Governance - Dimensions in Law and Interdisciplinary Research. Grundmann S., 
Moeslein F. & Riesenhuber K. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Teoh, S.H., 2002. Investor psychology in capital markets: 
Evidence and policy implications. Journal of Monetary Economics 49: 139-209. 
  163 
David, P.A., 1985. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. The American Economic Review 
75: 332-337. 
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., Zeckhauser, R., 1999. Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds. 
The Journal of Business 72: 1-33. 
Deutsch, M., Gerard, H.B., 1955. A study of normative and informational social influences 
upon individual judgment. The journal of abnormal and social psychology 51: 629. 
Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1999. Advocates. Journal of Political Economy 107: 1-39. 
Diekmann, A., 2001. Empirische Sozialforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschen-
buch Verlag. 
Dimson, E., Spaenjers, C., 2011. Ex post: The investment performance of collectible stamps. 
Journal of Financial Economics 100: 443-458. 
Drehmann, M., Oechssler, J., Roider, A., 2005. Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial 
Markets: An Internet Experiment. The American Economic Review 95: 1403-1426. 
Dyck, A., Morse, A., Zingales, L., 2010. Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud. The 
Journal of Finance 65: 2213-2253. 
Ekelund Jr, R.B., Ressler, R.W., Watson, J.K., 1998. Estimates, bias and sales in Latin-
American art auctions, 1977-1996. Journal of Cultural Economics 22: 33-42. 
Elliott, G., Timmermann, A., 2008. Economic forecasting. Journal of Economic Literature: 3-
56. 
Ely, R.J., 2004. A Field Study of Group Diversity, Participation in Diversity Education 
Programs, and Performance. Journal of Organizational Behavior 25: 755-780. 
Esman, A., 2012. China's USD 13 Billion Art Fraud -  and What it Means For You. Forbes, 
August 13, 2012. 
Espeland, W.N., Sauder, M., 2007. Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate 
Social Worlds. American Journal of Sociology 113: 1-40. 
Esposito, E., 2013. The structures of uncertainty: performativity and unpredictability in 
economic operations. Economy and Society 42: 102-129. 
Ettredge, M., Gerdes, J.J., 2005. Timeliness of investor relations data at corporate web sites. 
Communications of the ACM 48: 95-100. 
Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 2001. Learning and expectations in macroeconomics. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Eysenbach, G., 2006. Infodemiology: tracking flu-related searches on the web for syndromic 
surveillance. In: AMIA Annual Symposium Proceedings: 244, American Medical 
Informatics Association. 
Feasby, C.C., 1997. Public Opinion Poll Restrictions, Elections, and the Charter. University of 
Toronto – Faculty of Law Review 55: 241-268. 
Fernando, C.S., May, A.D., Megginson, W.L., 2012. The value of investment banking 
relationships: evidence from the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The Journal of Finance 
67: 235-270. 
Festinger, L., 1954. A Theory of Social Comparison Processes. Human Relations 7: 114-140. 
Festinger, L., 1957. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
  164 
Fong, K., Hong, H., Kacperczyk, M., Kubik, J., 2012. Do Security Analysts Discipline Credit 
Rating Agencies? AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper. 
Francis, J., Philbrick, D., 1993. Analysts' decisions as products of a multi-task environment. 
Journal of Accounting Research 31: 216-230. 
Frank, R.H., 1999. Higher education: The ultimate winner-take-all market? Cornell Working 
Paper Series (CHERI). 
Frank, R.H., Cook, P.J., 1988. The Winner-Take-All Society: How More and More Americans 
Compete for Ever Fewer and Bigger Prizes, Encouraging Economic Waste, Income 
Inequality, and an Impoverished Cultural Life. New York: The Free Press. 
Frey, B.S., 2008. Happiness: A Revolution in Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Frey, B.S., Gallus, J., 2012. Happiness policy and economic development. International 
Journal of Happiness and Development 1: 102-111. 
Frey, B.S., Stutzer, A., 2002a. What can economists learn from happiness research? Journal 
of Economic Literature 40: 402-435. 
Frey, B.S., Stutzer, A., 2002b. Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions 
Affect Human Well-Being. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Frey, B.S., Stutzer, A., 2009. Should happiness be maximized? In: Dutt A.K. & Radcliff B. 
(eds.). Happiness, Economics and Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 97-126. 
Galton, F., 1907. Vox populi. Nature 75: 450-451. 
Garber, P.M., 2000. Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Garcia-Ferrer, A., 2012. On Granger's predictability of financial markets in theory and 
practice. International Journal of Forecasting 28: 121-127. 
Garicano, L., Posner, R.A., 2005. Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics 
Perspective. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19: 151-170. 
Garratt, A., Mitchell, J., Vahey, S.P., Wakerly, E.C., 2011. Real-time inflation forecast 
densities from ensemble Phillips curves. The North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance 22: 77-87. 
Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J.M., 2006. Media Bias and Reputation. Journal of Political 
Economy 114: 280-316. 
Giles, J., 2011. Social science lines up its biggest challenges. Nature 470: 18-19. 
Ginsberg, J., Mohebbi, M.H., Patel, R.S., Brammer, L., Smolinski, M.S., Brilliant, L., 2009. 
Detecting influenza epidemics using search engine query data. Nature 457: 1012-
1014. 
Glaeser, J., Laudel, G., 2006. Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft. 
Gleason, C.A., Lee, C.M.C., 2003. Analyst forecast revisions and market price discovery. 
Accounting Review: 193-225. 
Goodhart, C., 1975. Problems of monetary management: the UK experience. Papers in 
Monetary Economics (Reserve Bank of Australia) 26: 219-245. 
  165 
Graham, J.R., 1999. Herding among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence. The 
Journal of Finance 54: 237-268. 
Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R., Rajgopal, S., 2005. The economic implications of corporate 
financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3-73. 
Granger, C.W., Newbold, P., 1974. Spurious regressions in econometrics. Journal of 
Econometrics 2: 111-120. 
Granovetter, M.S., 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. The American Journal of Sociology 78: 
1360-1380. 
Greene, W.H., 2003. Econometric Analysis. Massachusetts: Pearson Education  
Grinblatt, M., Titman, S., Wermers, R., 1995. Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio 
Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior. The American 
Economic Review 85: 1088-1105. 
Grossman, S.J., 1977. The existence of futures markets, noisy rational expectations and 
informational externalities. The Review of Economic Studies 44: 431-449. 
Grossman, S.J., Stiglitz, J.E., 1980. On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. 
The American Economic Review 70: 393-408. 
Groysberg, B., Healy, P.M., Maber, D.A., 2011. What Drives Sell-Side Analyst 
Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks? Journal of Accounting Research 49: 
969-1000. 
Grunberg, E., Modigliani, F., 1954. The predictability of social events. The Journal of 
Political Economy 62: 465-478. 
Grunberg, E., Modigliani, F., 1963. Economic forecasting when the subject of the forecast is 
influenced by the forecast: comment. The American Economic Review 53: 734-737. 
Guadalupe, M., Li, H., Wulf, J., 2012. Who lives in the c-suite? Organizational structure and 
the division of labor in top management. NBER Working paper. 
Hamilton, J.D., 2009. Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08. NBER Working 
paper. 
Hamilton, W.D., 1971. Geometry for the selfish herd. Journal of Theoretical Biology 31: 295-
311. 
Hands, D.W., 1990. Grunberg and Modigliani, Public Predictions, and the New Classical 
Macroeconomics. Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology 7: 
207-223. 
Hayward, M.L., Boeker, W., 1998. Power and conflicts of interest in professional firms: 
Evidence from investment banking. Administrative Science Quarterly: 1-22. 
Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G., 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 31: 405-440. 
Healy, P.M., Wahlen, J.M., 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13: 365-383. 
Heilemann, U., Stekler, H.O., 2012. Has The Accuracy of Macroeconomic Forecasts for 
Germany Improved? German Economic Review. 14: 235-253. 
  166 
Heisenberg, W., 1927. Ueber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik 
und Mechanik. Zeitschrift fuer Physik 43: 172-198. 
Helper, S., 2000. Economists and Field Research:" You Can Observe a Lot Just by 
Watching". The American Economic Review 90: 228-232. 
Henshel, R.L., 1993. Do self-fulfilling prophecies improve or degrade predictive accuracy? 
How sociology and economics can disagree and both be right. The Journal of Socio-
Economics 22: 85-104. 
Henshel, R.L., 1995. The Gruenberg/Modigliani and Simon possibility theorem: A social 
psychological critique. Journal of Socio-Economics 24: 501-520. 
Hertzberg, A., Liberti, J.M., Paravasini, D., 2010. Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: 
Evidence from Loan Office Rotation. Journal of Finance 65: 795-828. 
Hey, J.D., Morone, A., 2004. Do Markets Drive Out Lemmings‚or Vice Versa? Economica 
71: 637-659. 
Hilary, G., Hsu, C., 2013. Analyst Forecast Consistency. Journal of Finance 1: 271–297. 
Hirschman, A.O., 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty - Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hirshleifer, D., Hong Teoh, S., 2003. Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a 
Review and Synthesis. European Financial Management 9: 25-66. 
Hirshleifer, D., Hong Teoh, S., 2010. Psychological Influences on Financial Regulation and 
Policy. In: Baker K. & Nofsinger J.R. (eds.). Behavioral Finance: Investors, 
Corporations, and Markets. New York: Wiley. 151-167. 
Hirshleifer, D., Teoh, S.H., 2009. Thought and behavior contagion in capital markets. In: 
Hens T. & Schenk-Hoppé K.R. (eds.). Handbook of financial markets: Dynamics and 
evolution. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 2-46. 
Hong, H., Kacperczyk, M., 2010. Competition and bias. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
125: 1683-1726. 
Hong, H., Kubik, J.D., 2003. Analyzing the analysts: Career concerns and biased earnings 
forecasts. The Journal of Finance 58: 313-351. 
Hong, H., Kubik, J.D., Solomon, A., 2000. Security analysts' career concerns and herding of 
earnings forecasts. The Rand Journal of Economics 31: 121-144. 
Horowitz, N., 2011. Art of the Deal: contemporary art in a global financial market: Princeton 
University Press. 
Howitt, P., 2002. Looking Inside the Labor Market: A Review Article. Journal of Economic 
Literature 40: 125-138. 
Hribar, P., Jenkins, N.T., 2004. The effect of accounting restatements on earnings revisions 
and the estimated cost of capital. Review of Accounting Studies 9: 337-356. 
Jackson, A.R., 2005. Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell Side Analysts. The Journal of 
Finance 60: 673-717. 
Janis, I.L., 1972. Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Jegadeesh, N., Kim, W., 2010. Do analysts herd? An analysis of recommendations and market 
reactions. Review of Financial Studies 23: 901-937. 
  167 
Kahneman, D., 1992. Reference points, anchors, norms, and mixed feelings. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51: 296-312. 
Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C., 1985. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. The 
American Economic Review 75: 424-440. 
Katz, R., Lazo, J., 2011. The economic value of weather and climate forecasts. In: Clements 
M.P. & Hendry D.F. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Economic Forecasting. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ke, B., Petroni, K., Safieddine, A., 1999. Ownership concentration and sensitivity of 
executive pay to accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and 
privately-held insurance companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28: 185-
209. 
Kelly, B., Ljungqvist, A., 2007. The value of research. NYU Working Paper Series. 
Kemp, M.C., 1962. Economic forecasting when the subject of the forecast is influenced by 
the forecast. The American Economic Review 52: 492-496. 
Keynes, J.M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: 
Macmillan. 
Kim, A., Meschke, F., 2013. CEO Interviews on CNBC. Working Paper (SSRN). 
Kindleberger, C., 1978. Manias, Panics, and Crashes. New York: Wiley. 
King, M.F., Bruner, G.C., 2000. Social desirability bias: A neglected aspect of validity 
testing. Psychology & Marketing 17: 79-103. 
Kirschenheiter, M., Melumad, N.D., 2002. Can Big Bath‚ and Earnings Smoothing Co-exist 
as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies? Journal of Accounting Research 40: 
761-796. 
Kothari, S., 2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 31: 105-231. 
Krugman, P., 2007. Will there be a dollar crisis? Economic Policy 22: 435-467. 
Kuran, T., Sunstein, C.R., 1999. Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation. Stanford Law 
Review 51: 683-684. 
Kvale, S., 1996. Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. Thousand 
Oaks: SAGE. 
Lacko, J.M., Pappalardo, J.K., 2010. The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer 
Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled 
Experiment with Mortgage Borrowers. American Economic Review 100: 516. 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1992. The impact of institutional trading on stock 
prices. Journal of Financial Economics 32: 23-43. 
Lazear, E.P., Shaw, K., Stanton, C., 2013. Making Do With Less: Why Productivity Rises 
During Recessions. NBER Working paper. 
Le Bon, G., 1895. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. London: Ernst Benn. 
Lehman Brothers, 2007. Annual Report. 
Leibenstein, H., 1950. Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' 
Demand. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 64: 183-207. 
  168 
Lim, T., 2001. Rationality and analysts' forecast bias. The Journal of Finance 56: 369-385. 
Lin, H.-W., McNichols, M.F., 1998. Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts 
and investment recommendations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25: 101-127. 
Littig, B., 2002. Interviews mit Experten und Expertinnen. In: Bogner A., Littig B. & Menz 
W. (eds.). Das Experteninterview. Berlin: Springer. 191-206. 
Liu, X.G., Natarajan, R., 2012. The Effect of Financial Analysts' Strategic Behavior on 
Analysts' Forecast Dispersion. The Accounting Review 87: 2123-2149. 
Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., Wilhelm Jr, W.J., 2006. Competing for securities underwriting 
mandates: Banking relationships and analyst recommendations. The Journal of 
Finance 61: 301-340. 
Longstaff, F.A., 2010. The subprime credit crisis and contagion in financial markets. Journal 
of Financial Economics 97: 436-450. 
Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F., Helbing, D., 2011. How social influence can 
undermine the wisdom of crowd effect. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 108: 9020-9025. 
Lorge, I., Fox, D., Davitz, J., Brenner, M., 1958. A survey of studies contrasting the quality of 
group performance and individual performance, 1920-1957. Psychological Bulletin 
55: 337. 
Lucas Jr, R.E., 1976. Econometric policy evaluation: A critique. Carnegie-Rochester 
conference series on public policy: 19-46. Manchester: North-Holland. 
Machlup, F., 1955. The problem of verification in economics. Southern Economic Journal: 1-
21. 
Mackay, C., 1841. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. London: 
Office of the National Illustrated Library. 
MacKenzie, D.A., 2006. An engine, not a camera: how financial models shape markets. 
Boston: MIT Press. 
Malkiel, B.G., 1973. A Random Walk Down Wall Street. New York: Norton. 
Malloy, C.J., 2005. The geography of equity analysis. The Journal of Finance 60: 719-755. 
Malmendier, U., Shanthikumar, D.M., 2009. Do Security Analysts Speak In Two Tongues? 
Working Paper University of Berkeley. 
Malmendier, U., Shanthikumar, D.M., 2007. Do security analysts speak in two tongues? 
NBER Working paper. 
Marsden, P.V., Friedkin, N.E., 1993. Network studies of social influence. Sociological 
Methods & Research 22: 127-151. 
Mathis, J., McAndrews, J., Rochet, J.-C., 2009. Rating the raters: are reputation concerns 
powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? Journal of Monetary Economics 56: 
657-674. 
Matsumoto, D.A., 2002. Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The 
Accounting Review 77: 483-514. 
Mayring, P., 2000. Qualitative Content Analysis. Forum Qualitative Social Research 1: 1-11. 
Mayring, P., 2003. Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken. Weinheim: Beltz. 
  169 
McAllister, I., Studlar, D.T., 1991. Bandwagon, underdog, or projection? Opinion polls and 
electoral choice in Britain, 1979-1987. Journal of Politics 53: 720-741. 
McAndrew, C., Smith, J.L., Thompson, R., 2012. The impact of reserve prices on the 
perceived bias of expert appraisals of fine art. Journal of Applied Econometrics 27: 
235-252. 
McDonald, M.P., Thornburg, M.P., 2012. Interview Mode Effects The Case of Exit Polls and 
Early Voting. Public Opinion Quarterly 76: 326-349. 
Mehran, H., Stulz, R.M., 2007. The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. 
Journal of Financial Economics 85: 267-296. 
Mei, J., Moses, M., 2005. Vested interest and biased price estimates: Evidence from an 
auction market. The Journal of Finance 60: 2409-2435. 
Menkhoff, L., Taylor, M.P., 2007. The obstinate passion of foreign exchange professionals: 
technical analysis. Journal of Economic Literature: 936-972. 
Merton, R.K., 1936. The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. American 
Sociological Review 1: 894-904. 
Merton, R.K., 1948. The self-fulfilling prophecy. The Antioch Review 8: 193-210. 
Merton, R.K., Kendall, P.L., 1946. The Focused Interview. The American Journal of 
Sociology 51: 541-557. 
Miceli, M.P., Near, J.P., Dworkin, T.M.U., 2008. Whistle-blowing in organizations: 
Routledge. 
Michaely, R., Womack, K.L., 1999. Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter 
analyst recommendations. Review of Financial Studies 12: 653-686. 
Michaely, R., Womack, K.L., 2005. Brokerage Recommendations: Stylized Characteristics, 
Market Responses, and Biases. In: Thaler R.H. (ed.). Advances in Behavioral Finance. 
New York: Sage Foundation. 389-422. 
Mikhail, M.B., Walther, B.R., Willis, R.H., 1999. Does forecast accuracy matter to security 
analysts? The Accounting Review 74: 185-200. 
Milgrom, P.R., Weber, R.J., 1982. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. 
Econometrica: 1089-1122. 
Milliken, F.J., Morrison, E.W., Hewlin, P.F., 2003. An Exploratory Study of Employee 
Silence: Issues that Employees Donít Communicate Upward and Why. Journal of 
Management Studies 40: 1453-1476. 
Morck, R., 2008. Behavioral finance in corporate governance: economics and ethics of the 
devil's advocate. Journal of Management & Governance 12: 179-200. 
Morgenstern, O., 1928. Wirtschaftsprognose. Wien: Springer. 
Morris, S., Shin, H.S., 2002. Social value of public information. The American Economic 
Review 92: 1521-1534. 
Morrison, E.W., Milliken, F.J., 2000. Organizational silence: A barrier to change and 
development in a pluralistic world. Academy of Management Review: 706-725. 
Morrison, E.W., Milliken, F.J., 2003. Speaking up, remaining silent: The dynamics of voice 
and silence in organizations. Journal of Management Studies 40: 1353-1358. 
  170 
Morwitz, V.G., Pluzinski, C., 1996. Do polls reflect opinions or do opinions reflect polls? The 
impact of political polling on voters' expectations, preferences, and behavior. Journal 
of Consumer Research: 53-67. 
Muth, J.F., 1961. Rational expectations and the theory of price movements. Econometrica: 
315-335. 
Ng, S., Perron, P., 2001. Lag length selection and the construction of unit root tests with good 
size and power. Econometrica 69: 1519-1554. 
Noelle-Neumann, E., 1974. The Spiral of Silence: A theory of public opinion. Journal of 
Communication 24: 43-51. 
Noelle-Neumann, E., 1984. The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion - Our Social Skin. Chigago: 
Chigago University Press. 
Nofsinger, J.R., Sias, R.W., 1999. Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional and 
Individual Investors. The Journal of Finance 54: 2263-2295. 
North, D., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
O'Brien, P.C., 1990. Forecast accuracy of individual analysts in nine industries. Journal of 
Accounting Research: 286-304. 
O'Brien, P.C., McNichols, M.F., Hsiou Wei, L., 2005. Analyst impartiality and investment 
banking relationships. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 623-650. 
Oeller, L.-E., Barot, B., 2000. The accuracy of European growth and inflation forecasts. 
International Journal of Forecasting 16: 293-315. 
Parker, L.E., 1993. When to fix it and when to leave: Relationships among perceived control, 
self-efficacy, dissent, and exit. Journal of Applied Psychology 78: 949. 
Pfadenhauer, M., 2009. At Eye Level: The Expert Interview - A Talk between Expert and 
Quasi-expert. Houndmills New York: Palgrave/MacMillan. 
Phillips, D.J., Zuckerman, E.W., 2001. Middle-Status Conformity: Theoretical Restatement 
and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets. American Journal of Sociology 107: 
379-429. 
Pierdzioch, C., Ruelke, J.-C., Stadtmann, G., 2012. A Note on Forecasting Emerging Market 
Exchange Rates: Evidence of Anti-herding? Review of International Economics 20: 
974-984. 
Premeaux, S.F., Bedeian, A.G., 2003. Breaking the Silence: The Moderating Effects of Self 
Monitoring in Predicting Speaking Up in the Workplace. Journal of Management 
Studies 40: 1537-1562. 
Prendergast, C., 1993. A Theory of" Yes Men". The American Economic Review 83: 757-770. 
Prendergast, C., Stole, L., 1996. Impetuous youngsters and jaded old-timers: Acquiring a 
reputation for learning. Journal of Political Economy: 1105-1134. 
Rajan, R., Wulf, J., 2006. The flattening firm: Evidence on the changing nature of firm 
hierarchies from panel data. Review of Economics and Statistics 88: 759-773. 
Rajan, R., Zingales, L., 2001. The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins 
and Growth of Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 805-851. 
  171 
Rajan, R.G., 1994. Why bank credit policies fluctuate: a theory and some evidence. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 399-441. 
Rajan, R.G., 2012. Presidential Address: The Corporation in Finance. The Journal of Finance 
67: 1173-1217. 
Raman, K., 1981. Municipal Financial Reporting: Managing the Numbers. Public Budgeting 
& Finance 1: 56-61. 
Reinhart, C.M., Rogoff, K., 2009. This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly: 
Princeton University Press. 
Renneboog, L., Spaenjers, C., 2013. Buying beauty: On prices and returns in the art market. 
Management Science 59: 36-53. 
Repenning, N.P., Henderson, R.M., 2010. Making the Numbers? Short Termism‚ and the 
Puzzle of Only Occasional Disaster. NBER Working paper. 
Robert III, H.M., Robert, H.M., Robert, S.C., Evans, W.J., Honemann, D.H., Balch, T.J., 
2011. Robert's rules of order: Newly revised: Da Capo Press. 
Robinson, E., 2009. Research Renegades. Bloomberg Markets Magazine, October 9, 2009: 
32-44. 
Rost, K., Osterloh, M., 2009. Management fashion pay-for-performance for CEOs. 
Schmalenbach Business Review 61: 119-149. 
Rothschild, K.W., 1964. Cobweb cycles and partially correct forecasting. The Journal of 
Political Economy 72: 300-305. 
Roubini, N., Setser, B., 2004. The United States as a Debtor Nation: The Sustainability of the 
US External Imbalances. Draft. New York University, New York. 
Ryan, K.D., Oestreich, D.K., 1991. Driving fear out of the workplace: How to overcome the 
invisible barriers to quality, productivity, and innovation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Salganik, M.J., Dodds, P.S., Watts, D.J., 2006. Experimental study of inequality and 
unpredictability in an artificial cultural market. Science 311: 854-856. 
Samuelson, P.A., 1965. Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly. 
Industrial Management Review 6 
Samuelson, P.A., 1974. Challenge to judgment. The Journal of Portfolio Management 1: 17-
19. 
Sarno, L., Taylor, M.P., 2001. Official intervention in the foreign exchange market: is it 
effective and, if so, how does it work? Journal of Economic Literature 39: 839-868. 
Scharfstein, D.S., Stein, J.C., 1990. Herd Behavior and Investment. The American Economic 
Review 80: 465-479. 
Schooler, J.W., Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., 2003. The pursuit and assessment of happiness 
can be self-defeating. The Psychology of Economic Decisions 1: 41-70. 
Schulz-Hardt, S., Brodbeck, F.C., Mojzisch, A., Kerschreiter, R., Frey, D., 2006. Group 
decision making in hidden profile situations: Dissent as a facilitator for decision 
quality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91: 1080-1098. 
Shiller, R.J., 1995. Conversation, information, and herd behavior. The American Economic 
Review 85: 181-185. 
  172 
Shiller, R.J., 2005. Irrational exuberance (2nd): Random House Digital, Inc. 
Silver, N., 2012. The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail-but Some Don't: 
Penguin Press. 
Simon, H.A., 1954. Bandwagon and underdog effects and the possibility of election 
predictions. Public Opinion Quarterly 18: 245-253. 
Simpson, A., forthcoming. Does Investor Sentiment Affect Earnings Management? Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting 
Sinha, P., Brown, L.D., Das, S., 1997. A Re-Examination of Financial Analysts' Differential 
Earnings Forecast Accuracy. Contemporary Accounting Research 14: 1-42. 
Sockin, M., Xiong, W., 2013. Feedback effects of commodity futures prices. NBER Working 
paper. 
Soros, G., 1987. The alchemy of finance: Reading the mind of the market. New York: Wiley. 
Stanley, J.D., 1981. Dissent in Organizations. Academy of Management Review: 13-19. 
Stein, J.C., 2002. Information production and capital allocation: Decentralized versus 
hierarchical firms. The Journal of Finance 57: 1891-1921. 
Strasser, G., Titus, W., 1985. Pooling of unshared information in group decision making. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 
Sudman, S., 1986. Do exit polls influence voting behavior? Public Opinion Quarterly 50: 
331-339. 
Surowiecki, J., 2005. The wisdom of crowds. New York: Anchor. 
Tajfel, H., Turner, J.C., 1986. The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In: Austin 
W.G. & Worchel S. (eds.). Psychology of intergroup relations. Burnham: Nelson-Hall 
Publishers. 
Tangirala, S., Ramanujam, R., 2008. Exploring nonlinearity in employee voice: The effects of 
personal control and organizational identification. The Academy of Management 
Journal 51: 1189-1203. 
Temin, P., Voth, H.-J., 2004. Riding the south sea bubble. American Economic Review 94 
The Economist, 2009. Please do feed the bears. The Economist, October 3, 2009: 16-16. 
The Economist, 2013. Missing the mat. The Economist, July 20, 2013: 86-87. 
Toonkel, J., 2012. Morgan Stanley's Facebook analyst: sober man in world of hype. Reuters, 
May 31, 2012.  
Topchik, G.S., 2007. The first-time manager's guide to team building. Washington: 
AMACOM. 
Trueman, B., 1994. Analyst forecasts and herding behavior. Review of Financial Studies 7: 
97-124. 
Vahey, S., Wakerly, L., 2013. Moving towards probability forecasting. BIS Working Papers 
70. 
Veblen, T., 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. New 
York: Dover. 
Venn, J., 1866. Logic of Chance. Lond and Cambridge: MacMillan and Co. 
  173 
Vogel, L., 2007. How do the OECD Growth Projections for the G7 Economies Perform?: A 
Post-Mortem. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Welch, I., 1992. Sequential sales, learning, and cascades. The Journal of Finance 47: 695-
732. 
Welch, I., 2000. Herding among security analysts. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 369-
396. 
Wenzelburger, J., 2006. Learning in economic systems with expectations feedback. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Wermers, R., 1995. Herding, Trade Reversals, and Cascading by Institutional Investors. 
Working Paper, University of Colorado. 
Westphal, J.D., Clement, M.B., 2008. Sociopolitical dynamics in relations between top 
managers and security analysts: favor rendering, reciprocity, and analyst stock 
recommendations. The Academy of Management Journal 51: 873-897. 
Wilcox, C., 2010. Groupthink: An Impediment to Success: Xlibris Corporation. 
Williamson, O., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New 
York: Free Press. 
Withey, M., Cooper, W., 1989. Predicting exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 34: 1-539. 
Womack, K.L., 1996. Do brokerage analysts' recommendations have investment value? The 
Journal of Finance 51: 137-167. 
Zarnowitz, V., 1992. Facts and Factors in the Modern Evolution of US Economic 
Fluctuations. In: Zarnowitz V. (ed.). Business Cycles: Theory, History, Indicators, and 
Forecasting. Chigago: University of Chicago Press. 77-124. 
Zwiebel, J., 1995. Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation. The Journal of 
Political Economy 103: 1-25. 
 
 
 
 
  174 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A to Chapter 3 
Appendix A1: Interview Procedure and Data Analysis 
To generate a systematic and replicable qualitative analysis, the in-depth interviews were 
conducted following the method of “focused interviews” (Merton and Kendall 1946, p. 541). 
Focused interviews are conducted as individual, face-to-face interviews in which the 
interviewer poses questions in accordance with a previously designed interview guide. In our 
case, this guide was based on the propositions which are derived from the theories on herding 
behavior and closely related areas reviewed in Chapter 2 and 3. The interview guide is 
provided in Appendix A.2. In the literature, the term focused interview is often used 
interchangeably with the term “semistructured interview” (see, e.g., Merton and Kendal 1946, 
p. 546; Kvale 1996, p. 5). Both terms imply that the interviewer uses an interview guide to 
pose the questions in a previously defined form while the question sequence can be varied 
according to the interview situation and the respondent can answer with free-form responses 
(Glaeser and Laudel 2006, p. 39).  
There are four reasons why we decided to employ a qualitative study using focused 
interviews. Firstly, Merton and Kendall (1946, p. 541) suggest the use of focused interviews 
because “the array of reported responses to this situation enables the investigator to test the 
validity of hypotheses derived from […] social psychological theory”, which is similar to our 
context here. Secondly, we refrained from sending questionnaires to organizations because it 
is unclear whether an addressee responds personally to the questions or one of his or her 
subordinates, in particular if the addressee is of high rank. Thirdly, as we aimed to interview a 
broad range of people in diverse positions and organizations, it was important to have the 
flexibility to react to the respondents’ answers and adapt to the diverse situations they 
described. This is only possible in face-to-face interviews, where the interviewer can pose an 
additional question to clarify a narrated situation (see, e.g., Bewley 1998, p. 472). Fourthly, 
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due to this flexibility and the meeting with the interviewee, the interviewer gains additional 
information about the environment the respondent is working in, which helps to correctly 
compare and link the statements provided across the various interviews (see, e.g., Helper 
2000; Diekman 2001, p. 371-381). 
Although research in economics is usually seen as a strictly quantitative matter, there are 
prominent examples in which economists have employed interview surveys to explore a 
phenomenon, test the external validity of an economic concept and further economic theory. 
Famous examples include Blinder and Choi’s (1990) and later Bewley’s (1999) interview 
surveys on sticky wages in labor economics, an area well known for its quantitative empirical 
rigor. More recent examples of interview surveys are Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007; 2010) 
analysis of management practices or Lacko and Pappalardo’s (2010) work on the use of 
mandated consumer mortgage disclosures.  
 
Sample selection 
Bewley (1998) clearly stated that his sample is far from random, because many randomly 
selected, possible respondents refused to give an interview due to time constraints or other 
demurs. He explains that “the best information [to a find an interview partner] was word of 
mouth […], and a nearly sure way to obtain an interview was a personal contact who was 
trusted by the respondent […]. I therefore arranged as many interviews as possible through 
family, friends, and acquaintances, including people I had interviewed, always targeting the 
categories of firms I had in mind.” (Bewley 1998, p. 473). We did exactly the same when 
arranging our interviews. We are left with a sample that is non-random but structured in the 
dimensions of the size of the financial services providers (number of employees) and the rank 
and position of the respondent. Thus, we are able to provide a comprehensive, balanced and 
insightful sample. 
 
Interview procedure and data analysis 
All but three of the focused interviews were conducted in the respondents’ offices or meeting 
rooms of their employers, financial providers located in Zurich, Switzerland. One of the 
remaining interviews took place in the respondent’s home and two of them in the 
interviewers’ office at the University of Zurich. The interviews were conducted in German in 
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accordance with the interview guide (see Appendix A2) They were digitally recorded and 
literally transcribed by the author, resulting in more than 300 pages of interview text. One of 
the respondents refused to be recorded. In this instance, the interviewer took detailed notes 
during the interview.  
The data analysis was then coded following Mayring’s (2003, p. 92-99) “scaled and 
structured content analysis”. In order to present the analysis in a reproducible form, each step 
is shortly described. As Mayring’s book (2003) is held in German, the terms are translated in 
accordance to Mayring’s earlier summary in English (2000): 
 
4. Definition of the unit of analysis: Interview transcripts of the twelve interviews. 
5. Definition of the dimensions of assessment: The dimensions were defined as the 
degree of acceptance for a specific proposition. For example, the dimension of 
Proposition P2 – The larger the organization is, the higher are the costs of non-
herding – is the degree to which the respondent accepts that the employees’ costs of 
non-herding are increasing in the size of the organization (i.e. the number of 
employees). 
6. Definition of the scaled categories of dimensions: For each of the dimensions (step 2.), 
a corresponding scale was defined. In general, the scale of the answers to the 
propositions was defined by five categories, namely strong affirmation, weak 
affirmation, denial of influence (respondent sees no influence of the proposed factor), 
strong contrariwise effect, or weak contrariwise effect (respondent sees an influence in 
the opposite direction).  
7. Formulating the definitions and rules for coding and identification of typical examples 
from the interviews: This step of the procedure shows how systematic and replicable 
the scaled and structured content analysis is. The coding rules enable a reproduction of 
the coding by any other researcher. The coding rules define the scales and categories 
by which the respondents answers are coded for each dimension. This procedure is 
also supported by “prototypical statements” (Mayring 2000, p. 3), which are extracted 
from the interviews and used as an appropriate example for a specific coding rule. An 
example of a coding rule is provided in Appendix A3.  
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8. First filtering of the data and marking of important text passages: The transcripts have 
been filtered and all test passages that were related to any of the dimensions (step 2.) 
have been marked.  
9. Second filtering of the data and coding of the important text passages: All the marked 
text passages from step 5. are coded in accordance with the coding rules. 
10. Revision and adaptation of the coding rules: After the coding of about fifty percent of 
the transcripts, the coding rules are revised and, if necessary, adapted to arrive at a 
stricter and more systematic and comprehensible set of coding rules. This incremental 
process increases the reproducibility of the coding results (see, Mayring 2003, p. 53). 
11. Final coding and quantitative analysis of the results: On the basis of the revised 
coding rules, a final coding is made for all the marked text passages. All the coded 
passages of an interview that have been assigned to the same dimension are 
quantitatively assessed by identifying the most often answers to a certain proposition. 
This leads to the final classification if the respondent generally affirms or denies a 
proposition. It is important that this technique uses all text passages that relate to a 
particular dimension (i.e. proposition) and not only the passages that follow directly 
after the question (concerning the proposition) was posed. This helps to identify the 
reliability of the respondents’ answers. Contradictory statements are classified as 
undecided. 
 
Generalizability of results and possible biases 
The number of interviews was defined on the basis of the different categories of financial 
service providers and of the functions and positions the respondents are working in. 
Considering also the enormous effort involved in finding a respondent, conducting the 
interview, transcribing the tape and coding the data, twelve interviews seemed to be a 
reasonable number. “In current [psychological] interview studies, the number of interviews 
tend to be around 15 plus-minus 10” (Kvale 1996, p. 102). As this interview study analyzes 
propositions derived from sociopsychological theories, we can certainly compare its scope 
with the scope of psychological studies. Kvale (1996, p. 102-103) argues further that small 
numbers of interviews can also provide valuable insights into tendencies and mechanisms of 
human behavior. In economics, the picture is similar. For example Blinder and Choi (1990) 
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conducted 19 interviews in their study on economic theories of wage stickiness. Hence, based 
on this reasoning, we think that we are able to use the results of our interview survey to 
provide tendencies in difference and congruence between theory and practice on human 
herding behavior.  
 There are several possible biases when using interviews to test propositions. As an 
interview is always conducted in a certain social environment, it can be biased by many 
different factors, such as age, sex, status, and group membership among others (see, e.g., 
Littig 2002; Pfadenhauer 2009). The social environment can trigger a social desirability bias 
(King and Bruner 2000). In addition, Howitt (2002) states that economists are generally 
skeptical about results from interview surveys. He uses the example of Bewley’s (1999) 
interview study on sticky wages and names three major drawbacks. First, Bewley’s interviews 
are not structured. Second, Bewley’s interview analysis is not structured either. Third, Bewley 
asked his respondents not only about what they did but also what they think they would do. 
Our interview study does not have such drawbacks. In contrast to Bewley, we employed 
focused, semistructured interviews, used a highly structured, reproducible method for the 
analysis and did not ask the respondents about what they think, but only about their 
experience. However, while we have to acknowledge that our results might also be biased by 
social desirability, we argue that the bias is low, due to three facts. Firstly, the questions did 
not address issues of high moral standards, nor were they embarrassing for the respondents. In 
addition, the questions are formulated in an objective and impartial form which does not 
suggest any desirability, i.e. that a particular kind of response is preferable (see Diekmann 
2001, p. 391-399). Secondly, the interviews are conducted in a business context, in which the 
respondents are used to the question-and-answer structure of an interview. Thirdly, the 
respondents did not have to fear any consequences as we, the interviewers, did not know their 
supervisors, are not involved in their business network, and were able to assure full 
anonymity. In addition, two of them were already retired, implying even weaker incentives to 
whitewash the issues in question.  
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Appendix A2: Interview guide 
Dissertationsprojekt: “The Costs of Non-Herding” 
Von Reto Cueni 
Lerhstuhl von Prof. Dr. Bruno S. Frey 
 
Interviewleitfragen 
(Please see below for the English translation) 
 
à Dieses Interview findet im Rahmen meines Dissertationsprojektes 
statt. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen werden von mir hoch vertraulich 
behandelt; die Interviews werden nur anonymisiert weiterverwendet. 
Einleitende Fragen: 
E1:  Was würde Sie unter “Herdenverhalten auf den Finanzmärkten” 
 verstehen?  
E2:  Kommt Ihrer Meinung nach solches Verhalten tatsächlich vor 
 und wenn ja, wie entsteht es? 
à Überleiten auf “Herdenverhalten in Unternehmungen” 
F1: Sind Ihnen Situationen bekannt, in denen Mitarbeitende bei einer 
 Entscheidungsfindung (in Meetings, Gremien oder ähnlich) 
 eigene Bedenken und kritische Meinungen nicht eingebracht 
 haben? 
àWenn ja, weiter:                  (Wenn Nein àF7) 
F2:  Haben diese Mitarbeitenden dann dadurch eine Entscheidung 
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 begünstigt, die diese selbst eigentlich als falsch eingeschätzt 
 haben? 
F3: Gab es Situationen, die wegen der nicht geäusserten Bedenken 
 von Mitarbeitenden und somit aufgrund dieser fehlenden 
 Informationen zu falschen Entscheidungen geführt haben? 
F4: Wie würden Sie solche Situationen beschreiben? Gibt es spezifi-
 sche Merkmale?  
(à spezifische Merkmale abfragen wenn unklare Antwort) 
F5:  Wie würden Sie ein solches Verhalten von eigentlich kritischen, 
 aber schweigenden Mitarbeitenden erklären?  
(Spezifische Gründe?  à Wenn befraget Person ähnliche Begriffe wie Kosten nennt 
(Risiko, Angst ausgestossen zu werden, etc.) für Klärung nachfragen 
F6:  (Wenn nicht schon erwähnt in F4) Sind Ihnen Situationen bekannt, 
 in denen solche fehlenden kritischen Stimmen oder falschen 
 Entscheidungen es den kritischen Mitarbeitenden immer weiter 
 erschwert haben ihre gegensätzlichen Meinungen zu äussern und 
 sich dadurch die falschen Entscheidungen immer weiter verstärkt 
 haben? 
(Kettenreaktion, Verstärkung → Herdenverhalten) 
F7:à(Wenn nein bei F1) 
 Denken Sie es gibt Gründe dafür, dass das oben beschriebene 
 Verhalten in Ihrem Umfeld (Organisation) nicht vorkommt? 
(àGibt es vielleicht „ähnliche“ Situationen bei Ihnen à würden Sie diese aber 
eventuell anders beschreiben?) 
F8:  Welche Faktoren sind Ihrer Meinung nach entscheidend, dass die
 Mitarbeitenden in einer Unternehmung ihre persönlichen 
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 Standpunkte vertreten und kritische Meinungen äussern  können? 
(à spezifische Faktoren!) 
F9:  Kennen Sie aufgrund Ihrer Erfahrung bestimmte Typen von 
 Banken oder anderen Firmen in der Finanzwirtschaft in denen 
 kritische Meinungen nicht oder nur sehr schwer geäussert werden 
 können. à Was haben diese Banken für Merkmale ? 
(à spezifische Faktoren!) 
F10: Kennen Sie aufgrund Ihrer Erfahrung bestimmte Typen von 
 Mitarbeitenden, die besonders dazu neigen, ihre kritischen 
 Meinungen nicht zu äussern in Diskussionen, Meetings, etc. (>in 
 Situationen der Entscheidungsfindung)  
 à Was haben diese Arbeitenden für Merkmale? 
(à spezifische Faktoren!) 
F11: (Für die kommenden Fragen): Wie würden Sie unsere 
 Determinanten (Gründe) beurteilen, dass in einer Bank kritische 
 Stimmen eher geäussert werden?  
  (Bitte geben Sie an, ob die Richtung des Effektes für Sie stimmt und wie 
 wichtig sie die Determinante einschätzen) 
F11.1: Hierarchie 
 Je weniger hierarchisch organisiert (weniger authoritär) eine 
 Bank ist, desto eher können kritische Meinungn innerhalb ihrer 
 Organisation geäussert werden. 
F11.2: Grösse der Bank 
 Je kleiner die Bank, desto besser können kritische Stimmen 
 geäussert werden. à gemessen an Anzahl Mitarbeiter 
F11.3: Zusammensetzung der Eigentümerschaft  
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 Banken im privaten Besitz geben den Mitarbeitenden ein  besseres 
 Umfeld um sich kritisch zu äussern, als börsenkotierte
 Unternehmen 
F11.4: Personalwesen: 
F11.4.1: Lohnpolitik: Je weniger variable Lohnanteile (Boni) desto eher 
    werden kritischen Meinungen geäussert. 
F11.4.2: (Nachhaken) Kennen Sie Unternehmen, die eine Personal-
 Strategie verfolgen, indem sie gezielt Mitarbeitende auswählen, 
 die eher dazu neigen sich kritisch zu äussern? 
F11.5:  Risikomanagement:  
F11.5.1: Das Risikomanagement hat die institutionalisierte Aufgabe des 
 “Advocatus Diaboli”, darum interessiert mich dort spezifisch, 
 welche Merkmale Sie in einer Bank als unabdingbar für das Risk 
 Management einschätzen, um diese Rolle wahrzunehmen und 
 auch kritische  Meinungen zu äussern. Haben. Sie bestimmte 
 Erfahrungen damit gemacht? 
F11.5.2: Hat der Grad der Unabhängigkeit des Riskomanagements 
 innerhalb der Organisation Einfluss auf den Schwierigkeitsgrad 
 für Mitarbeitenden ihre kritischen Meinungen zu äussern? 
(Das Riskomanagement könnte den Mitarbeitenden als Basis dienen, um ihre 
kritischen Meinungen zu äussern in einem Entscheidungsprozess.) 
F11.6: Haben Sie weitere Anmerkungen zu diesen Determinanten oder 
 andere Ideen dafür? 
F12 (Für die kommenden Fragen) Wie würden Sie unsere individuellen 
 Determinanten beurteilen, dass die Mitarbeitenden einer Bank ihre 
 kritische Stimmen eher äussern werden? Hier geht es mir um die 
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 persönlichen Faktoren der Menschen: 
(Bitte geben Sie an, ob die Richtung des Effektes für Sie stimmt und wie wichtig sie 
die Determinante einschätzen 
F12.1: Je besser ausgebildet desto eher sagen die Mitarbeitenden ihre   
   kritischen Meinungen. 
F12.2: Je älter desto eher sagen die Mitarbeitenden ihre      
 kritischen Meinungen. 
F12.3: Je erfahrener in der ausübenden Tätigkeit desto eher sagen die 
 Mitarbeitenden ihre kritischen Meinungen. 
F12.4: Je höher in der Hierarchie desto eher sagen die Mitarbeitenden 
 ihre kritischen Meinungen. 
F12.5:  Je vermögender desto eher sagen die Mitarbeitenden ihre   
   kritischen Meinungen. 
F12.6: Je länger in der Firma desto eher sagen die Mitarbeitenden ihre  
  kritischen Meinungen. 
F12.7: Haben Sie weitere Anmerkungen zu diesen Determinanten oder 
  andere Ideen dafür? 
F13: Haben Sie sonstige Anmerkungen? 
à zum Forschungsthema 
à zur Art meines Vorgehens 
à zu anderen, verwandten Themen 
à Was würde Sie besonders interssierten in diesem Themenfeld des 
Herdenverhaltens von Mitarbeitern und generell von Herdenverhalten auf 
Finanzmärkten? 
Herzlichen Dank, dass Sie sich Zeit für meine Forschung nehmen! 
(Please see below for the English translation) 
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Dissertation project: “The Costs of Non-Herding” 
by Reto Cueni 
Chair of Prof. Dr. Bruno S. Frey / University of Zurich 
 
Interview guide   
(Translated copy, see German version for original) 
 
à This interview is part of my dissertation project. All recordings are strictly 
confidential; the interviews will be used only in anonymous form. 
Introducing questions: 
E1:  What do you think of when you hear about herding behavior on  financial 
markets?  
E2:  From your point of view, does such behavior exist and, if yes, how 
 does it originate? 
à skip to Herding behavior in organizations 
F1: Are you aware of situations in which employees did not  communicate 
 their concerns or criticism during a decision-making process (in 
 meetings, in boards, etc.)? 
àIf YES, continue:                  (if NO àF7) 
F2:  Did these employees support a decision which they privately perceived 
as a wrong one?  
F3: Were there situations that led to wrong decisions because 
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 employees did not communicate their private information or their 
 objections during the decision-making process?  
F4: How would you describe such situations? Are there specific 
 characteristics or mechanisms?  
(àask for specifics if answers are unclear) 
F5:  How would you explain the employees’ behavior of holding a critical 
 opinion but not communicating their objections or critical private 
 information)?  
(Specific reasons? à If respondent uses terms similar to costs (risks, fear of being/becoming 
a loner etc.) ask for specification)  
F6:  (If not already mentioned in F4 ) Are you aware of situations in  which the 
 employee’s silence at the beginning of the decision-making process 
 started to increase the costs of non-herding, leading to a reinforcement of 
 wrong opinions later in the process? 
(Chain reaction, Reinforcement à Herding behavior) 
F7:(à If NO in F1): 
 Do you know why the herding behavior described does  not occur in 
 your organization? 
(àMaybe you are aware of similar situations, which you would describe differently) 
F8:  Which factors are important in creating an organization in which the 
 employees can communicate their private information and objections?  
(à Ask for specific factors!) 
F9:  Are you aware of specific types of banks or other financial service 
 providers whose employees cannot communicate their criticism or can 
 only do so against high resistance ?  
(àAsk for specific characteristics!) 
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F10: Are you aware of specific types of employees who are particularly prone 
 to remaining silent and not communicating criticism against a prevailing 
 opinion during a decision-making process (in meetings, boards, etc.)  
(Ask for specific characteristics!) 
F11: (In the following set of questions):  How would you assess our 
 institutional determinants of employees’ difficulties when they want to 
 communicate criticism in a bank or a financial service provider, in 
 your experience?  
(à Please indicate if you agree on the direction of the effect and how strong you experienced 
the impact of the determinant) 
F11.1: Hierarchy 
The flatter the hierarchy in an organization (more decentralized), the easier for 
the employees to communicate their criticism in a decision-making process 
F11.2: Bank size  
The smaller the organization, the easier for the employees to communicate their 
criticism in a decision-making process  à Size measured as the number of 
employees 
F11.3: Ownership structure 
Privately held banks provide a better environment (make it easier) than publicly 
listed banks for the employees to communicate their criticism in a decision-
making process. 
F11.4: Human Resource Management 
F11.4.1: Wage policy: The lower the part of the salary that is performance 
related, the easier for the employees to communicate their criticism in a 
decision-making process 
F11.4.2: (Follow-up question) Are you aware that your company pursues a HR 
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strategy to select a special type of employees who are more prone to 
communicate critical private information and criticism in a decision-making 
process? 
F11.5:  Risk Management:  
F11.5.1: The risk management plays the institutionalized role of a devils 
advocate in a bank or a financial service provider. Thus, I am interested in the 
characteristics that are important for the risk management to fulfill its role and to 
be able to communicate information against a prevailing opinion. What is your 
experience in this matter? 
F11.5.2: Does the degree of independence of risk management in the 
organization also influence the degree of difficulties employees in 
communicating criticism in general?  
(Because the risk management might provide employees with a basis for expressing a critical 
perspective during a decision-making process.) 
F11.6: Have you further ideas or suggestions regarding institutional 
determinants? 
F12 (In the following set of questions):  How would you assess our individual 
determinants of employees’ difficulties if they want to communicate criticism in 
a bank or a financial service provider in accordance with your experience?  
(à Please indicate if you agree on the direction of the effect and how strongly you 
experienced the impact of the determinant) 
F12.1: The higher the employee’s education, the easier for him or her to 
communicate criticism during a decision-making process. 
F12.2: The older the employee, the easier for him or her to communicate 
criticism during a decision-making process. 
F12.3: The more experienced the employee in a certain job, the easier for him or 
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her to communicate criticism during a decision-making process. 
F12.4: The higher an employee’s hierarchical position in the organization, the 
easier for him or her to communicate criticism during a decision-making 
process. 
F12.5:  The wealthier the employee, the easier for him or her to communicate 
criticism during a decision-making process. 
F12.6: The higher the employee’s tenure in an organization, the easier for him or 
her to communicate criticism during a decision-making process. 
F12.7: Have you further ideas or suggestions regarding individual determinants? 
F13: Have you other suggestions? 
à on the research topic… 
à on the interview procedure… 
à on related topics… 
à What would be your aim in an analysis of the topic of employees’ herding 
behavior and herding behavior in financial markets in general? 
Thank you very much for your time! 
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Appendix A3: Example of coding rules 
 
Kodierung (nach 
betref. Hypothese)  
(Coding in accordance 
with proposition)
Ausprägung/Kategorie 
(Scale/category) Definition (definition) Ankerbeispiel (prototypical example)
Interviewnummer / 
Zeilennummer  (Number 
of the interview / of the 
line)
zusätzliche 
Kodierregel  
(additional coding 
rules)
1 Starke Zustimmung 
(strong affirmation)
Grösse des Unternehmens hat 
starken Einfluss auf die CONH 
der MA (Size of organization 
has strong influence on 
employees' CONH)
Also sicher was das GEHÖR für kritische Meinungen angeht, 
da ist es sicher so, dass in kleineren Banken das gesagte 
eher Zuhörer findet. ("Surely, if it's about people listening 
more to critical voices in smaller banks, then for sure it is that 
way.")
12/601 Keine (None)
2 Schwache 
Zustimmung (weak 
affirmation)
Grösse des Unternehmens hat 
etwas Einfluss auf die CONH 
der MA (Size of organization 
has some influence on 
employees' CONH)
"Also ich denke das hat einerseits mit der grösse des 
Institutes zu tun, [...]".  ("Well, I think that the size of the 
organization is somewhat linked [...].")
10/433 Keine (None)
3 Verneinung des 
Einflusses  (Denial of 
influence)
Grösse des Unternehmens hat 
keinen Einfluss auf die CONH 
der MA (Size of organization 
has no influence on 
employees' CONH)
 "Das ist keine Frage der Grösse, auch in grösseren Banken 
unterscheidet sich der tägliche Umgang nicht von kleineren."   
(“This is not a matter of size; normally even in big banks the 
daily work environment does not differ between a big bank 
and an institute of small or medium size.")
11/505 Keine (None)
4 Schwacher 
entgegengesetzer Effekt 
(weak contrariwise 
effect)
Grösse des Unternehmens hat 
schwachen entgegengesetzen 
Einfluss auf die CONH der MA 
(Size of organization has 
strong contrariwise influence 
on employees' CONH)
-kein Beispiel-  (-no example-) - Keine (None)
5 Starker 
entgegengesetzter 
Effekt (strong 
contrariwise effect)
Grösse des Unternehmens hat 
starken entgegengesetzer 
Einfluss auf die CONH der MA 
(Size of organization has 
strong contrariwise influence 
on employees' CONH)
-kein Beispiel-  (-no example-) - Keine (None)
Kodierleitfaden - skalierend-strukturierende Inhaltsanalyse  (coding rules - scaled and structured content analyse)
Proposition P2
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Appendix B to Chapter 4 
Appendix B1: Additional Explanation for the Measure of Analysts’ Herding Behavior 
We follow Gleason and Lee (2003) and Clement and Tse (2005) in measuring the herding 
behavior of analysts’ earnings estimates. The measure is illustrated in Figure B1. Imagine 
analyst i issues an EPS forecast on a stock j, pictured as estimate A (red dots) in Figure B1. 
Afterwards, many other analysts who cover the same stock j release their earnings estimates 
(blue dots). These estimates of the other analysts are used to generate the consensus. The 
revision of analyst i estimate (A) on stock j is depicted with two red dots (B). The binominal 
herding measure takes the value 1 if the forecast (B) of analyst i deviates both from his or her 
own most recent forecast (A) and from the consensus. All other estimates of analyst i that lie 
in the dashed area of the figure are defined as herding forecasts. 
 
Figure B1: Additional Figure to Explain Herding Measure 
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Appendix B2: 
Table B2: Additional Descriptive Statistics for Financial Coverage Subsample 
  
Panel E: Financial Coverage (Privately held)
(N=5,417)
Variables Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
Bold 0.78 0 1 1 1 1
BrokerSize 20.35 1 11 20 27 61
LagAccuracy 0.69 0.00 0.50 0.82 0.97 1.00
DaysElapsed 15.65 1 2 6 20 90
Horizon 96.45 31 61 71 117 346
Frequency 4.44 2 3 4 5 21
GenExperience 5.13 0 3 4 7 23
FirmExperience 3.10 0 1 2 4 21
Companies 18.43 1 13 18 22 51
Industries 2.80 1 2 2 3 22
Lead_Underwriter 0.61 0 0 1 1 1
Co_Underwriter 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Syndicate_Member 0.10 0 0 0 0 1
No_Underwriting 0.10 0 0 0 0 1
Panel F: Financial Coverage (Publicly listed)
(N=16,406)
Variables Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
Bold 0.77 0 1 1 1 1
BrokerSize 71.59 1 30 55 113 229
LagAccuracy 0.72 0.00 0.57 0.84 0.97 1.00
DaysElapsed 12.42 1 1 5 15 90
Horizon 94.18 31 60 69 98 348
Frequency 4.58 2 3 4 6 21
GenExperience 6.07 0 3 5 8 26
FirmExperience 3.81 0 1 3 5 24
Companies 19.08 1 13 18 23 87
Industries 2.84 1 2 3 3 22
Lead_Underwriter 0.80 0 1 1 1 1
Co_Underwriter 0.11 0 0 0 0 1
Syndicate_Member 0.02 0 0 0 0 1
No_Underwriting 0.08 0 0 0 0 1
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the full sample (Panel A), the subsample of analysts covering
the financial sector (Panel B), the subsamples of analysts from privately held (Panel C) and publicly listed
brokers (Panel D), and the subsamples of analysts covering the financial sector from privately held (Panel E)
and publicly listed brokers (Panel F). We retain only the last forecast an analyst i is issuing on a specific stock
j in year t. The variable Bold equals 1 if the analyst’s revised estimate deviates from both his last estimate and
the prerevision consensus estimate, and 0 otherwise (see also Figure 1). Private equals 1 if the broker is
privately held, and 0 if the broker is either a listed company or owned by a listed company. BrokerSize is the 
number of analysts employed at a specific broker. LagAccuracy is analyst i's last year accuracy on stock j. 
DaysElapsed is the number of days that are elapsed between analyst i's forecast an the most recent forecast of
another analyst. Horizon is the number of days analyst i's forecast is issued before the end of the financial
period. Frequency is the number of forecasts analyst i makes during the financial year t for a stock j. 
FirmExperience is the number of consecutive years analyst i covers stock j. GenExperience is the number of
consecutive years in which analyst i filed at least one forecast in the Institutional Brokerage Estimation
System (IBES) since 1983. Companies and Industries are the numbers of stocks and sectors, respectively,
which are covered by analyst i. Lead_Underwriter, Co_Manager, and Syndicate_Member equal 1 if the
brokerage house acts in year t as either a lead underwriter, a co-manager, or a syndicate member in a U.S. IPO
or SEO. No_Underwriting equals 1 if the brokerage house is not engaged in underwriting activities in year t.  
Data sources: I/B/E/S, SDC Platinum Database, own compilation based on information from FINRA, FFIEC,
SEC, Bloomberg Businessweek, Lexis Nexis, Wikipedia and company home pages.
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Appendix C to Chapter 6 
Appendix C1:  
Table C1: Regression of Forecast Error on Time (Years) for Three Different Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: Yearly Median of AFEP
Variables Weather Art Finance
Year -0.000058*** 0.0061 0.0047*
(-3.04) (1.54) (1.92)
Constant 0.120645*** -12.038 -9.3873*
(23.82) (1.50) (-1.90)
Observations 12 12 12
Adj. R2 0.43 0.11 0.19
Notes: The table reports OLS coefficient estimates, and t-values in parentheses. The models
Weather, Art, Finance correspond to the respective data samples. The regression model is
always the estimation of the Yearly Median of AFEP on Year and a constant. The dependent
variable Yearly Median of AFEP is calculated as the median absolute forecast error in
percentage of the actual outcome per calender year of the respective sample for weather
forecasts (temperature prediction), art forecasts (presale price estimate) or financial forecast
(earnings per share estimate). Year is the 4-digit number of the respective year between 1999
and 2010. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Data sources: MeteoSwiss, I/B/E/S, www.artron.net
